United States District Court, D. Maryland
Xinis United States District Judge.
before the Court are motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by Defendants Ditech Financial LLC
(“Ditech”), ECF No. 12, BWW Law Group, LLC
(“BWW”), ECF No. 20, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
(“Ocwen”), ECF No. 27, and U.S. Bank, National
Association (“US Bank”), Mark Runkel and P.W.
Parker, ECF No. 29. The issues are fully briefed, and the
Court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6 because no
hearing is necessary. For the reasons stated below, the
Defendants' motions are granted pursuant to Rule
Factual and Procedural History
27, 2007, Plaintiff Dale Young executed an Adjustable Rate
Note in the amount of $216, 000.00 to Homecomings Financial,
LLC, fka Homecomings Financial Network, Inc.
(“Homecomings”). ECF No. 27-2. The Note includes
a special indorsement from Homecomings to Residential Funding
Company, LLC; an allonge containing a special indorsement
from Residential Funding Company, LLC to GMAC Mortgage, LLC;
and a blank indorsement from GMAC Mortgage, LLC making the
Note payable to the bearer. See ECF No. 27-2 at 5-6.
Plaintiff alleges that during the foreclosure action, Ditech
held the Note. See Affidavit of Dale Young, ECF No.
1-6 at 10 (“They have breeched [sic] the Deed of Trust
agreement for the ALLEGED DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC ACCOUNT #
3738762 . . . They have no legal standing to further collect
on the [Ditech Account], and all collection activity will
cease with no further payments collectable or due on the
[Ditech Account] . . .[they] forever waive any right to
collect, sell or transfer the alleged debt regarding the
[Ditech Account] through or by any judicial or non-judicial
Note was secured by a Deed of Trust for a property located at
1314 Dillon Court, Capitol Heights, Maryland 20743
(“the Property”). ECF No. 29-4 at 1. The Deed of
Trust was also executed on July 27, 2007 by Plaintiff to
Homecomings and was recorded among the Land Records of Prince
George's County, Maryland. ECF No. 29-4. The Deed of
Trust, signed by Plaintiff, named Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) the
beneficiary under the security interest as the nominee for
Homecomings, its successors, and assigns. ECF No. 29-4. On
December 10, 2014, MERS executed and recorded an Assignment
of Deed of Trust in the Land Records of Prince George's
County, Maryland, which granted all beneficial interest under
the Deed of Trust to Defendant Ocwen. See ECF No.
September 9, 2015, Defendant BWW was recorded as the
substitute trustees for the Deed of Trust, see ECF
No. 29-1, and they initiated a foreclosure action in the
Circuit Court of Prince George's County, Maryland.
Ward v. Young, Case No. CAEF15-25198, (the
“State Foreclosure Action”); see also
Maryland Judiciary Case Search, ECF No. 27-7. On January 11,
2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss the State
Foreclosure Action in circuit court. See ECF No.
29-1 at 1-5, 25-31. The substitute trustees, BWW, filed a
Report of Sale on February 16, 2016. ECF No. 27-7. On March
1, 2016, the circuit court denied Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss. ECF No. 29-2.
September 21, 2016, following the circuit court's denial
of his motion and while the sale of the property was pending
ratification, Plaintiff sent correspondence to his new loan
servicer, Specialized Loan Servicing LLC. See Letter
from Loan Servicer, ECF No. 1-3 at 2. In its October 7, 2016
response, Specialized Loan Servicing LLC notified Plaintiff
that U.S. Bank was the current noteholder “as Indenture
Trustee of the GMACM Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-HE4.”
Letter from Loan Servicer, ECF No. 1-3 at 2; see
also Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 21- 22.
December 12, 2016, the circuit court entered an Order
ratifying the sale of the Property. ECF No. 29-3. Two days
later, on December 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant
Complaint in this Court. See Complaint, ECF No. 1.
On January 9, 2017, after Plaintiff filed his federal
Complaint, he appealed the state court order ratifying the
foreclosure sale. See State Foreclosure Action, Dkt.
No. 21. On March 31, 2017, the Court of Special Appeals
dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, id. at Dkt. No.
30, and on May 12, 2017, dismissed his Petition to Vacate the
Order Dismissing the Appeal, id. at Dkt. No. 32.
Plaintiff's Claims in the Instant Action
construed, Plaintiff asserts four primary factual allegations
in his Complaint. First, Plaintiff avers that Defendants are
barred from foreclosing on the Property because the
securitization of Plaintiff's loan resulted in the
mortgage being paid off via an unknown mortgage insurer,
thereby wholly satisfying the debt to Defendants.
See Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 4, 14-15. Second,
Plaintiff alleges that because the Note and Deed of Trust
were separated when the Note was sold into a loan pool, the
chain of title was broken. See Id. at 4, 7. Third,
Plaintiff claims that the Deed of Trust could not be assigned
while GMAC-a prior holder of the Note- was in bankruptcy.
See Id. at 3. Finally, Plaintiff contends that
Defendants lacked standing to foreclose because the
Assignment of Deed of Trust was forged and false. See
Id. at 13.
on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts causes of action
against all Defendants for: (1) violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”); (2) fraud; (3) unjust enrichment; (4)
insurance fraud; (5) breach of contract; (6) bad faith; (7)
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”); and (8) negligent misrepresentation.
See Complaint, ECF No. 1. Additionally,
Plaintiff's Complaint “seek[s] an emergency
Temporary Restraining Order to take effect immediately,
” ECF No. 1 at 52, a declaration that the Note is
“null, void, [and] legally unenforceable, ”
id. at 55, and “an order halting the
foreclosure of all real estate in the United States of
America by any of the Defendants . . . which includes
injunctions on any post-foreclosure activities, ”
id. at 52.
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
argue that Plaintiff's Complaint lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
alternatively, the Younger abstention doctrine.
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins,
Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). When a defendant
argues lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the allegations
in the complaint are assumed to be true under the same
standard as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and “the motion
must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to
invoke subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns v.
United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). When a
defendant asserts that facts outside of the complaint deprive
the court of jurisdiction, the Court “may consider
evidence outside the pleadings without converting the
proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Velasco v.
Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.
2004); Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. The court should
grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on a factual challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction “only if the material
jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party
is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
Evans, 166 F.3d at 647 (quoting Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States,
945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)).