United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
J. HAZEL United States District Judge
Starsha Sewell brings this case against Defendant
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
("WMATA"). alleging that it engaged in
discriminatory employment practices in violation of her
rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
('"Title VII"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e el seq., and the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 42 U.S.C. § 12112
ef seq. ECF No. I. Pending before the Court are the
following motions: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No.1; Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Defendant's "Out of Time" Motion to Dismiss.
ECF No. 11; Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's
"Out of Time Reply" to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration. ECF No. 12: Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Defendant's Untimely Opposition. ECF No. 1 7: and
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Second Untimely
Opposition. ECF No.
These issues have heen fully briefed and a hearing is
unnecessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons
that follow, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and will deny all of Plaintiffs pending motions.
was employed by WMATA from February 8. 2010 through September
2012. ECF No. 1 at 5.Plaintiff alleges that WMATA
employees engaged in a series of discriminatory employment
practices against her. both during her employment with the
agency and when she attempted to re-apply for a position
after her departure. See generally ECF No. 1.
June 16. 2011 through November 4. 2011. Plaintiff was unable
to work due to medical issues. Id. at 3. Plaintiff
alleges that Dr. Gina Pervall discriminated against her because
of a prior disability by refusing to provide her with
documentation necessary to return to work until January'
25. 2012. even though Plaintiff had passed a medical and drug
test administered by another doctor on November 7. 2011.
Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Pervall
obstructed Plaintiffs employment opportunities in retaliation
for Plaintiff engaging in protected activities with her union
regarding the delayed reinstatement. Id. at 4.
April 2012. Plaintiff applied for a position as "St.
Organizational Training Consultant" with WMATA. but was
removed from consideration by Tiquisha Harris, Id.
at 8. On July 6. 2012, Plaintiff 11 led a formal complaint of
employment discrimination with WMATA and, on the same day.
was invited to engage in an informal meeting with an official
from the human resources department concerning her
allegations. Id. On July 11, 2012. Plaintiff
received a •'generic" letter regarding her
concerns, which "did not.. .hold Tiquisha Harris
accountable tor discriminating against [Plaintiff] in the
hiring process." Id. On July 31. 2012.
Plaintiff declined to continue with WMATA"s voluntary
dispute resolution process and requested to move forward with
tiling a formal complaint against WMATA. Id. at 9.
further alleges that on July 29. 2012. Amy Quillen, motivated
by racial discrimination and in retaliation against Plaintiff
for engaging in protected activities, such as tiling a WMATA
internal complaint, conducted an unauthorized background
check of Plaintiff. hi. Finally, on August 9. 2012.
Plaintiff alleges that James Wynne discriminated against
Plaintiff because of her sex when he denied Plaintiffs
request for a formal charge of discrimination. id.
Plaintiff tiled a charge with the EEOC regarding violations
of her rights under Title VII and the ADA on August 28, 2012.
Id. at 5. On July 16. 2013. the EEOC reached a final
decision in Plaintiffs case. id.
October 25. 2013. Plaintiff applied for the position of
"Director of Customer Care" with WMATA.
Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff states that she was
"qualified to fill [the] position." hi. at
6. On October 28. 2013. Plaintiff was denied consideration
for the position, allegedly in retaliation for her engagement
in protected activities, including filing a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. filing an internal complaint
with WMATA. and raising her discrimination concerns with her
union. Id. at 6. Plaintiff further alleges that she
was denied consideration based on her sex and race.
filed an additional charge with the EEOC and was issued a
right to sue letter on June 10. 2016. Id. at 1:
see also ECF No. 1-1, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
survive a motion to dismiss invoking Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
"a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its foee.'"Ashcroji v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662. 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp.
r. Twomhly. 550 U.S. 544. 570 (2007)). "A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678.
"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice." hi. (citing Twomhly, 550
U.S. at 555) ("a plaintiffs obligation to provide the
'grounds' of his 'entitlefment) to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of a cause of action's elements will not
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)\s purpose "is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the
facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville.
464 F.3d 480. 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). When deciding a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). a court "must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint, "
and must "draw all reasonable inferences [from those
facts] in favor of the plaintiff." E.J. du Pont de
Nemours &- Co, v. Kolon Indus.. Inc.. 637
F.3d 435. 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court need not. however, accept
unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles
County C'omm 'rs. 882 F.2d 870. 873 (4th Cir.
1989). legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265. 286 (1986). or
conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to
actual events. United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v.
Hirst. 604 F.2d 844. 847 (4th Cir. 1979). Although
pleadings of self-represented litigants must be accorded
liberal construction, see Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147. 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). liberal construction does not
mean a court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that
set forth a cognizable claim, see Welter v. Dep't of
Soc. Sens, .90] F.2d 387. 391 (4th Cir. 1990).