United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
J. HAZEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Angele Rose Reid ("Plaintiff or "Reid")
brings this pro se action against Ocwcn Loan
Servicing. LLC ("Defendant'') to quiet title
on the real property located at 2305 Norlinda
Avenue. Oxon Hill. Maryland 20745 ("the
Property") Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs
Emergency Stay Motion to Dismiss Foreclosure. ECF No. 4. and
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). LCF No. 12. A hearing is
unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For
the following reasons. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
granted, and Plaintiffs Emergency Stay Motion is thus denied
Court derives the following facts from Plaintiffs Complaint.
ECF No. 2. public land records, and judicial records from the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County and the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland. The Court may
consult these documents without converting the Motion to
Dismiss into one for Summary Judgment. See Sec'y
of State For Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484
F.3d 700. 705 (4th Cir. 2007) ("In reviewing the
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). we may properly
take judicial notice of matters of public record.");
Colonial Pern Ins. Co. v. Coil. 8871;.2d 1236. 1239
(4th Cir. 1989) (noting that "the most frequent use of
judicial notice of ascertainable facts is in noticing the
content of court records.") (internal citations
October 26. 2006. the Property was conveyed via Warranty Deed
from Reid to Cheryl R. Johnson. See ECF No. 12-3 at
To purchase the Property. Johnson obtained a purchase money
loan ("the Loan") from New Century Mortgage
Corporation for $403, 750.00 and executed a Deed of Trust
("the Deed of Trust"). See ECF No. 12-4 at
1-2. On June 29. 2015. the Deed of Trust was assigned to
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for
Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2007-BR1.
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates. Series 2007-BR1
("Deutsche Bank") at C/O Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC.
See ECF No. 12-5 at 1. Substitute Trustees initiated
foreclosure proceedings against Johnson in September 2015
following apparent default on the Loan. See WBGLMC v.
Johnson, CAFF15-26303 (Cir. Ct. Prince George's Cly.
Sept. 9, 2015) (the "Foreclosure
Property has traced a tortured history throughout the
Maryland courts. On June 16. 2011. Deutsche Bank filed suit
against Reid and Johnson in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County. Deutsche Bunk National Trust v.
Reid, CAF11-14694 (Cir. Ct. Prince George's Cty.
June 22. 2011) (the "First Lawsuit") Deutsche Bank
sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that Reid
had "no claim or recessionary interest in the Property
affecting Deutsche Bank's interest, " that "the
Deed of Trust is a valid and enforceable
interest/encumbrancc/lien against the Property." and
that "Deutsche Bank (as secured party under the Deed of
Trust) has superior, right, title, and interest." ECF
No. 12-6 at 5. In response, Reid filed counterclaims against
Deutsche Bank and cross-claims against Johnson, requesting
declaratory relief and an injunction for quiet title. In her
Cross and Counter Complaint. Reid specifically sought a
declaration that she "is the absolute owner of the
property." that "any deed recorded by defendant
Cheryl R. Johnson as a result of the purported transfer of
the property is void ab initio, " and that "[Reid]
has complete, sole, and uninterrupted ownership and rights in
the property .. ." ECF No. 12-7 at 23-24.
Order issued July 23, 2012. docketed on July 30. 2012. the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County ratified the
October 26. 2006 conveyance of the Property from Reid to
Johnson, held that the Deed of Trust is "a valid and
enforceable lien" against the Property, and ordered Reid
to vacate the Property within 15 days. ECF No. 12-8 at 1-2.
Reid's counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice.
Id. at 2. The Circuit Court denied Reid's
requests for reconsideration, and Reid appealed the decision
to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. See ECF
No. 12-9 at 2. Reid presented several questions for review,
including whether the Circuit Court erred by ratifying and
confirming the conveyance, or by ordering Reid to vacate the
Property. See Id. at 2-3. On June 4. 2014. the Court
of Special Appeals issued a thirteen-page opinion, affirming
the decision of the Circuit Court. See Id. at 3.
12. 2012. Reid filed suit against New Century Mortgage
Corporation a/k/a Deutsche Bank. Johnson, and others in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Reid v.
New Century Mortg. Corp., No. 8:12-CV-02083-AW. 2012 WL
6562887. at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 13. 2012) (the "Second
Lawsuit") Plaintiff Reid again requested declaratory
relief and an injunction for quiet title on the Property. ECF
No. 12-10 at 18-21. Specifically. Plaintiff sought a
declaration that "plaintiff enjoy undisturbed ownership
of the property." that "am deed recorded by Cheryl
Johnson as a result of the purported transfer of the property
is void ab initio." and that "plaintiff has
complete, sole and uninterrupted ownership and rights"
in the Property. Id. at 18-19. Defendants moved to
dismiss. The Court dismissed the claims against Deutsche Bank
on principles of res judicata. finding that "the [the
First Lawsuit] involved the same parties." and
Plaintiff's claims before it were "essentially
equivalent." ECF No. 12-11 at 5. In its opinion, the
Court also noted that allowing Plaintiff to litigate her
claims against Deutsche Bank would "unduly interfere
with the state court's resolution of what is. at bottom,
a quiet title action." Id. at 6. The Court
closed the case with prejudice. Id. at 9.
March 15. 2016. Reid initiated yet another action against New
Century Mortgage Corporation a/k/a Deutsche Bank and Ocwen
Loan Servicing in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County. Reid v. New Century Mortg. Corp.,
CAF16-07557 (Cir. Ct. Prince George's Cty. March 15.
2016) (the "Third Lawsuit"). Plaintiff again
petitioned the court to quiet title on the Property. In that
complaint. Plaintiff made allegations nearly identical to the
statements in her Complaint sub judice, including
that Defendants are "not Holder/holder in Due Course of
the "authentic original unaltered Promissory
Note'" and "Plaintiff specifically challenges
the debt instrument that give[s] rise to any lien
instrument." Compare ECF No. 12-12 at 1-5.
with ECF No. 2 at 1-2. On May 4. 2016. the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County granted Ocwen's and
Deutsche Bank's Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed
Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. ECF No. 12-13.
has now filed the current action with this Court to quiet
title against Ocwen Loan Servicing. See ECF No. 2.
Plaintiff once again claims that Defendants arc
""not Holder/holder in Due Course of the
"authentic original unaltered Promissory
Note.'" and ''Plaintiff specifically
challenges the debt instrument that give[s] rise to any lien
instrument." Id. at 2. Plaintiff also makes
vague and conclusory allegations that "there is not a
meeting of the minds as to the contract agreement." that
"this is fraud by misrepresentation of a material
fact." and proclaims that "the contract is to be
deemed void." Id. at 3. Defendant Ocwen has
moved to dismiss. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff filed an Opposition.
ECF No. 18. Having reviewed the submissions, the aggregate of
prior court records, and relevant authorities, the Court now
grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
may "test the adequacy of a complaint by way of a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Pretich v. Med
Res., Inc., 813 F.Supp.2d 654. 660 (D. Md. 2011) (citing
German v. Fox, 267 F.App'x 231, 233 (4th Cir.
2008)). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim do
"not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of a claim, or the applicability of defenses."
Pretich, 813 F.Supp.2d at 660 (citing Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231. 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
The court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim for relief unless "it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations." GE Inv.
Private Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543.
548 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Tel Co., 492 U.S. 229. 249-50) (1989)). To overcome
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege enough facts
to state a plausible claim for relief. Bell Atl Corp. v.
Tvombly, 550 U.S. 544. 570 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. 678 (2009). A claim is plausible
when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.'"
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
evaluating the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs claims, the
Court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true
and construes the factual allegations in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266. 268 (1994): Lambeth v. Bd of
Comm'rs of Davidson Cry., 407 F.3d 266. 268 (4th
Cir. 2005). However, the complaint must contain more than
"legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and
bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement."
Nemet Chevrolet. Ltd v. Consumer affairs.com. Inc.,
591 F.3d 250. 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) further
provides that "[a] pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Although "no technical forms of pleading are required, a
complaint must 'give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiffs claim is and the ground upon which it
rests.'" Engle v. United States, 736
F.Supp. 670. 671 (D. Md. 1989). qff'd, 902 F.2d
28 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41. 48 (1957)). The Court is not obligated to accept
unsupported legal allegations. Revene v. Charles County
Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870. 873 (4th Cir. 1989). legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v.
Attain, 478 U.S. 265. 286 (1986). or conclusory factual
allegations devoid of any reference to actual events.
United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844.
847 (4th Cir. 1979).