United States District Court, D. Maryland
L. Hollander United States District Judge.
Price (“Petitioner”) and six others were indicted
on July 17, 2013 (ECF 1), on charges involving conspiracy to
distribute oxycodone, possession with intent to distribute,
and health care fraud. Price entered a plea of guilty on May
9, 2014, to the charge of Conspiracy to Distribute and
Possess with Intent to Distribute Oxycodone, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. ECF 148; ECF 150 (Plea Agreement). On
September 9, 2014, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 60
months' imprisonment. ECF 198; ECF 201 (Judgment).
Petitioner did not note an appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See Docket.
September 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct a Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255. ECF 238 (the “Petition”). Price signed the
Petition on September 19, 2016. Id. In her Petition,
Price claims she is entitled to relief pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551');">135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The government has moved
to dismiss the Petition on the ground that it was untimely
filed. ECF 241. Alternatively, the government argues that
Price is not entitled to relief. Price has replied. ECF 246.
She argues that her Petition is timely because
Johnson “did not become retroactive until the
Supreme Court issued an opinion in Welch [v.
United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1257
(2016)].” Welch was decided April 18, 2016.
addition, Price moved to stay this matter, pending the
Supreme Court's decision in Beckles v. United
States. ECF 250. See Beckles v. United States,
___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017). The government opposed
that Motion (ECF 253) and Price replied. ECF 357. Given that
the Supreme Court decided Beckles, 137 S.Ct. 886, in
March 2017, I shall deny ECF 250 as moot.
hearing is necessary to resolve the Petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2255(b). For the reasons that follow, I shall
dismiss the Petition.
Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135
S.Ct. 255, on June 26, 2015. In Johnson, the Court
invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal
Act (“ACCA”), ruling that the definition of a
“violent felony” was unconstitutionally vague.
Id. at 2555-2558. The Court determined that the
residual clause “did not articulate clearly how to
evaluate the risks of injury posed by a crime, depriving
defendants of fair notice regarding their potential sentence
and inviting 'arbitrary enforcement by
judges.'” United States v. Winston, 850
F.3d 667, 680 (4th Cir. Mar. 13, 2017) (explaining and
quoting Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557).
in Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct.
1257, 1264-685 (2016), the Supreme Court made clear that
Johnson announced a new substantive rule of
constitutional law, which applies retroactively on collateral
review. In Beckles, however, the Supreme Court
determined that the advisory sentencing guidelines are not
subject to Johnson challenges.
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), a one-year
limitation period applies to petitions under § 2255,
which runs from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the