United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
J. HAZEL United Slates District Judge.
18, 2017. Plaintiff Donnell Westley Sampson,
an inmate housed at the Eastern Correctional Institution.
filed a complaint against Maryland Parole Commissioner
Reynolds and Karla Showalter, Assistant Public Defender.
Post-Conviction Defenders Division, alleging violations
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requesting $650, 000.00
in compensatory- and punitive damages. ECF No. 1. Sampson
contends that Commissioner Reynolds revoked his mandatory
parole release at a parole revocation hearing held on May 26.
2016. presumably due to the fact that Sampson had
"obtain[ed] a new charge and was convicted."
Id. at 4. Sampson states that at the same hearing.
Commissioner Reynolds terminated his parole conditions,
allowed him approximately 90 days of credit, but then
rescinded those days. Id. Sampson states that he was
told lie would be incarcerated until February 2017.
Id.; see also ECF Nos. 1-2 and 1-3.
Because Sampson was still incarcerated as of May 18. 2017. he
argues that his continued incarceration "well exceeds my
time to serve." ECF No. 1. Because he appears indigent.
Sampson shall be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for screening of any
complaint "in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a): see also McLean
v. United Slates. 566 F.3d 391, 394 (4th Cir. 2009).
Before permitting the case to move forward or requiring a
response from the defendants, "the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see
also Williamson v. Angelone. 197 F.Supp.2d 476. 478
(E.D. Va. 2001). The screening is necessary to determine
whether defendants should be required to respond to the
extent that Sampson is seeking damages under a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights theory related to alleged illegal
acts by government employees involving his parole revocation
and the computation of his sentences, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice as the claims are not cognizable
under Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Heck, an Indiana state prisoner sued two state
prosecutors and a state investigator who had participated in
the investigation leading to plaintiffs conviction. Plaintiff
alleged that defendants had knowingly destroyed evidence
which was exculpatory in nature and had also caused an
unlawful voice identification procedure to be used at trial.
The complaint sought compensatory and monetary damages. The
Supreme Court concluded that the complaint must be dismissed,
[t]o recover damages for alleged unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under $ 1983.
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983
suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction has already been invalidated. But if the
district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of
any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the
action should be allowed to proceed in the absence of some
other bar to the suit.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-7 (emphasis in original).
Sampson claims that his mandatory parole release was revoked
on May 26. 2016 and now contends that he is being held past
his release date. Sampson's civil rights claim for
damages implicates the constitutionality of his
incarceration, which cannot proceed in this court without
first demonstrating the invalidity of the sentence.
Heck is also applicable to parole proceedings or the
fact or duration of a parole term. See Husketh v.
Sills, 34 F.App'x 104. 105 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2002}
(challenge to parole eligibility "implies the invalidity
of [plaintiffs] current confinement" and thus, is barred
by Heck): Williams v. Comovoy, 453 F.3d 173. 177 (3d
Cir. 2006) (applying Heck to parole revocation
decisions): ('okley v. Mack. No. CA 9:12-881
-RMG- BM. 2012 WL 1986528, at *3 (D.S.C. May 10. 2012),
report and recommendation adopted No. CIV.A.
9:12-881-RMG. 2012 WL 1993519 (D.S.C. June 4. 2012)
(allegation that parole was unlawfully revoked barred by
Heck), Heck's favorable termination requirement
thus bars Sampson's damage claim that Commissioner
Reynolds and Public Defender Showalter committed
constitutional violations arising out of the revocation of
his mandatory parole release.
Court offers no opinion on the legality of Sampson's
current confinement. If he wishes to challenge the length and
duration of his confinement, keeping in mind the limitations
on such claims, he may file a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition
for habeas corpus relief in this Court after he has exhausted
his remedies in state court by filing a petition for writ of
aforementioned reasons. Sampson's Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted. The Complaint shall,
however, be dismissed without prejudice, for failure to state
a claim. A separate Order follows.
 Sampson references "Exhibit
C" but the Court does not see such an exhibit included
in his ...