United States District Court, D. Maryland
XINIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
pending before the Court are Defendants' unopposed
Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF
Nos. 8, 23, and 26). The Court now rules pursuant to Local Rule
105.6 because no hearing is necessary. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court will GRANT Defendants' Motions to
matter arises out of foreclosure proceedings in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, Case No.
CAEF-15-20470 (the “Foreclosure Action”) filed
with respect to the property located at 6711 Sand Cherry Way,
Clinton, Maryland 20903 (the “Property”).
See ECF No. 1-1. A copy of the Foreclosure Action
docket is attached to this opinion.
August 3, 2015, foreclosure proceedings commenced against
Plaintiffs Clifford Lee Massey and Marilyn Lovette
Panda-Massey (collectively “Plaintiffs” or the
“Masseys”), in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County. See Foreclosure Action Docket,
Entry 1. After related proceedings to include mediation, the
Circuit Court ordered the foreclosure sale. See
Foreclosure Action Docket, Entry 14. Plaintiffs thereafter
sought to remove the Foreclosure Action to this Court.
See Ward v. Massey, No. 8:16-cv-01530-DKC. On June
9, 2016, this Court remanded the Foreclosure Action for want
of jurisdiction. See Ward v. Massey, No. DKC
16-1530, 2016 WL 3196679 (D. Md. June 9, 2016).
on September 16, 2016, Plaintiffs proceeding pro se,
filed the instant action in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County, Maryland. ECF No. 2, naming corporate
defendants BWW Law Group, GMAC Mortgage, Blank Rome LLP,
EverBank, JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (“Chase”), and
Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC (“Ocwen”), the Territory
of Maryland, and individual defendants Lori Hester, Nicholas
Derdock, Jr, Sydney J. Harrison, Melvin C. High, Larnzell
Martin, Jr., James R. Billings-Kang, Judges Mary Ellen
Barbera, Leo F. Green, Peter B. Krauser, Crystal D.
Mittlestaedt, Karen H. Masonm and Toni E. Clarke, and
Maryland Attorney General Brian E. Frosh (collectively,
“Defendants”). Defendants Billings-Kang, Ocwen,
and Everbank then properly removed the action to this Court
on October 13, 2016. ECF No. 1.
Complaint, although difficult to decipher, alleges that all
Defendants acted improperly in either enforcing an invalid
lien or participating in the Foreclosure Action. Plaintiffs
contend that they were gifted the Property when “born
under the Maritime Law, pursuant to Internal Revenue Code
188.8.131.52.2.2.” ECF No. 2 at 1. Plaintiffs further
allege that Defendants Derdock, Chang, and Billings-Kang in
the Foreclosure Action filed a fraudulent summons and
complaint because the attorneys did not provide “proof
of delegation of authority or jurisdiction of any kind”
over Plaintiffs' estate and thus, the Property. ECF No.
2-3 at 2. Plaintiffs contend that all Defendants are acting
in concert to unlawfully and fraudulently enforce an invalid
lien. ECF No. 2-3 at 2. Plaintiffs also claim to bring this
action against all Defendants for “following the orders
of a criminal enterprise, ” specifically for committing
the federal criminal offense of “breach of public
trust/fraud upon the court, ” citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242, by having “meddled in [their]
estate without authorization” as “Executors De
Son Tort.” ECF No. 2 at 1. Plaintiffs seek a Writ of
Mandamus, dismissing the Foreclosure Action and enjoining
various state employees from proceeding in the Foreclosure
Action. ECF No. 2 at 2.
October 18, 2016, Billings-Kang, EverBank, and Ocwen filed a
joint Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 8. On October 27, 2016, BWW
Law Group and Derdock also filed a joint Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 23, and Chase filed its Motion to Dismiss on November
4, 2016. ECF No. 26. For the reasons that follow, the Motions
STANDARD OF REVIEW
purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test
the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of
Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs
are proceeding pro se, and their Complaint must be
construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). However, liberal construction does not
absolve Plaintiffs from pleading plausible claims. See
Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981)
(citing Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562-63 (4th
Cir. 1977)). As the Fourth Circuit made clear:
It is neither unfair nor unreasonable to require a pleader to
put his complaint in an intelligible, coherent, and
manageable form, and his failure to do so may warrant
dismissal. Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 966 (1965); Holsey
v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981). District
courts are not required to be mind readers, or to conjure
questions not squarely presented to them. Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
Harris v. Angliker, 955 F.2d 41, 1992 WL 21375, at
*1 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must
“accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as
true, ” and “construe the facts and reasonable
inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Ibarra v. United States, 120
F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). “The mere recital of
elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, is not sufficient to survive a motion made
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Walters v.
McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint's factual
allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “To
satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not
‘forecast' evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of the claim. However, the complaint must allege
sufficient facts to establish those elements.”
Walters, 684 F.3d at 439 (citation omitted).
“Thus, while a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate
in a complaint that the right to relief is ‘probable,
' the complaint must advance the plaintiff's claim
‘across the line from conceivable to
plausible.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A district court may
sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to state
a claim, and where the face of a complaint plainly fails to
state a claim for relief, the district court has “no
discretion but to dismiss it.” Eriline Co. S.A. v.
Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 n.10 (4th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations omitted).
plaintiff alleges fraud or “the gravamen of the claim
is fraud even though the theory supporting the claim is not
technically termed fraud, ” Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that such claims be pleaded
with particularity. Haley v. Corcoran, 659 F.Supp.2d
714, 721 (D. Md. 2009) (quoting Adams v. NVR Homes,
Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D. Md. 2000); Fed.R.Civ.P.
9(b)). To satisfy this standard, plaintiffs “must, at a
minimum, describe the time, place, and contents of the false
representations, as well as the identity of the person making
the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.”
United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “These facts are
often referred to as the ‘who, what, when, where, and
how' of the alleged fraud.” Id. (quoting
United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of
Tex. Inc.,336 F.3d 375, 384 (5th Cir. 2003)). This
requirement affords the Defendants notice of the basis for
the plaintiff's claim, safeguards against frivolous