United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
SHEET METAL WORKERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 100 WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA PENSION FUND, et al., Plaintiffs,
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, Defendants.
J. HAZEL, United States District Judge
action. Plaintiffs, the Sheet METAL Workers' Local Union
No. 100 (the "Union""). Sheet Metal
Workers' Local Union No. 100 Washington. D.C. Area
Pension Fund. Sheet Metal Workers' Local Union No. 100
401 (k) Fund. Sheet Metal Workers' Local Union No. 100
Washington. D.C. Area Apprenticeship Fund, Sheet Metal
Workers" Local Union No. 100 Washington. D.C. Area
Vacation Fund, and Sheet Metal Workers' Local Union No.
100 Washington. D.C. Area Health Fund (collectively.
"Benefit Funds") seek to recover on a fringe
benefit bond on which Defendant. Western Surety Company
("Western Surely"), is the surety. Currently
pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for
Scheduling Order. ECF No. 38. No hearing is necessary to
resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.).
For the reasons that follow. Plaintiffs Motion is denied.
Court thoroughly summarized the tactual and procedural
background of this suit in its May 17. 2016 Memorandum
Opinion on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
See BCF No. 35 at 2-8.A brief summary of the relevant
Sheet Metal, Inc. ("United") was a sheet m
subcontractor that employed members of the Union on various
construction projects. Id. at 2. In July 2009. the
Union and United entered into a collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA") under which United agreed to pay
set amounts to the Benefit funds. Id. These funds
were to be governed in accordance with the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 et seq.,
and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 el
seq. The CBA also required that United post a bond to
ensure the satisfaction of its requirements under the CBA.
Id., at 3. On September 1. 2011. Defendant issued a
Contractors Fringe Benefits Bond (the "Bond") in
the amount of $500, 000 naming United as its principal and
the Union and Benefit Funds as its obliges. Id., In
late 2013 and early 2014, United became delinquent on
multiple payments, and ultimately ceased all operations in
March 2014. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs sent multiple
letters to Defendant requesting payment on the Bond, and
ultimately filed this suit when Western Surety refused to
remit any payment on Plaintiffs' bond claim.
Id., at 8.
7. 2015. this Court entered a Scheduling Order for this suit.
ECF No. 20. The Scheduling Order specified that "the
schedule will not be changed except for good cause."
Id. at 1. As part of this Scheduling Order, the
Court directed that all "Dispositive pretrial
motions" would be filed by October 19. 2015.
Id. at 2. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on October 19, 2015, alleging that they were
entitled to judgment on Western Surety's liability. ECF
No. 30. The Court granted in part and denied in part that
motion on May 17. 2016. ECF No. 35. In its Memorandum
Opinion, the Court found that Western Surety is liable under
the Bond as a matter of law, but that there was insufficient
evidence to determine Plaintiffs" damages. Id.
at 26. Five months later, on October 25. 2016. Plaintiffs
submitted their Motion for Scheduling Order, asking the Court
to allow the Plaintiffs to submit a supplemental motion for
summary judgment. ECF No. 38. Specifically. Plaintiffs
contend that the Court should adopt a "burden-shifting
analysis." which would allow Plaintiffs to rely on
certain documents provided by United in assessing damages.
ECF No. 38-1 at 5. The Court interprets this request as being
either a Request for Reconsideration of its initial decision
on Plaintiffs" Motion for Summary Judgment. or a Request
for Extension of the tiling deadlines, as the deadline for
filing dispositive motions has passed. The Court addresses
Plaintiffs" motion under these two standards, and finds
it to be without merit under either standard.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motion to reconsider
motion to reconsider is appropriate to raise a significant
change in the law or I acts, or when "the Court has
patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision
outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the
parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of
apprehension. "" Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc. v.
Singh, 983 F.Supp.2d 632. 638 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting
Above the Bell. Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing. Inc., 99
F.R.D. 99. 101 (E.I). Va. 1983)). "A motion to
reconsider is inappropriate where it merely seeks to
re-debate the merits of a particular motion."
Remediation Products. Inc. v. Advcntiis Americas.
Inc., No. 3:07CV153-RJC-DCK. 2010 WL 2572555. at *1
(W.D. N.C. June 22. 2010). or merely request that the
district court change its mind. United States v.
Williams, 674 F.2d 310. 313 (4th Cir. 1982). "The
power to reconsider an order is 'committed to the
discretion of the district court.* In exercising this
discretion, courts must be sensitive to "concerns of
finality and judicial economy."' Asher &
Simons. P.A. v. j2 Glob. Canada, inc., 977 F.Supp.2d
544. 546-47 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting Am. Canoe Ass'n v.
Murphy Farms. Inc., 326 F.3d 505. 51 5 (4th Cir.2003)).
In this Court, "any motion to reconsider any order
issued by the Court shall be filed with the Clerk not later
than fourteen (14) days after entry of the order." Local
Rule 105.10 (D.Md. 2014).
Motion for extension of time
this Court's scheduling orders "must be obeyed
absent good cause." Wonasue v. Univ. of Md. Alumni
Ass'n., 2013 WL 5719004 (D. Md. Oct. 17. 2013).
"A court's scheduling order 'is not a frivolous
piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly
disregarded by counsel without peril."' Jams v.
Koons Auto., Inc., No. DKC-09-3362. 2013 WL 3713845. at
*8 (D. Md. July 15. 2013) (quoting Potomac Etec. Power
Co. v. Elec, Motor Supply. Inc., 190 F.R.D. 372. 376 (D.
Md. 1999)). After a deadline in a scheduling order has
expired, "the good cause standard must be
satisfied" to justify leave to file a dispositive
motion. Nourison Rux Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d
295. 298 (4th Cir. 2008). This requires more than simply
identifying a new argument that had not been previously
raised. See Id. The movant can satisfy the good
cause requirement only "by showing that, despite due
diligence, it could not have [filed the dispositive motion]
in a reasonably timely manner." Holliday v.
Holliday, No. 09-cv-01449-AW. 2012 WL 1409527. at *3 (D.
Md. Apr. 20, 2012). "Absent a showing of good cause,
untimely cross-motions for summary judgment are subject to
being stricken." Carter v. VNA, Inc., No.
GLR-12-868. 2013 WL 3967925. at *7(D. Md. July 30. 2013).
motion is without merit, whether it is assessed as a Motion
for Reconsideration or as a Motion for
Motion for ...