United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Allen Holliday (“Plaintiff” or
“Holliday”), an African-American male, filed this
four-count Complaint against Defendant Board of Education for
Anne Arundel County (“Board” or
“Defendant”), asserting claims for retaliation,
breach of contract, and declaratory judgment stemming from
his filing of charges of discrimination with the Maryland
Commission on Civil Rights (“Commission”) and
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 13-1.)
Currently pending before this Court is Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8), [1] Plaintiff's
Motion to Strike the Reply to the Response (ECF No. 11), and
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 13). The parties' submissions have
been reviewed, and no hearing is necessary. See
Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons stated below,
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion
to Strike the Reply to the Response (ECF No. 11) is DENIED.
Further, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 8) is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN
PART.[2]Specifically, this Court denies
Defendant's Motion as to Counts I-III but grants
Defendant's Motion as to Count IV.
BACKGROUND
When
reviewing a Motion to Dismiss, this Court accepts as true the
facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. See Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (2011). Plaintiff Allen
Holliday, an African-American male, has been a maintenance
mechanic with the Anne Arundel County school system since
2010. (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 13-1 at ¶¶ 2-4,
15.) The maintenance department has over twenty maintenance
staff. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff claims that at
the time of his hire and throughout his first year, he
noticed that more African-American employees were tasked with
roof work than white employees, a harder assignment due to
elevated height, dirty materials, and exposure to the
elements (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.) Further, he
noticed that promotion practices favored white employees.
(Id. at ¶ 20.) When Holliday complained about
these alleged unfair practices, he claims that he “did
not get help, ” but rather became known as a trouble
maker and one who complained about discriminatory work
environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-23.) In
addition to complaining about unfair practices generally,
Plaintiff also made a complaint alleging that he himself was
denied a promotion due to his race. (Id. at ¶
22.) In 2013, he filed a Charge of racial discrimination with
the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (“Maryland
Commission”) about the racially discriminatory
practices (“2013 Charge”). (Id. at
¶ 24.)
Sometime
after Plaintiff filed the 2013 Charge, the Maryland
Commission conducted an onsite investigation which involved
interviewing five to six of Holliday's co-workers.
(Id. at ¶ 26.) After the investigation, a
co-worker told Plaintiff that he was upset Plaintiff filed
the 2013 Charge, Plaintiff heard gossip about the Charge, and
Plaintiff “began to receive regular dirty looks and
also received verbal threats.” (Id.) Further,
Plaintiff claims that while at headquarters, groups of
co-workers yelled “snitch” at him numerous times.
(Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff also heard co-workers
say “snitches get stitches.” (Id. at
¶ 28.) At a departmental meeting in 2015, a co-worker
went as far to write “Snitch's Get Stiches
[sic]” on the meeting board. (Id. at ¶
29.) A presiding manager who was present at the meeting did
nothing in response. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32.)
Plaintiff subsequently complained about this “written
retaliatory public threat” to his supervisor.
(Id. at ¶ 33.)
Around
the summer of 2015, Plaintiff was removed from his
maintenance positon and put on a floor crew. (Id. at
¶ 36.) In his experience, those working floor crew had a
substantial background in the work, which Plaintiff did not.
(Id. at ¶ 42.) When he asked why he was
transferred, a manager told him that it was in part because
he had signed up for a particular shift schedule.
(Id. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff told both his
supervisors and an individual in Human Resources that he
never signed up for the particular shift and that he did not
want to be assigned to floor crew. (Id. at ¶
38.) Despite his objections, he remained on floor crew.
(Id. at ¶ 39.) Due to the nature of the work,
Plaintiff claims that he started noticing knee problems,
including bilateral knee osteoarthritis and/or right knee
medial meniscus. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.) He
brought in doctors' notes to substantiate these injuries
and support his requests to be moved off of floor crew.
(Id. at ¶ 45.) Despite his repeated requests,
Plaintiff worked on floor crew through March of 2016.
(Id. at ¶ 46.)
During
his time in this assignment, Plaintiff claims that he was
harassed by two, Caucasian onsite supervisors, one of which
had been interviewed by the Maryland Commission related to
Plaintiff's 2013 Charge. (Id. at ¶ 47.) The
harassment consisted of the supervisors leaving banana peels
and chicken bones on the hood of Plaintiff's vehicle up
to ten times in 2015 and 2016, which Plaintiff understood as
racist, taunting symbols. (Id. at ¶¶
47-52.) Because his vehicle was parked in public areas or at
public school facilities, the “symbolic harassment and
litter” was visible to the public, including children.
(Id. at ¶ 52.) Plaintiff claims that this
“retaliatory hostile work environment altered the
conditions of employment and made it difficult to work, to
succeed, and to maintain employment.” (Id. at
¶ 53.) In 2016, Plaintiff's knee condition worsened
and caused him to quit his second, part-time job.
(Id. at ¶ 56.) In addition, during all of this
time he claims that he was denied opportunities to work
overtime. (Id. at ¶ 58.)
On
March 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a second charge with the
Maryland Commission on Civil Rights and U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission for retaliation, racial
discrimination, and disability discrimination (“2016
Charge”). (ECF No. 5-2.) In May of 2016, the Plaintiff
and Defendant entered into a Pre-Determination Settlement
Agreement (“the Agreement”).[3] (ECF No. 5-1.) On
March 29, 2017, Plaintiff brought the instant suit alleging
retaliation under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and
Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”),
Md. Code, State Gov't §§ 20-266(a) (Counts I,
II); breach of contract (Count III); and seeking a
declaratory judgment (Count IV). After Defendant filed a
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4), Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint, (ECF No. 5). Defendant subsequently filed a Motion
to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8), to which
Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 9) and Defendant a Reply
to the Response (ECF No. 10). Currently pending before this
Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 8), Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the
Reply to the Response (ECF No. 11), and Plaintiff's
Motion for Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No.
13), which Defendant opposes (ECF No. 14).
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
I.
Motion to Amend
A
plaintiff may amend his or her complaint once “as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served” or “by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Rule
15(a) requires that leave “shall be freely given when
justice so requires.” Id. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that Rule 15
“gives effect to the federal policy in favor of
resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them
on technicalities.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d
404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006). Notwithstanding this liberal
standard, a district court may deny leave to amend
“when the amendment would be prejudicial to the
opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad faith, or
the amendment would be futile.” Equal Rights Center
v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir.
2010); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962) (“In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . .
. undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the
leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely
given.'”). “Whether an amendment is
prejudicial will often be determined by the nature of the
amendment and its timing.” Harvey, 438 F.3d at
427.
II.
Motion to Dismiss
A
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by
Rule 12(b)(6), which authorizes the dismissal of a complaint
if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6)
is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to
resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a
claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley
v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir.
2006); see also Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd.,
822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016). The sufficiency of a
complaint is assessed by reference to the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
684 (2009).
ANALYSIS
I.
Motion to Amend
Holliday
filed the initial complaint on March 29, 2017. (ECF No. 1.)
After Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, he filed an
Amended Complaint on July 14, 2017. (ECF No. 5.) Defendant
subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 8), Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 9), and
Defendant filed a Reply to the Response (ECF No. 10.)
Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply
to the Response, “for introducing new legal argument in
a filed Reply without Plaintiff having an ability to
respond.” (ECF No. 11.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant argued for the first time that certain factual
allegations supporting Plaintiff's retaliation claims are
statutorily time barred. (Id.) On September 14,
2017, Plaintiff also filed a Motion to file a Second Amended
Complaint for similar reasons, explaining that the Second
Amended Complaint does not add any new legal claims but
rather addresses Defendant's statute of limitations
argument by distinguishing certain time periods. Defendant
argues that there is no legal basis to strike the Reply or
amend the pleadings.
The
Second Amended Complaint adds no new legal claims, but rather
adds labels to certain sections of the Complaint in order
“to separate the background facts before the actionable
period, from the actionable facts.” (ECF No. 13 at 2.)
In addition, discovery has not commenced in this case given
that it is at the motion to dismiss stage. Accordingly, the
amendment will not be prejudicial to the Defendant. Further,
the record shows no bad faith on behalf of Plaintiff and as
explained below, the amendment is not futile given that this
Court is denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's retaliation and breach of contract claims.
See Equal Rights Center v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602
F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a district
court may deny leave to amend “when the amendment would
be prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has
acted in bad faith, or the amendment would be futile”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint is (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED and
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Reply to the Response
(ECF No. 11) is DENIED.
II.Motion to ...