United States District Court, D. Maryland
W. GRIMM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Anthony Lolin Jimenez, Sr. is suing Defendants
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) and its
employee Kathleen Dean. Defendants move to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 18, pursuant to Federal Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. ECF No. 19. Jimenez filed a “Response and
Motion to Strike Defendants[']
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P.
12(a)(1)[, ] (f).” ECF No. 24.
Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 25. A hearing is not
necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. Because Plaintiff
fails to state a claim, his Amended Complaint will be
is incarcerated at the Crowley County Correctional Facility
(“CCCF”) in Olney Springs,
Colorado. On November 14, 2016, Jimenez filed a
Complaint against Wells Fargo and Dean, claiming that
Defendants improperly refused to give him access to various
certificates from a mortgage-backed security trust in which
he alleges he has an interest, in violation of the Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. ECF No. 1. Defendants
moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that §
552a “is not actionable against a non-governmental
agency.” ECF No. 7. Jimenez opposed the motion, ECF No.
14, and filed his Amended Complaint. I struck Defendants'
original motion to dismiss in light of their Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. ECF No. 23.
Amended Complaint, Jimenez abandons his Privacy Act claim and
instead raises claims of tort violations as well as
“other undefined ‘per se' infractions,
etc.” Am. Compl. 7. He alleges that he has
“determined and identified a Security CUSIP related to
his criminal case, D0602000CR000178.” Id. at
5, ¶ 5.b. Jimenez contends “the transaction that
encumbered CUSIP 316345602 consisted of mortgage/asset back
securities either publicly sold or privately traded.”
Id. ¶ 5.c.
maintains that he requested information from Wells Fargo, the
alleged custodian of the record, but Kathleen Dean denied his
requests, “claiming privacy/privilege right.”
Id. In support of his original Complaint, Jimenez
filed two emails that Dean sent in response to his request,
both asking him to provide a specific address and the
borrower's name. Id; ECF No. 1-6. Jimenez
responded that he wanted the “‘registration
statement; and the original issued certificate, QUSIP [sic]
316345602, ” to which Dean replied that the
certificates were unavailable and registration statements are
private documents. Am. Compl. 5, ¶ 5.c.
prolix and disjointed Amended Complaint and other filings all
but defy comprehension. But, the Court recognizes its
obligation to attempt (if possible) to construe the pleadings
of self-represented litigants like Jimenez liberally.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). As best as I can discern, Jimenez alleges that
Defendants are liable under various imagined causes of action
because the District Attorney's Office in Colorado or the
Fourth Judicial District of Colorado “Mortgaged”
his criminal case, “giving rise to an undisclosed debt
obligation, default, judgment, foreclosure, lien” that
“was converted into a Mortgage Backed Security then
sold in the Pooling & Servicing Agreement” to which
Wells Fargo was a party. Am. Compl. 8, ¶ 5; Notice of
Claim 3, ECF No. 18-4. Specifically, “Wells Fargo,
National Association [sic] was the Securities
Administrator/Master Servicer to the transaction reflected by
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement recorded with the SEC
under COMM NO. 333-115122, November 1, 2004” Am. Compl.
5, ¶ 5.g. He claims that two Form 1099-Bs were filed
in relation to that financial security, listing him as the
“payor” and “receiver, ” but he was
not aware of, nor did he authorize the security or the
filings. Id. at 5-6, ¶ 5.c-h. He views these
alleged financial transaction as part of “the schemes
of the Defendants and their co-conspirators, ” and
alleges that “Defendants and their co-conspiractors are
directly or indirectly responsible, in-whole or in-part, for
the Plaintiff's liberty being stolen then marketed for
financial gain and other benefits, for all those involved
except the Plaintiff.” Id. at 5-6, ¶
5.g-i; 10, ¶ 13. The very notion that Defendants or
their alleged co-conspirators collateralized his criminal
proceedings is not only implausible; it is preposterous.
Based on these nonsensical allegations, Jimenez raises claims
of “deceptive trades, negligence, negligence per se,
breach of duty, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy,
” and “other undefined ‘per se'
infractions, etc.” Id. at 7. In his Response,
Jimenez clarifies that his Amended Complaint is not
“based on personal injury, ” but rather is
“a contract issue [and the absence thereof] resulting
in a deceptive trade practice and possible personal
injury.” Pl.'s Resp. 2, ¶ 4 (emphasis and
brackets in original).
redress, Jimenez asks this Court: (1) to order the U.S.
Marshal to take custody of the alleged “mortgage
file”; (2) to order Defendants to “produce the
explicit contract authorizing the business relationship
between [Jimenez] and WELLS FARGO, N.A. and/or their
co-conspirators”; and (3) to order Defendants to
reimburse him for “twice the face value of instrument
CUSIP . . ., and all of the proceeds that they have received
including the maximum allowed interest rate by law, ”
in addition to $50 million for loss of life, liberty and
property. Am. Compl. 11. In a word, Plaintiff's claims
are simply humbug.
moves to strike Defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 12(a)
and (f), contending that it is “immaterial, . . .
insufficient, ” “misleading and
distractive.” Pl.'s Resp. 1. To the contrary,
Defendants' motion and supporting memorandum succinctly
state their arguments in support of dismissal. I will deny
Jimenez's motion to strike.
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The
purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “‘to test the
sufficiency of a complaint' and not to ‘resolve
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.'” Presley v. City of
Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
243 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also Goines v. Valley Cmty.
Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016). The
sufficiency of a complaint is assessed by reference to the
pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), which provides that a
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). Under the plausibility
standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels
and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555; see also Painter's Mill Grille, LLC
v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013)
(“It is now well established that mere conclusory and
speculative allegations are not sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss.”).
reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94). From those
allegations, it must “draw all reasonable inferences
[from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.”
Id. (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.
2009)). While a court must accept as true all the factual
allegations contained in the complaint, legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are not afforded such deference.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating that
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice” to plead a claim); see A Society Without a
Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011).
pro se litigant's complaint should not be
dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the litigant
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). However, liberal construction
does not absolve Plaintiff from pleading plausible claims.
See Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D.
Md.1981) (citing Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560,
562-63 (4th Cir. 1977)).
It is neither unfair nor unreasonable to require a pleader to
put his complaint in an intelligible, coherent, and
manageable form, and his failure to do so may warrant
dismissal. District courts are not required to be mind
readers, or to conjure questions not squarely presented to
Harris v. Angliker, 955 F.2d 41, 1992 WL 21375, at *
1 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (internal ...