United States District Court, D. Maryland
DEBRA F. MEADOWS
CHARLES COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
pending and ready for resolution in this employment case is
the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, for summary judgment, and for judgment on the
pleadings filed by Defendant Keller Transportation, Inc.
(“Defendant”). (ECF No. 75). The issues have been
briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the
motion will be granted.
complaint is not a model of clarity. Plaintiff lives in
federally subsidized housing with her children, started
working for Defendant in 2011, and suffers from dyslexia.
(ECF No. 1, at 7-8). Although not stated in the complaint,
she stated in the EEOC charge that she is Jewish. (ECF No.
alleges that Defendant changed her status from employee to
independent contractor for the purposes of her 2015 tax
refund. Plaintiff further alleges that she incurred a debt
related to her housing after Defendant misreported her income
and misclassified her and her daughter as “border[s]
and migrant workers.” (ECF No. 1, at 7). She also
alleges that Defendant did not give her vacation leave or
sick leave and refused to pay her for work she had done
during the 2015 school year. She alleges that Defendant put
her in a “group [i]nsurance [p]ool[.]”
March 26, 2015, Plaintiff contacted her Congressman to
explain the problem she was having with her taxes. (ECF No.
1-1, at 6-7). Plaintiff was injured on November 2, 2015, and
she quit working for Defendant on February 26, 2016. (ECF No.
1, at 7-8).
filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on June 2, 2016, alleging
that her former employer, Keller Transportation, Inc.,
discriminated against her on the basis of religion, national
origin, and disability when it changed the way it deducted
taxes from her paycheck, did not compensate her for time
worked, and denied her leave. (ECF No. 75-5). The EEOC issued
her a right to sue notice on June 15. (ECF No. 1, at 6).
Plaintiff filed suit on August 18 against Defendant, Helen
Keller, the Charles County Board of Education (the
“Board”), and “Keller Jr[.] Keller III
Ernest Bus Service Inc., ” alleging discrimination on
the basis of disability, religion, and national origin in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq.
Plaintiff also alleged retaliation. (Id. at 5).
November 23, Ms. Keller moved to dismiss all claims against
her. (ECF No. 22). The Board moved for summary judgment on
March 1, 2017. (ECF No. 48). On June 16, the court granted
Ms. Keller's motion to dismiss and the Board's motion
for summary judgment. (ECF No. 67). Because “Keller
Jr[.] Keller III Ernest Bus Service Inc.” was never
properly identified and served by Plaintiff, it was dismissed
on July 6. (ECF No. 70). After discovery closed, Keller
Transportation, Inc., the only remaining defendant, moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for summary
judgment, or for judgment on the pleadings on August 21. (ECF
No. 75). Plaintiff has not responded, despite receiving
notice of the opportunity and necessity to respond. (ECF No.
76); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1975).
Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
Standard of Review
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are
governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction properly
exists in the federal court. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins
Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642,
647 (4th Cir. 1999). In a 12(b)(1) motion, the
court “may consider evidence outside the
pleadings” to help determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the case before it. Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United
States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991);
see also Evans, 166 F.3d at 647. The court should
grant the 12(b)(1) motion “only if the material
jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party
is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768.