Arthur, Shaw Geter, Thieme, Raymond G., Jr. (Senior Judge,
Specially Assigned), JJ.
Petty, appellant, appeals from an order issued by the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City granting summary judgment in favor
of appellees, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
several employees of the Baltimore City Fire Department, and
the Baltimore City Professional Fire Fighters, IAFF Local
734. Appellant presents one argument on appeal: Did the
circuit court err in entering summary judgment against him?
For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.
August 13, 2015, appellant filed a four-count complaint in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore (the "City"); four
employees of the Baltimore City Fire Department
("BCFD"), specifically, Jeffrey Segal, Mark Wagner,
James Wallace, and Charles Dwyer; and the Baltimore City
Professional Fire Fighters, IAFF Local 734 (the
"Union"). Appellant had been an employee with the
BCFD from September 18, 1995, until April 15, 2015, when he
was discharged. During his employment, appellant had risen
through the ranks, and at the time of his discharge he was an
emergency vehicle driver assigned to a HAZMAT unit. It is not
disputed that appellant was a dues paying member of the Union
at all relevant times.
first count of appellant's complaint was an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against each of
the defendants. He alleged that during his employment he was
subject to "unjustified, illegal and malicious
harassment" by Wagner, Wallace, and Dwyer, that caused,
without elaboration, "certain disciplinary actions"
and "disparate adverse treatment" to be made
against him; "cast [asper]sions" on his character;
and violated his rights to seek assistance from his Union. He
alleged that the City, the BCFD, and Segal, Assistant Chief
of the BCFD, acquiesced in those actions.
second count alleged tortious interference with contract and
was against Wagner, Wallace, and Dwyer, who allegedly induced
the BCFD to "breach its contractual obligations"
regarding employment opportunities and promotions for
appellant. Appellant alleged, again without elaboration, that
as a result of those employees' actions he was removed
from his position and forced to resign.
third count alleged negligence by: 1) the City, the BFCD, and
Segal for allowing the three named employees to harass
appellant; and 2) the City and the BFCD for failing to
provide appropriate medical care to appellant for the
work-related injury to his right hand and thumb, which caused
"serious permanent disability, " and in failing to
properly process appellant's retirement claim.
fourth count alleged breach of contract and alleged that the
Union failed to represent him in his employment claims.
responded by moving for summary judgment. In support of their
motion appellees argued, among other things, that appellant
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
the action in circuit court; appellant's tort claim was
barred by the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act
("MWCA"), see Md. Code Ann., Lab. &
Empl. §§ 9-101, et. seq.; and
appellant's tortious interference with contract claim
against the three named employees was not actionable because
the employees were parties to the contract with the City.
Appellees clarified that appellant was removed by
administrative action for two reasons. First, he was deemed
no longer fit for duty by the opinion of the Medical Director
of the Mercy Medical Center Public Safety Infirmary due to
the injury to his hand. Second, appellant had exhausted his
paid leave (from January 8, 2014 to April 15, 2015) for a
line of duty injury and had to either return to work, be
separated from City employment, or challenge his status by
means of an internal appeal or grievance, which he has not
Circuit Court for Baltimore City agreed with appellees and
entered summary judgment against appellant on grounds that he
did not exhaust his administrative and contractual remedies.
argues on appeal that the circuit court's ruling was in
error, because the ruling was "erroneously predicated on
the assumption" that his claims were "within the
scope of available administrative and contractual
remedies." Appellees preliminarily respond that
appellant has waived his appeal because he has cited no case
law to support his argument. Even if appellant's argument
is preserved, appellees argue that the circuit court's
ruling was correct - appellant was required and failed to
exhaust available remedies under the Baltimore City Charter,
Art. VII, § 100, and Arts. 6 and 12 of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the City and the Union and the
quickly dismiss appellees' waiver argument. Md. Rule
8-504, governing the content of appellate briefs, contains no
requirement that an appellant must cite case law in support
of his arguments. Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115
Md.App. 549, 577-78 (1997), the main case cited by appellees
for its waiver argument, stands for the proposition that
where a brief only recites facts and does not relate those
facts to a legal theory, we shall not address the potential
merits of the argument presented. Here, appellant contests
the lower court's grant of summary judgment. Appellant
cites several cases regarding the standard of review for
summary judgment and ...