United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
J. Garbis United States District Judge
Court has before it Interpleader Defendant Edmund T.
Broderick's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 54], the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by John Pompey [ECF No.
56], and the materials submitted relating thereto. The Court
has held a hearing and had the benefit of the arguments of
Summary of Pertinent Events
2005, Lowell Broderick (“Broderick”) and John
Pompey (“Pompey”) formed Versa Tile Marble, LLC.
undisputed that, in 2005, PHL Variable Life Insurance Company
(“PHL”) issued two $1, 000, 000 life insurance
policies - one on the life of Broderick (“the Broderick
Policy”) with Pompey as beneficiary and the other on
the life of Pompey (“the Pompey Policy) with Broderick
as the beneficiary. It is also undisputed that the Company
paid the premiums on both policies through 2009.
2009, Broderick and Pompey ended their business relationship.
On June 30, 2009, they entered into a Membership Interest
Redemption Agreement (“MIRA”) whereby Pompey
purchased Broderick's membership in the Company for some
$80, 000 and proceeded to operate the business. The MIRA said
nothing about the life insurance policies.
about January 16, 2009, Broderick signed a document [ECF No.
54-10] that PHL and Broderick treated as changing the
beneficiary on the Broderick Policy from Pompey to the Lowell
S. Broderick Revocable Trust (“the
Trust”). Broderick thereafter paid the premiums on
the Broderick policy until he died on March 3, 2015.
Broderick's death, both Pompey and the Trust claimed
entitlement to the Broderick Policy death benefits. The
critical issue is whether, in January 2009, Broderick
effectively changed the Broderick policy beneficiary from
Pompey to the Trust.
commenced this action by filing an Interpleader Complaint
[ECF No. 1] against Pompey and Edmund T. Broderick
(“Edmund”) individually and as Trustee of the
filed an Answer [ECF No. 18] asserting that he was entitled
to the benefits of the Broderick policy.
filed an Answer [ECF No. 22], asserting that the Trust was
entitled to the benefits of the Broderick
agreement of all parties, the Court issued a procedural Order
[ECF No. 44] providing that the Court would first proceed to
determine whether Pompey or the Trust is entitled to the
benefits of the Broderick policy. After that determination is
made, the case shall proceed with regard to such of the other
claims as may remain pending.
the Court must now proceed to determine whether Pompey or the
Trust is entitled to the proceeds of the Broderick policy.
instant cross motions both Pompey and the Trust seek summary
judgment establishing their right to the death benefits of
the Broderick Policy.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings
and supporting documents “show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The well-established principles pertinent
to such motions can be distilled to a simple statement.
Court may look at the evidence presented in regard to the
motion for summary judgment through the non-movant's rose
colored glasses, but must view it realistically. After so
doing, the essential question is whether a reasonable fact
finder could return a verdict for the non-movant or whether
the movant would, at trial, be entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. E.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,477 U.S. 317, ...