United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Presently
pending and ready for resolution in this defamation case is
the motion to remand filed by Plaintiff Alicia Byrd. (ECF No.
19). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, the motion to remand will be
denied.
I.
Background
On
September 27, 2017, Plaintiff commenced this action against
Defendants Bishop William P. DeVeaux, Sr., Washington
Conference Second Episcopal District African Methodist
Episcopal Church (“Washington Conference”), and
General Conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Church
(“General Conference”), in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County, Maryland. (ECF No. 2). On
November 3, African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc.
(“AMEC”) removed the action from the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County, stating that it was
incorrectly named by Plaintiff as “General Conference
of the African Methodist Episcopal
Church.”[1] (ECF No. 1). On December 1, Plaintiff
filed the pending motion to remand, arguing that removal was
untimely and that AMEC is not a proper defendant. (ECF No.
19, at 4). Defendants filed a joint opposition (ECF No. 22),
and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 24).
II.
Standard of Review
28
U.S.C. § 1441 allows defendants to remove an action
“brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction.”
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), district courts have
original jurisdiction “of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and is between . . .
citizens of different States.”
The
standard of review applicable to motions to remand depends on
whether the defect at issue is merely procedural or raises
concerns as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
Deficiencies in the jurisdictional allegations in a notice of
removal are procedural errors and may be challenged by motion
within thirty days of removal. Doe v. Blair, 819
F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 2016); Ellenburg v.
Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192,
197-98 (4th Cir. 2008). Further, jurisdictional
allegations in a notice of removal need not “meet a
higher pleading standard than the one imposed on a plaintiff
in drafting an initial complaint.” Ellenburg,
at 200 (“[J]ust as a plaintiff's complaint
sufficiently establishes diversity jurisdiction if it alleges
that the parties are of diverse citizenship and that the
matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, the sum specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, so too
does a removing party's notice of removal sufficiently
establish jurisdictional grounds for removal by making
jurisdictional allegations in the same manner.”);
Cunningham v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 669 F.Supp.2d
624, 627 (D.Md. 2009) (“Where a defendant seeks to
remove a case to federal court, the defendant must simply
allege subject matter jurisdiction in his notice of
removal.”). Concerns as to the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the court or
parties, and a district court must remand any case in which
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
506 (2006).
In
considering a motion to remand, the court must
“strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all
doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court.”
Richardson v. Philip Morris Inc., 950 F.Supp. 700,
702 (D.Md. 1997) (citations omitted). This standard reflects
the reluctance of federal courts “to interfere with
matters properly before a state court.” Id. at
701. When challenged in a motion to remand, the burden is on
the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction to prove by a
preponderance of evidence the facts necessary to establish
the court's jurisdiction. Vest v. RSC Lexington,
LLC, 2016 WL 6646419, at *7 (D.S.C. Nov. 10, 2016).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff
argues that removal was improper in this case because (1) the
removing party, AMEC, is not a proper defendant; (2) removal
was untimely; and (3) complete diversity does not exist. (ECF
No. 9).
A.
Proper Defendant
Plaintiff
argues in her motion to remand that, according to The
Doctrine and Discipline of the African Methodist Episcopal
Church, “[AMEC] is not the entity that this
lawsuit should be filed against” (ECF No. 19, at 6),
and that “bishops are assigned, employed and paid by
the General Conference not [AMEC]” (Id. at 7).
Plaintiff fails to provide any documentation or other
evidence to support her assertions.
In her
complaint, Plaintiff named General Conference of the African
Methodist Episcopal Church as a Defendant, and named Dr.
Jeffrey Cooper, its purported “General Secretary”
and “Chief Information Officer, ” to receive
service. Dr. Cooper received the summons and complaint on
October 4 or 5, 2017.[2] Dr. Cooper, who accepted service for
General Conference, attests in his declaration attached to
Defendants' joint opposition to Plaintiff's motion to
remand that he is the “General Secretary and Chief
Information Officer of AMEC, Inc., ” not the
General Conference. (ECF No. 22-1, at 2) (emphasis added). He
further attests that the “General Conference is not a
legal entity, ” and that “the proper entity to be
named is in fact AMEC, Inc.”[3] (Id. at 3).
In her
reply, Plaintiff argues that, according to The Doctrine
and Discipline, suit can only be brought against AMEC
for actions regarding real, personal, or mixed property and
that “[s]ubsequently, [AMEC] is not a proper party in a
matter that is a claim for false light invasion of
privacy.” (ECF No. 24, at 8-9). Not only has Plaintiff
failed to provide any documentation in support of her
assertions, but moreover, “an argument raised for the
first time in a reply brief or memorandum will not be
considered.” Clawson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.,
Inc., 451 F.Supp.2d 731, 734 (D.Md. 2006). Therefore,
...