United States District Court, D. Maryland
L. Hollander United States District Judge
December 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned civil
rights Complaint. ECF 1. On January 31, 2018, the court
received five motions from Plaintiff. ECF 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant
Plaintiff's first Motion to Amend, ECF 7; deny, without
prejudice, Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, ECF 11;
and deny Plaintiff's remaining motions, i.e.,
ECF 8, 9, 10.
Motions to Amend
first motion to amend, Plaintiff seeks to add
“WCI/NCBI” and Warden “R. Graham” as
Defendants. ECF 7. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading
is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever
all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party's written consent or the court's
leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 dictates that
“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Id. Although the time frame under
Rule 15(a)(1)(A) has expired, and the time frame under Rule
15(a)(1)(B) has not yet been triggered, the court concludes
that amendment would neither prejudice the Defendants nor
cause a significant delay in the proceedings.
also filed a second motion to amend in which he asserts that
he timely requested that prison officials forward funds from
his inmate account to satisfy this court's Order to pay
the $50 administrative fee by January 4, 2018. See
ECF 2 at 1. But, he claims that prison officials failed to
promptly act on his request. ECF 10. As with Plaintiff's
first Motion to Amend, this Motion was not filed within the
time frame provided under Rule 15. Unlike the first Motion,
however, Plaintiff's second Motion to Amend does not
appear to relate to the underlying Complaint. Rather, this
Motion appears directed at ensuring that the court does not
dismiss his case for failure to timely pay the filing fee.
See ECF 2 at 1 (informing Plaintiff that failure to
pay the filing fee by January 4, 2018 “may result in
dismissal of the Complaint without further notice and without
court acknowledges Plaintiff's concerns. However, the
court has received the filing fee and notes that the case is
proceeding. Accordingly, the court will deny the second
motion to amend.
Motions for Injunctive Relief
has filed a self-styled “Motion for Reparative
Injunction, ” in which he requests that this court
“return petitioner to [Roxbury Correctional
Institution], and restore the plaintiff's property lost,
job, classification, housing assignment and back pay and days
to October 31st of 2017. And to allow this petition to
continue on its merits without further unfair interference
from DPSCS/RCI.” ECF 8. In another filing titled
“Motion of ex pate [sic] injunction, ” Plaintiff
asks this court to order that DPSCS stop
“transfer[r]ing Petitioner from prison to prison. For
no other reason but because he dared to work on, since May of
2017 and file on 12-13-2017, The [sic] above petition.”
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90
(2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order must establish the following elements: (1)
a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of
suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the
party's favor; and (4) why the injunction is in the
public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Pashby v. Delia,
709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013). Each of these factors must
be separately considered and satisfied. Pashby, 709
F.3d at 320. A preliminary injunction is distinguished from a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) only by the
difference in notice to the nonmoving party and by the
duration of the injunction. U.S. Dep't of Labor v.
Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d 275, 281 n.1 (4th Cir.
2006) (comparing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) with Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)).
A preliminary injunction cannot issue without notice to the
nonmovant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).
the Defendants were not provided with advance notice of
Plaintiff's requests, Plaintiff's motions shall be
construed as requesting a TRO. At the outset, the Court notes
that Plaintiff's TRO motions are unrelated to the subject
of his Complaint, and thus have no connection to the
likelihood of success on the merits. In any event, even
assuming that the Complaint and the TRO motions are
intertwined, most of Plaintiff's requests in the TRO
motions fall beyond the scope of constitutional rights.
example, there is no constitutional right for an inmate to be
housed in a particular institution, at a particular custody
or classification level, or in a particular section or unit
of a correctional institution. Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (holding that the due process clause
does not “protect a duly convicted prisoner against
transfer from one institution to another within the state
prison system”); Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590,
594 (4th Cir. 1994) (no constitutional right to a
“particular security or custody status”); see
also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)
(concluding that protected liberty interests are generally
limited to freedom from restraint that imposes atypical and
significant hardship on inmate in relation to “ordinary
incidents” of prison life).
“[p]risoners . . . do not have a constitutionally
protected right to work while incarcerated, or to remain in a
particular job once assigned.” Pinkett v.
Crowder, ELH-13-2509, 2014 WL 3571802, at *13 (D. Md.
July 18, 2014) (citing Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d
812, 815 (4th Cir. 1978); Awalt v. Whalen, 809
F.Supp. 414, 416-17 (E.D. Va. 1992)). And, unless a prisoner
identifies a statutory entitlement to good time or diminution
credit (which Plaintiff fails to do here), he does not have a
right to accrue good time credit prospectively.
Blankumsee v. Galley, PWG-15-837, 2016 WL 270073, at
*7 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2016) (“Inmates generally have no
liberty interest in . . . earning diminution credits”).
Accordingly, even if Plaintiff could make a showing of the
TRO requirements, it is not within this court's authority