United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Paula
Xinis, United States District Judge
Pending
before the Court in this employment discrimination case are
two motions: a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Board of
Education of Calvert County (“the Board”) (ECF
No. 3), and a motion for leave to amend the Complaint filed
by Plaintiff Victoria Karol (“Karol”) (ECF No.
8). The issues are fully briefed and the Court now rules
pursuant to Local Rule 105.6 because no hearing is necessary.
The Court GRANTS the Board's motion, ECF No. 3, and
DENIES Karol's motion, ECF No. 8.
I.
BACKGROUND
Karol
brings this action against her employer, the Board, alleging
gender discrimination under a theory of disparate treatment
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII)
(Count I), age discrimination under a theory of disparate
treatment in violation of the Age Discrimination Employment
Act (ADEA) (Count II), retaliation in violation of Title VII
(Count III), and discrimination under a theory of hostile
work environment in violation of Title VII (Count IV).
According
to the Complaint, Karol, who was born in 1956, was hired by
the Board in 1978. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at
¶¶ 9, 10. In May 2013, the Board selected Karol as
the Acting Director of Human Resources, and in May 2014, she
became Director of Human Resources. Karol remained in that
position until she became Director of Strategic Partnership
Community Engagement. Compl. ¶¶ at 10, 45.
The
Complaint centers on the actions of Karol's supervisor,
Anthony Navarro, and her second-level supervisor, Dr. Daniel
Curry. See Compl. at ¶ 13. Karol alleges that
Navarro harassed and intimidated her by: (1) seeking the
input of a retired Maryland State Policeman and detective
about Human Resources' new-hire fingerprinting procedure
instead of adopting Karol's recommended course of action;
(2) denying Karol's request to attend a conference on the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), even though attendance would
enhance her job performance; (3) relying on an outside
consultant instead of Karol regarding ACA compliance issues;
(4) denying Karol's staffing requests; and (5) requiring
Karol to attend bi-weekly staff meetings without making
subordinate male employees do the same. Id. at
¶¶ 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23. Karol also asserts that
Navarro “fabricated” complaints about the quality
of her work and one time yelled at her, “Do you see
this, do you see this? What about this don't you
understand?” while pounding his fists on the table.
Id. at ¶ 17. As to Dr. Curry, Karol asserts
that she was told by Curry that if she complained of
Navarro's treatment, she would be reassigned to a
different position without Karol having input as to the new
position. Id. at ¶ 26. Karol also claims that
Curry refused to consider her re-application to be Director
of Human Resources after her transfer. Id. at ¶
¶ 27, 45.
The
Board moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), arguing that the complained-of treatment, even if
true, fails to make out adverse employment action under Title
VII or the ADEA discrimination or retaliation claims. Nor was
the treatment, as pleaded, motivated by gender. ECF No. 3-1
at 7, 11, 16. Karol has opposed the motion and, in the
alternative, moved to amend her Complaint. ECF Nos. 7, 8. The
Court addresses each motion in turn.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) properly is granted when the
complaint does not include sufficient factual allegations to
render the plaintiff's claims facially plausible or
permit reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the alleged misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In so assessing, the Court takes as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations and makes all
reasonable inferences in the favor of the plaintiff.
Phillips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 1999). The Court does not credit conclusory
statements or a plaintiff's legal conclusions, even when
the plaintiff purports them to be allegations of fact.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678-79; Giarrantano v.
Jonson, 520 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). From the
facts averred, the Court must be able to infer “more
than the mere possibility of misconduct”; the complaint
must contain factual pleadings that show the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. See Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 126 F.Supp.3d 521, 526 (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678).[1]
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Disparate Treatment (Counts I, II)
To
sustain disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the
ADEA, a plaintiff must show that she was a member of a
protected class (or is over the age of 40), that her employer
took an adverse employment action against her, that her job
performance was satisfactory, and that similarly situated
employees outside the protected class (or under 40) received
more favorable treatment. See Cepada v. Bd. Of Educ. of
Baltimore Cty., 814 F.Supp.2d 500, 510, 512 (D. Md.
2011). Adverse employment actions are those which affect the
terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. See Munday
v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th
Cir. 1997). Notably, not all undesirable employment actions
are considered adverse under the law. In the context
of job transfer, “absent any decrease in compensation,
job title, level of responsibility, or opportunity for
promotion, reassignment to a new position commensurate with
one's salary level does not constitute an adverse
employment action even if the new job does cause some modest
stress not present in the old position.” Holland v.
Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256-57
(4th Cir.1999); Johnson v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 397 F.Supp.2d 688, 697 (M.D. N.C. 2005),
aff'd, 205 Fed.Appx. 152 (4th Cir. 2006)
(imposition of additional duties is not an adverse employment
action).
The
Board is correct that Karol's claims must fail because
she has not alleged a sufficiently adverse employment
action.[2] Perhaps the closest factual averment is
her reassignment from the position of Director of Human
Resources to another director-level position. But in no way
does Karol assert this reassignment was adverse. She has not,
for example, alleged facts supporting a decrease in pay,
diminished opportunities for promotion, adverse working
conditions, or decreased responsibility as a result of the
transfer.
Similarly,
the actions preceding her transfer, such as not sending Karol
to a job-related conference, compelling her attendance at
staff meetings, or soliciting advice of others, cannot
plausibly be construed as affecting the terms, conditions or
benefits of her employment. Karol, therefore, has failed to
sufficiently plead that the ...