United States District Court, D. Maryland
L. Russell, III United States District Judge
March 24, 2017, the Court received a “Motion to Appear
Amicus Curiae” for filing from Lamar Christopher
Chapman, an inmate housed at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania. Chapman, who characterizes
himself as a “prolific litigator, ” names
President Donald J. Trump, Sr. as the Defendant and appears
to challenge Trump's executive orders that Chapman
portrays as a “Muslim Ban or Religious Ban.” (ECF
No. 1). Chapman argues that Trump premises one of the
executive orders on a national security threat list compiled
by the previous administration of Barack Obama, “an
unconstitutional and invalid office holder.” He alleges
that a number of states filed temporary restraining orders
against the executive order without any case or controversy.
Chapman contends that unspecified actions were misfiled in
bad faith and in the wrong venue because the correct venue is
the District of Columbia, the location of Trump's
residence. Id. Chapman did not accompany the action
with a civil filing fee or indigency application. The Court
will not require Chapman to cure this deficiency because the
case shall be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for screening of any
Complaint “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.” See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d
391, 394 (4th Cir. 2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Before permitting the case to move forward or requiring a
response from the Defendant, “the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b); see also Williamson v. Angelone,
197 F.Supp.2d 476, 478 (E.D.Va. 2001); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). The
screening is necessary to determine whether the Court will
require Defendant to respond to the action.
a complaint need not contain detailed allegations, the facts
alleged must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level and require “more than labels and
conclusions, ” as “courts are not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The complaint
must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 569.
Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported
by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations
in the complaint. Id. at 547.
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard,
however, a pro se action may still be subject to summary
dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal
construction means only that if the court can reasonably read
the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff
could prevail, it may permit the action to proceed. See
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir.
1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal
arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,
417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), nor should a court “conjure up
questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
review of Public Access to Court Electronics Records
(“PACER”) shows that Chapman is a prolific
litigator. The Court is unable to construe any legal basis
for Chapman's filing in this District. To the extent he
is contesting the action challenging Trump's executive
order in this Court,  he has failed to demonstrate he has
standing to file suit.
complicated constitutional minimum of Article III standing
has three elements. The plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact, (2) an injury that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) an injury that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, et al., 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1997). Here, because Chapman has failed to show
he has suffered an injury in fact, he has no standing to file
cause of action, construed as a civil rights complaint, will
be dismissed. Leave to file or appear as amicus curiae shall
be denied as the Court concludes that the proffered
information is unusable and that Chapman has failed to
demonstrate a special interest in the outcome of the
case. A separate Order follows.
 Chapman's federal convictions
arose in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois.
 See Int'l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump., F.Supp.3d __, 2017 WL 1018235 (D.Md.
2017) (granting in part a preliminary injunction of
Trump's second executive order temporarily suspending
immigration from six Muslim-majority countries and suspending
the entry of refugees above 50, 000 in 2017).
 When reviewing motions for leave to
file amici curie memorandum, federal district courts have
discretion to grant or deny leave and may look to the reason
why the amicus brief is desirable and why the matters
asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case. See
Am. Humanist Assoc. v. ...