United States District Court, D. Maryland
CHRISTOPHER WILSON, Prisoner Identification No. 3514268, Plaintiff,
BALTIMORE CITY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, KEVIN WILSON and INTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR BALTIMORE CITY, MD, Defendants.
Theodore D. Chuang United States District Judge
Wilson ("Plaintiff), currently confined at Stevens
Correctional Center in Welch, West Virginia, filed this
action pro se against the Baltimore City State's
Attorney's Office, former Assistant State's Attorney
Kevin Wilson ("ASA Wilson"), and the Internal
Affairs Division of the Baltimore City Police Department
("BCPD".. Plaintiffs claims arise from his alleged
cooperation pursuant to a plea agreement and his subsequent
arrest and imprisonment for violating the terms of his
probation. Pending before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss,
filed by the Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office
and ASA Wilson, and a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively,
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by BCPD. For the reasons
set forth below, the Motions are granted.
2009, Plaintiff entered into a "contract, " or a
plea agreement, with the Baltimore City State's Attorney
Office relating to criminal charges for which he was
arrested. Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. As part of the plea agreement,
Plaintiff was to assist the State's Attorney's Office
to "catch a dirty cop, " but he would "not be
asked to do anything ... that would put me
in knowing danger." Id. He was deemed to have
fulfilled his part of the agreement, but the allegedly
corrupt police officer was not arrested. Plaintiff was then
sentenced in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland
to five years of probation with a IS-year suspended sentence.
one week of the sentencing, Plaintiff was arrested for a
violation of probation. According to Plaintiff, ASA Wilson
"had changed his mind" about Plaintiffs fulfillment
of the plea agreement and thus had Plaintiff arrested under
false pretenses in order to "force" his continued
cooperation. Compl. 3; Suppl. Compl. 1, ECF No.5. Plaintiff
expressed concern that the additional cooperation requested
to facilitate the arrest of the "dirty cop" would
expose his identity, and that "the people I had snitched
on would know it was me who was snitching and they would kill
me." Compl. 3. Unmoved, ASA Wilson told Plaintiff to
cooperate fully or "go to prison." Id.
cooperated as requested, leading to the arrest of the
"dirty cop." Id; see Suppl. Compl. 1-2.
About two weeks later, Plaintiff was shot four times by two
unnamed parties who told him to "stop snitching"
and threatened to harm his family. Compl. 3-4. Plaintiff gave
the names and addresses of the shooters to ASA Wilson, the
Internal Affairs Division of BCPD, and Drug Enforcement
Administration investigators. ASA Wilson, however, declined
to arrest the shooters and told him to "leave it
alone" and keep his "mouth shut, " or he would
be put in jail. Id. at 4; Suppl. Compl. 2-3.
Complaint as supplemented, Plaintiff, who was incarcerated at
Roxbury Correctional Institution in Hagerstown, Maryland at
the time he filed this action, seeks relief for wrongful
endangerment, wrongful imprisonment, pain and suffering, and
mental anguish. He alleges that he is in prison on the
probation violation, the shooters are free, and he suffered
mental distress due to his fear that his children would be
harmed. Plaintiff initially sought $1 million in damages. In
his Supplement to the Complaint, he now seeks $3 million in
seek dismissal of the Complaint or summary judgment in their
favor on several grounds, including that: (1) the Complaint
does not sufficiently allege facts that establish subject
matter jurisdiction; (2) the Baltimore City State's
Attorney Office is not a legal entity that can be sued; (3)
ASA Wilson is entitled to prosecutorial immunity; (4)
Defendant's are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
and state sovereign immunity; (5) Plaintiffs claims are
barred by the statute of limitations; and (6) the Complaint
fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
the plaintiffs burden to show that subject matter
jurisdiction exists. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., Div. of
Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.
1999). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(I) allows a
defendant to move for dismissal when it believes that the
plaintiff has failed to make that showing. When a defendant
asserts that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts
sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the
allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true under the
same standard as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and "the
motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient
facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction""
Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir.
2009). When a defendant asserts that facts outside of the
complaint deprive the court of jurisdiction, the Court
"may consider evidence outside the pleadings without
converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment."
Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia,
370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); Kerns, 585 F.3d
at 192. The court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion based
on a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction
"only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in
dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law." Evans, 166 F.3d at 647 (quoting
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United
States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)).
defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint
must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for
relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow "the
Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
Although courts should construe pleadings of self-represented
litigants liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), legal conclusions or conclusory statements do
not suffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must
examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the
factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268
(1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson
Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.2005).
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over
this action. "Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction"" Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Consequently,
this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction only over
"civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States, " 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2012), or civil actions wherein there is diversity of
citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy
requirement is met, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There is no
presumption that jurisdiction is vested in a federal court.
Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394,
399 (4th Cir. 1999). The burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction rests on the party invoking the
jurisdiction of the court. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d
1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiff has failed to
identify any federal constitutional or statutory right
allegedly violated. Moreover, the parties appear to be either
Maryland citizens or are not considered to be citizens for
the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See O'Neill
v. Early,208 F.2d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1953)
("[T]here is no diversity of citizenship in a suit
which, although nominally against state agencies and
officers, is in reality a suit against a state.");
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Clark, 944
A.2d 1122, 1131 (Md. 2008) ("[T]he Baltimore City Police
Department is a state agency."). ...