United States District Court, D. Maryland
CLIFTON S. RYLAND Petitioner
STATE OF MARYLAND Respondent
FREDERICK MOTZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
response to the above-entitled petition for writ of habeas
corpus, respondent asserts that the petition must be
dismissed because petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies
and his claim is procedurally defaulted. ECF 5. Petitioner
was provided an opportuntty to file a reply, but filed
nothing further. ECF 8. There is no need for a hearing to
resolve the matters pending. See Rule 8(a),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016);
see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir.
2000) (petitioner not entitled to a hearing under 28 U.S.C.
g2254(e)(2)). For the reasons that follow, the petition is
dismissed without prejudice and a certificate of
appealability shall not issue.
petition concerns Clifton T. Rylandss allegation that his
Maryland parole was revoked for a "technical"
violation. ECF I at p. 8. Ryland states he was told by his
Maryland parole agent that "he was no longer
[Ryland's] agent" and that his case was closed out.
Id. He claims that the "Charles Co.
Courthouse" ordered him to report to the District of
Columbia, where Ryland reported to a parole agent for 90
days. Id. He states that he was never advised by the
Charles County parole officer that he must report and had not
heard anything from them until he was arrested at his parole
agent's office in D.C. Id.
states that on November 18, 2014, Ryland filed a petition for
judicial review of the Parole Commissionss decision to revoke
his release in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. ECF 5 at
Ex. 1 (docket entries); Ex. 2 (Petition for Judicial Review);
Ex. 3 (Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Review). On
December 12, 2014, the Parole Commission filed a motion to
dismiss the petition as untimely because it had been filed
past the thirty-day filing deadline. Id. at Ex. 4
and 5. Ryland did not oppose the motion to dismiss and, by
order dated January 27, 2015, the petition for judicial
review was dismissed as untimely. Id. at Ex. 6.
filing a federal habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C.
S2254, a petitioner must show that all of his claims have
been presented to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. S2254(b) and
(c); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
491 (1973). This exhaustion requirement is satisfied by
seeking review of the claim in the highest state court with
jurisdiction to consider it. In order for a state prisoner to
satisfy the exhaustion requiremen, he must have fairly
presented both the same legal claims and the same supporting
facts to each of the appropriate state courts. Gray v.
Netherlands 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 364-66 (1995) (per curiam);
Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561, 573 (4th Cir 1997);
Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d 158, 161-62 (4th Cir.
1996); Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th
Cir. 1994). "Where questions concerning exhaustion
arise, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstraiing that
state remedies have, in fact, been exhausted."
Mallory , 27 F.3d at 994.
petitioner has failed to present a claim to the highest state
court with jurisdiction to hear it the procedural default
doctrine applies. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 749-50 (1991) (failure to note timely appeal);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489-91 (1986)
(failure to raise claim on direct appeal); Murch v.
Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 46 (1972) (failure to raise claim
during post-conviction); Bradley v. Davis, 551
F.Supp. 479, 481 (D. Md. 1982) (failure to seek leave to
appeal denial of post-conviction relief). A procedural
default also may occur where a state court declines "to
consider the merits [of a claim] on the basis of an adequate
and independent state procedural rule." Yeatts v.
Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 1999).
Fourth Circuit has explained:
If a state court clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of
a habeas petitionerss claim on a state procedural rule, and
that procedural rule provides an independent and adequate
ground for the dismissal, the habeas petitioner has
procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). A
procedural default also occurs when a habeas petitioner fails
to exhaust available state remedies and "the court to
which the petitioner would be required to present his claims
in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find
the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998).
procedural default has occurred, a federal court may not
address the merits of a state prisoner's habeas claim
unless the petitioner can show (1) both cause for the default
and prejudice that would result from failing to consider the
claim on the merits, or (2) that failure to consider the
claim on the merits would result in a miscarriage of justice,
i.e. the conviction of one who is actually innocent.
See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);
Breard, 134 F.3d at 620. "Cause" consists
of "some objective factor external to the defense [that]
impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in state
court at the appropriate time." Id. (quoting
Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Even where a petitioner
fails to show cause and prejudice for a procedural default, a
court must still consider whether it should reach the merits
of a petitionerss claims in order to prevent a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
noted, Ryland failed to properly pursue appellate review of
the parole revocation decision issued by the Parole
Commission when he did not file a timely appeal and did not
oppose the motion to dismiss. No merits review occurred in
the state court due to Rylandss failure to file a timely
appeal. See Md. Rule 7-206(b) ("transcript of
testimony and all exhibits and other papers filed in agency
proceeding" included in record for judicial review of
administrative agency decisions). Because no merits review
occurred and Ryland is now barred from obtaining such a
review, it is impossible for this court to determine if the
state court decided a question of law in an unreasonable
manner in reviewing the revocation decision. See Green v.
French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998). Any attempt
by Ryland now to obtain such a review would result in another
dismissal of the state court action as untimely. See
Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs., S7-401(f)(1) (appeal of parole
revocation decision must be filed within 30 days of the date
the written decision is received). The petition must be
district court dismisses a habeas petition solely on
procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not
issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both "(1)
'that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right' and (2) 'that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.'" Rouse v.
Lee,252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Slack