United States District Court, D. Maryland
DEBRA F. MEADOWS
CHARLES COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
pending and ready for resolution in this employment
discrimination case are a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendant Helen E. Keller (ECF No. 22); a motion for summary
judgment by Defendant Charles County Board of Education
(“Charles County Schools” or the
“Board”) (ECF No. 48); and two papers filed by
Plaintiff Debra Meadows (“Plaintiff”) (ECF Nos.
52; 62) that appear to be motions for leave to amend her
complaint. The issues have been briefed, and the
court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local
Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Ms. Keller's
motion will be granted, the Board's motion will be
granted, and both of Plaintiff's motions will be denied.
allegations in Plaintiff's complaint are not entirely
clear. Plaintiff began working for Keller Transportation,
Inc. (“KTI”), a bus company that has a contract
with Charles County Schools, in 2011. (ECF No. 1, at 7).
Plaintiff lives in subsidized federal housing with her
children. (Id.). She suffers from dyslexia.
(Id. at 8).
Plaintiff filed her taxes in early 2015, she discovered
several problems. (Id. at 7). First, she found out
that she was categorized an independent contractor and sought
to correct the Board's employment records to reflect that
she was an employee of Charles County Schools. Second, she
found that KTI's human resources department had
classified her and her son as “border and migrant
workers.” (Id.). Third, she discovered that
KTI had reported her income as being “extremely high,
” too high for her subsidized housing. (Id.).
This discrepancy led to Plaintiff and her nine-year-old
daughter being assigned a $500, 000.00 debt. When the new
school year started later in 2015, Plaintiff was given no
vacation or sick leave for her position. When Plaintiff was
on workers' compensation leave in November 2015, KTI told
Plaintiff that she should contact the unemployment benefits
office. That office, however, informed her that KTI had not
reported her employment with the company and that she was not
entitled to any unemployment benefits.
filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on June 2, 2016, and the EEOC
issued her a right to sue notice on June 15. (ECF No. 1, at
6). She filed this suit on August 18 against Ms. Keller, KTI,
the Board, and “Keller Jr[.] Keller III Ernest Bus
Service Inc., ” alleging ongoing discrimination on the
basis of her religion, national origin, and disability in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
(Id. at 2-5). She also alleged that Defendants
retaliated against her in violation of Title VII.
(Id. at 5).
schedule was set and discovery began (ECF No. 27), but the
parties have had numerous discovery disputes. Magistrate
Judge Timothy J. Sullivan was assigned to the case on
December 19, 2016 (ECF No. 29), and continues to supervise
the discovery issues between the parties. Plaintiff has
recently filed an interlocutory appeal based on one of Judge
Sullivan's decisions. (ECF No. 64).
November 23, Ms. Keller moved to dismiss all claims against
her. (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff was provided with a
Roseboro notice (ECF No. 24), which advised her of
the pendency of the motion to dismiss and her entitlement to
respond within seventeen days from the date of the letter.
See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310
(4th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff responded on December 5
(ECF No. 26) and filed a supplement to her response on March
6, 2017 (ECF No. 50). The Board filed its pending motion for
summary judgment on March 1, 2017. (ECF No. 48). Plaintiff
was provided a Roseboro notice for the Board's
motion (ECF No. 49), and she responded on March 13 (ECF No.
51). Plaintiff filed her pending motions on March 28 and
April 26. (ECF Nos. 52; 62).
Plaintiff's Motions to Amend
Standard of Review
may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within
twenty-one days after serving it or within twenty-one days
after service of a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), whichever
is earlier. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). When the right to amend as
a matter of course expires, “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent
or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
Whether to grant leave to amend is a matter left to the
discretion of the district court, see Simmons v. United
Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 769
(4th Cir. 2011), though courts should
“freely give leave when justice so requires, ”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Denial of leave to amend is
appropriate “only when the amendment would be
prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith
on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be
futile.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178
F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785
F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)). Generally, pro
se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976));
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
has submitted two papers - one labeled a “Memorandum to
Amend and Correct” and the other labeled a “Rule
2-341. Rule -341 Amending and Pleading to Correct in
Plaintiff Defen[ses]” - that appear to be efforts to
amend her complaint. (ECF Nos. 52; 62). In these papers,
Plaintiff provides additional facts related to her existing
Title VII and ADA claims. She also mentions numerous new
allegations of violations of other federal laws, including
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; the
Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839; the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; mail fraud statutes, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; the Racketeer ...