United States District Court, D. Maryland
CURTIS E. WILLIAMS, #275-455 Plaintiff
TIMOTHY CHESNAVAGE DR. KAHLID ELBEDAWI Defendants
K. Bredar United States District Judge
Curtis E. Williams, presently confined at the Maryland
Reception Diagnostic Classification Center
(“MRDCC”), filed a civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking money damages against a
Baltimore County Detention Center (“BCDC”)
corrections officer, Timothy Chesnavage, alleging use of
excessive force during an incident on December 10, 2015. (ECF
1 at p. 3.) Williams further claimed that after
receiving treatment for injury suffered during the incident,
Dr. Kahlid Elbedawi, a BCDC physician, did not provide
necessary pain medication. (Id. at p. 4.)
October 28, 2016, Williams was granted 21 days to complete a
United States Marshal service of process form to assist the
Clerk in obtaining service of process on Dr. Elbedawi. (ECF
16.) Williams did not comply; accordingly, Dr. Elbedawai is
dismissed without prejudice from this action.
Chesnavage filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment (ECF 8) that was dismissed without
prejudice, subject to renewal, upon submission of an
affidavit. Chesnavage has complied. (ECF 14.) Although
Williams was informed on two occasions pursuant to the
dictates of Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th
Cir. 1975), that he was entitled to file written opposition
to the motion or risk dismissal of his case without further
notice (ECF 12 and 15), Williams has failed to respond to the
reviewing the complaint in light of a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint
as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences
derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d
418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra
v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v.
Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26
(4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint
need only satisfy the “simplified pleading
standard” of Rule 8(a)).
Supreme Court of the United States has explained a
“plaintiff's obligation to provide the
'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (alteration in original). Nonetheless, the
complaint does not need “detailed factual
allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 555. Instead, “once a claim has been
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.” Id. at 563. To survive a motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. âBut where the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but
it has not 'show[n]' -- 'that the pleader is
entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting
judgment is governed by Rule 56(a), which provides:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any
factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is ...