United States District Court, D. Maryland
William M. Nickerson, Senior United States District Judge
response to the above-captioned civil rights complaint,
Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF
25. Plaintiff was advised by letter from the Clerk of his
right to file an Opposition Response and of the consequences
of failing to do so. ECF 26. In response, Plaintiff filed two
pieces of correspondence (ECF 27 & 28), neither of which
address the assertions raised by Defendant. Rather, Plaintiff
appears to accuse the Clerk or this Court of siding with
Defendant and claims he has been unfairly denied counsel and
improperly ordered to pay the filing fee pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1915. Id. No hearing is required to
resolve the matters pending. See Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. 2016). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's
motion shall be granted and the complaint dismissed without
complaint, Plaintiff Shamar Anderson, an inmate committed to
the custody of the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services and confined to Western Correctional
Institution (WCI), asserts that on March 11, 2014, while he
was confined at Maryland Correctional Institution Jessup
(MCIJ), he was assaulted by Akhere Okojie, a correctional
officer. ECF 1 at p. 4. Anderson states that Okojie punched
him in the face while another higher ranking officer was
escorting Anderson to segregation. Id. He further
claims that Okojie's coworkers, who Anderson does not
name, "almost killed me with [mace]." Id.
Anderson explains that two and one-half cans of mace were
deployed and some of it went into Anderson's mouth and
nose. Id. He claims his "skin was red hot,
burning up." Id.
relief, Anderson seeks monetary damages in the amount of $25,
600 and cites pain and suffering, loss of school time, and
fees required for medical sick call slips. Id.
reviewing the complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) the court accepts all
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and
construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived
therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420
(4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra
v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v.
Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26
(4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint
need only satisfy the "simplified pleading
standard" of Rule 8(a)).
Supreme Court of the United States explained a
"plaintiffs obligation to provide the
"grounds" of his "entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the
complaint does not need "detailed factual
allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 555. Instead, "once a claim has been
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint."
Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, "a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]'
- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief"
Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563
(citing Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology,
Inc., 40 F.3d, 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994)) (once a claim
for relief has been stated, a plaintiff 'receives the
benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are
consistent with the complaint').
of Administrative Remedies
raises the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion and asserts
the complaint must be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1997e. ECF 25 at pp. 4-7. Inmates are required to
exhaust "such administrative remedies as are
available" before filing an action. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a), see also Ross v. Blake, U.S., 136 S.Ct.
1850, 1858 (2016) (An inmate "must exhaust available
remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones."). The
statute provides in pertinent part that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such ...