United States District Court, D. Maryland
RICHARD D. BENNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
answer to the above-entitled Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S2254, Respondents assert that
the petition must be dismissed as untimely. ECF
I1. Petitioner was provided an opportuntty
to file a Reply addressing the timeliness of the petition and
asserting, if applicable, any basis for equitable tolling of
the filing deadline. ECF 12 & 14. Petitioner instead
filed Motions for Appointment of Counse.. ECF 15 & 16.
Upon review of the pleadings filed, the Court finds no need
for an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016); see also
Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000)
(petitioner not entitled to a hearing under 28 U.S.C.
s2254(e((2).. For the reasons stated below, Petitionerss
motions will be denied, the Petition shall be dismissed as
untimely, and a Certificate of Appealability shall not issue.
April 20, 1999, Petitioner Darin Glenn was found guilty of
first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and
related offenses in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
at Ex. I and 2. On June 8, 1999, Glenn was sentenced to serve
a life sentence plus a consecutive term of 40 years.
Jd. Glenn's conviction was affirmed on June 15,
2000 in an unreported opinion from the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. !d. at Ex. 2. Further review
was denied on November 13, 2000, when the Court of Appeals
declined further review. Jd. Glenn did not file a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. For purposes of calculating the federal habeas
corpus deadline, Glenn's conviction became final as of
February 12, 200,, the date the time for seeking review with
the United States Supreme Court expired. See Sup.
Ct. Rule 13.1 (90 day period of time for filing certiorari
November 2, 2001, Glenn filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. ECF II at Ex.
I. At that time, 262 days elapsed where no legal proceedings
regarding the conviction were pending in the Maryland courts
which would operate to toll the filing deadline to seek
federal habeas relief, leaving Glenn with 103 days to file a
federal habeas petition at the conclusion of post-conviction
November 24, 2003, Glenn withdrew his petition for
post-conviction relief without prejudice. Jd. The
withdrawal of the petition operated to begin the federal
habeas limitations period running again. See Coates v.
Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (per cunam) (AEDPA
clock restarts when state court completes post-conviction
review); Lawrence v. Florida. 549 U.S. 327 (same).
The 103 days left on the 365 day limitations period expired
on March 8, 2004.
filed another petition for post-conviction relief on November
3, 2008, which was denied on July 22, 2014. Glenn filed an
application for leave to appeal the post-conviction
court's denial of relief with the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, which was denied on April 16, 2015. ECF II
at Ex. 3. The mandate issued on May 18, 2015.
one-year statute of limitations applies to habeas petitions
in non-capital cases for a person convicted in a state court.
See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). This section provides:
(1) A I-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constituiionll right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the