United States District Court, D. Maryland
RICHARD D. BENNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15, 2016, the Court received for filing inmate Anthony
Kelly's self-represented 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights action. The Complaint seeks damages from the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
("DPSCS") and its personnel. Defendants have filed
an unopposed Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16), as well as a legal
memorandum (ECF No. 16-1),  and exhibits. ECF No. 16-2
through ECF No. 16-5. Also pending before the Court is
Kelly's Emergency Motion for Leave tp File an Amended
Complaint, which the Court shall deny. ECF No. 15.
matter is ready for disposition.. No hearing is necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). Defendants'
Motion, construed as a motion for summary judgment, IS
GRANTED for reasons to follow.
who is currently confined at the North Branch Correctional
Institution ("NBCI"), alleges that on June 20,
2016, Case Management Specialist Zies retrieved his legal
documents from her mailbox to make copies for him. He
complains that since July 7, 2016, Zies has refused to return
his legal documents unless Kelly dropped his lawsuit pending
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
against Leslie -Simpson, see Kelly v. Simpson,
CA-16-6598 (4th Cir. 2016). He further claims that Zies is
trying to stop him from challenging his conviction and
sentences in the U.S. Supreme Court. ECF No. 1, p. 2. Kelly
contends that he filed an administrative remedy procedure
("ARP") grievance regarding Zies' actions, but
Officer Gilpin indicated he was "going to trash
it." Kelly claims that he did not receive an
acknowledgement receipt of the ARP from the ARP Coordinator.
Id., p. 3. In his Motion to File an Amended
Complaint, Kelly seeks to add the State of Maryland and
Warden Frank Bishop as Defendants and to generally invoke the
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") as part of
his Complaint. ECF No. 15.
to amend shall be denied. A § 1983 lawsuit may not be
filed against the State of Maryland. The State is not a
"person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 & 70-71 (1989). Moreover,
the State of Maryland is immune from liability under the
Eleventh Amendment from a § 1983 suit in federal court
without regard to the nature of the relief sought. See
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 101-01 (1984); C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198,
201 (3rd Cir. 2000).
although Kelly names Warden Bishop in the caption of his
Amended Complaint, he makes no claims against Bishop in the
body of the Amended Complaint. A claim of personal or
supervisory culpability has not been made against Bishop.
although Kelly cites to the ADA, he provides no claims under
that statute. He has failed to show that he has a qualifying
disability under the ADA. To state a claim for violation of
the ADA, Kelly must show that he (1) has a disability, (2) is
otherwise qualified to participate in a program, and (3) was
denied the benefits of the program or discriminated against
because of the disability. See Millington v. Temple Univ.
Sch. Of Dentistry, 261 Fed. App. 363, 365 (3rd Cir.
2008). A physical condition may qualify as a
"disability" within the meaning of the ADA because
it "substantially limits one or more ... major life
activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102; 29 U.S.C. §
705(20)(B). Under the law in this circuit, to establish that
he is disabled under the ADA, Kelly must prove that: he has a
physical or mental impairment; that this impairment
implicates at least one major life activity; and the
limitation.is substantial. See Heiko v. Columbo Savings
Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 2006).
Standard of Review
Motion is styled as a Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A motion styled in this manner implicates
the Court's discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept.,
Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436-37 (D.
Md. 2011). Ordinarily, a court "is not to consider
matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes
when ruling on a motion to dismiss." Bosiger v. U.S.
Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). However,
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider
matters outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d): If
the court does so, "the motion must be treated as one
for summary judgment under Rule 56, " and "[a]ll
parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion."
the movant expressly captions its motion "in the
alternative" as one for summary judgment, and submits
matters outside the pleadings for the court's
consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that
conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court "does
not have an obligation to notify parties of the
obvious." Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).
district judge has "complete discretion to determine
whether or not to accept the submission of any material
beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the
motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it." 5 C
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.). This discretion
"should be exercised with great caution and attention to
the parties' procedural rights." Id. at
149. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration
of extraneous material "is likely to facilitate the
disposition of the action, " and "whether discovery
prior to the utilization of the summary judgment
procedure" is necessary. Id.
167. Given the exhibits presented here (which were also
presented to Kelly), the Court has ample information with
which to ...