United States District Court, D. Maryland
Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge.
Mario Brown ("Defendant" or "Brown") pled
guilty before this Court to one count of Distribution of
Cocaine Base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
See]., p. 1, ECF No. 22. At sentencing, this Court
found that Brown was a "career offener" under
Section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and
ultimately sentenced him to 151 months imprisonment, pursuant
to the Career Offender guidelines, followed by five years of
supervised release. Id., at 1-3. Brown filed an
untimely Notice of Appeal of this Court's Judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (ECF
No. 24), which the Fourth Circuit subsequently dismissed as
untimely via Order and Judgment dated March 17, 2009 (ECF
Nos. 31 & 32). Following the dismissal of his appeal,
Brown filed his first Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in this Court (ECF No.
39) arguing, inter alia, that he had asked his
attorney to file a timely Notice of Appeal, but that his
attorney failed to do so. Via Amended Order dated April 25,
2011 (ECF No. 53), this Court granted Brown a hearing as to
his attorneys' failure to file a timely Notice of Appeal,
but denied his motion as to all remaining arguments. This
Court appointed counsel to represent him, see Order,
ECF No. 54, and a hearing was held on August 25,
2011. Via Memorandum Order dated August 26, 2011
(ECF No. 64), this Court granted Brown's Motion to Vacate
as to his attorney's failure to file a timely Notice of
Appeal. Accordingly, this Court issued an Amended Judgment
(ECF No. 65) and allowed Brown to file an appeal of that
Judgment. The Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed this
Court's Judgment and denied Brown's petition for a
rehearing en banc. See J., ECF No. 77; Order, ECF
Brown filed a series of pro se Motions to Reduce
Sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), in light
of Amendment 750 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
which lowered the offense levels applicable to crack cocaine
offenses. This Court again appointed counsel to represent
Brown and ultimately denied his motions via Memorandum Order
dated June 24, 2013 (ECF No. 93), as he was sentenced
pursuant to the Career Offender provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines and, therefore, was not entitled to relief based
on a retroactive amendment to the Crack Cocaine
guidelines. He appealed this Court's Order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and
the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court via Judgment dated
October 25, 2013 (ECF No. 97). Brown later filed yet another
Motion to Reduce Sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2), in light of Amendment 782 to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the offense levels for
drug offenses. See Mot., ECF No. 99. This Court
likewise denied that Motion via Order dated August 25, 2015
(ECF No. 101). Finally, Brown filed a second Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (ECF No. 106), in light of the United States Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Counsel was again appointed
to represent Brown as to that Johnson challenge,
although Brown later voluntarily dismissed his motion.
over nine years after this Court's initial entry of
judgment and after this Court's appointment of three
separate attorneys to represent Brown on multiple motions for
post-conviction relief, Brown has filed a letter (ECF No.
109) "requesting an attorney to file on [his] behalf
pertaining to a Mathis challenge as the 7th
Circ[uit] has made a ruling in this matter, " which this
Court construes as a Motion to Appoint Counsel. Petitioner
has not filed any motion setting forth his argument for
post-conviction relief under
'''Mathis" nor is it clear exactly
what Seventh Circuit authority he refers to. This Court has
reviewed Brown's submission, and no hearing is necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons
that follow, Brown's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No.
109) is DENIED.
is no Sixth Amendment tight to counsel to pursue a petition
for collateral relief. See Pennsylvania v. Finely,
481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). A court may provide counsel for an
indigent inmate pursuing a petition for habeas corpus if that
die court "determines mat the interests of justice so
require." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). Rule 8(c) of
the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases provides that a court
must appoint counsel "[i]f an evidentiary hearing is
warranted." Brown has not articulated the grounds on
which he wishes to attack his conviction and sentence, nor
has he filed a Motion to Vacate. Nothing in the record
suggests that he is unable to articulate such claims if they
exist. Until a Motion is filed, this Court cannot determine
whether a hearing will likely be held in this matter.
is further cautioned that under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, a one-year limitations period runs from the
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Additionally, "[w]hile a federal
inmate may file one § 2255 motion to Vacate, set aside
or correct [his] sentence' after his judgment of
conviction has become final ... he must obtain authorization
from 'a panel of the appropriate court of appeals'
before presenting '[a] second or successive motion.'
" In re Vassell, 751 F.3d 267, 268-69 (4th Cir.
2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
these reasons, it ...