United States District Court, D. Maryland
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
pending and ready for resolution are: (1) a motion to vacate
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Petitioner
Terrin Anderson (“Petitioner”) (ECF No. 69); (2)
a motion for production of documents filed by Petitioner (ECF
No. 70); and (3) a motion to amend filed by Petitioner (ECF
No. 71). The issues have been briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, the motions to vacate sentence,
for production of documents, and to amend will be denied.
series of eight controlled buys from April 2011 to January
2012, Petitioner sold over 300 grams of cocaine base to
agents of the United States government. (ECF No. 72, at 1).
On June 6, 2013, law enforcement executed a search warrant
and an arrest warrant. They searched Petitioner's
residence at Indian Hills Place, Waldorf, Md. where a firearm
was found. Law enforcement arrested Petitioner at his
girlfriend's apartment at Promenade Place, Waldorf, Md.
(ECF No. 70, at 2).
was charged in an eight count indictment on August 19, 2013.
(ECF No. 72, at 1). On September 9, 2013, Petitioner's
counsel moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
search. The motion mistakenly stated that Petitioner had been
arrested at the Indian Hills residence. (ECF No. 34).
November 26, 2013, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of
distribution of 28 grams or more of cocaine base in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and one count of possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). As part of
his plea, Petitioner effectively agreed to withdraw the
motion to suppress. (ECF No. 75-4, at 11).
December 1, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 69).
With his motion to vacate, Petitioner attached a motion to
require production of documents related to the search
warrant, (ECF No. 70), and a motion for leave to amend once
the documents were produced (ECF No. 71). On January 30,
2015, the United States (“Respondent”) responded
and attached some of the documents Petitioner requested. (ECF
Motion to Vacate Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
asserts four grounds for relief in his motion to motion to
vacate. Petitioner raises three claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel related to the motion to suppress. (ECF
No. 69, at 5). Petitioner also alleges ineffective assistance
of counsel and a violation of due process because Petitioner
did not understand he was waiving his rights to see evidence
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) when he pled guilty. (Id.).
Standard of Review
eligible for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
“sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255(a). A pro se movant, such as
Petitioner, is entitled to have his arguments reviewed with
appropriate consideration. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1151-53 (4th Cir. 1978). But if the
§ 2255 motion, along with the files and records of the
case, conclusively shows that he is not entitled to relief, a
hearing on the motion is unnecessary and the claims raised in
the motion may be dismissed summarily. 28 U.S.C. §
Motion to Suppress
argues that counsel's performance was defective because
the suppression motion misstated where he was arrested and
did not cite any specific evidence in support of the request
for a Franks hearing. (ECF No. 69, 6-7).
prevail on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Petitioner needs first to show that “counsel's
efforts were objectively unreasonable when measured against
prevailing professional norms. Second, the [Petitioner] must
demonstrate that counsel's performance, if deficient, was
also prejudicial. This generally requires the [Petitioner] to
demonstrate by a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Frazer v. South Carolina, 430
F.3d 696, 703 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal citations
omitted). In evaluating objective unreasonableness, “a
court must indulge ...