United States District Court, D. Maryland
JAMES FREDERICK YOUNG, III, Prisoner Identification No. 3758409, Plaintiff,
WARDEN FRANK BISHOP, Defendant.
Theodore D. Chuang United States District Judge
Frederick Young, III, currently confined at North Branch
Correctional Institution ("NBCI") in Cumberland,
Maryland, has filed this Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Young alleges that his rights
under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Articles 4, 5, 7, and 11 of "Human Rights" were
violated while he was housed as a pretrial detainee at NBCI.
Compl. ¶¶ 13-21, ECF No.
.. Presently pending before the Court is a
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant Warden Frank Bishop ("the
Warden"). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
October 7, 205,, Young was charged with first-degree assault,
second-degree assault of a law enforcement officer, two
counts of second-degree assault, resisting arrest, disorderly
conduct, and failure to obey a reasonable and lawful order.
As a pretrial detainee, he was initially held at Baltimore
Central Booking and Intake Center ("BCBIC".. While
Young was detained there, on October 7, 2015, he refused to
comply with direct orders to stay locked in his cell. When a
lieutenant, sergeant, and three correctional officers
physically escorted him into his cell, he became combative by
swinging his fist. The sergeant and correctional officers
placed Young on the ground to handcuff him with his arms
behind his back. On October 8, 2015, Young was served with a
notice of inmate infraction, charging him with violating
prison Rules 100 (engaging in a disruptive act), 101
(committing assault or battery on staff), 104 (using
intimidating, coercive, or threatening language), 312
(interfering with or resisting the performance of staff
duties), and 400 (disobeying an order). As a result of this
incident, Young was ordered into administrative segregation
pending a hearing. On the morning of October 12, 2015, Young
assaulted a sergeant and officer at BCBIC after failing to
comply with orders to return to his cell.
October 12, 2015, Young was transferred to NBCI and placed in
administrative segregation and on staff alert based on
concerns that he posed a danger to the "security of the
institution and/or inmates and/or staff." Mot. Dismiss
Ex. 1 at 4, 5-6, 52, ECF No. 12-2. On November 19, 2015, a
formal hearing was held regarding the charges stemming from
the October 7, 2015 incident. Young pleaded guilty to
violating prison Rules 101, 312, and 400. The hearing officer
imposed a sanction of 90 days of segregation and an
indefinite suspension of visitation privileges. Young did not
formally appeal the decision or the sentence. On December 15,
2015, William Bohrer, on behalf of Warden Bishop, reviewed
and affirmed the hearing officer's decision but reduced
the visitation suspension from an indefinite period to six
months and imposed 60 days of cell restriction. At NBCI,
inmates placed in segregation for disciplinary reasons
receive out-of-cell recreation five days a week, as well as
two showers per week. An inmate on segregation with cell
restrictions receives recreation only once per week. Young at
times declined the out-of-cell recreation time and showers
available to him.
March 25, 2016, Young was convicted by a jury in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, Maryland of second-degree assault
and second-degree assault of a law enforcement officer. He
was sentenced on the same date to four years of imprisonment.
Complain,, received by the Court on January 7, 2016, Young
claims that his pretrial detention at NBCI constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
because he received only one hour of out-of-cell recreation
time each week due to his placement on cell restriction.
Young also alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment and his
human rights because he was housed as a pretrial detainee in
a maximum security facility with convicted inmates, and
because, in his view, confinement at NBCI is akin to slavery
in that he was subjected to inhumane torture in the form of
prison officials allowing an inmate in an adjacent cell to
"constantly throw feces" on his cell door and food
slot. Compl. ¶¶ 14-19. He further contends that he
is subjected to discrimination on a daily basis, in violation
of his human rights, because most of the correctional
officers are racist and "are out to hurt [him] mentally
or physically because [he is] currently incarcerated for
assaulting two Baltimore City Police Officers."
Id. ¶¶ 20-22. Young seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief, "'make-up' recreation, "
compensatory and punitive damages, and costs. Id.
Warden has filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975), Young was
sent correspondence notifying him that the Warden had filed a
dispositive motion, the granting of which could result in the
dismissal of his action. Young was also informed that he was
entitled to file materials in opposition to the Motion within
17 days from the date of that letter, and that his failure to
file a timely responsive brief to illustrate, through
accompanying affidavits or other evidence, a genuine dispute
of material fact could result in the dismissal of his case or
in the entry of summary judgment without further notice of
the Court. Young did not file a Response.
Warden seeks dismissal of the Complaint or summary judgment
in his favor on several grounds, including that: (1) the
Complaint must be dismissed because he is immune from
liability under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution; (2) Young's Human Rights claims do not
state a cognizable claim for relief; (3) the Complaint does
not allege that the Warden personally participated in the
alleged violations; (4) Young failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies; and (5) Young has failed to state a
plausible constitutional claim arising from his transfer to
NBCI and the imposition of a cell restriction limiting his
Motion to Dismiss
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
"been unclear on whether a dismissal on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds is a dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)."
Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th Cir.
2000). The Fourth Circuit has noted that "[a]though not
a true limit on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment is 'a block on the
exercise of that jurisdiction.'" Roach v.
W. Va. Reg'Uail & Carr. Facility
Auth., 74 F.3d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Biggs
v. Meadow, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995)). Thus, to the
extent that the Warden's Eleventh Amendment immunity
argument is most appropriately construed as the subject of a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it
would be governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). Where, as here, the defendant's Eleventh
Amendment argument relies on the pleadings alone, the
standard is effectively the same. Under Rule 12(b)(1), when a
defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to allege
facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdication,
the allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true under
the same standard as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and "the
motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient
facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction""
Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir.
Warden's arguments based on the lack of a cognizable
claim for Human Rights violations and the failure to allege
unconstitutional conduct by the Warden personally are
properly construed as the subject of a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a
plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts
pleaded allow "the Court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Id. Although courts should construe
pleadings of self-represented litigants liberally,
Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), legal
conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must examine the
complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the