United States District Court, D. Maryland
W. Grimm United States District Judge.
response to the above-captioned civil rights complaint,
Defendant moves to dismiss or for summary judgment. ECF No.
14. Plaintiff was advised of his right to file an Opposition
Response and of the consequences of failing to do so, ECF No.
15, but has filed nothing further. No hearing is necessary to
resolve the matters pending. See Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. 2016). For the reasons that follow, Defendant's
motion, construed as a Motion to Dismiss, shall be granted.
Marcus Clark, an inmate committed to the custody of the
Maryland Division of Correction and confined in Eastern
Correctional Institution ("ECI"), claims he was
removed from a prison job for discriminatory reasons. Compl.
5, ECF No. 1. He states that he was assigned to work in
the prison kitchen when Defendants Officer Troxell and
Lieutenant White walked through the dish room, where he was
working. Id. 4. A third officer, Officer Johnson,
called Plaintiff over and asked if he had gotten paperwork
from medical documenting that he could not wear work boots.
Id. Plaintiff explained that the doctor had seen him
and issued a medical order excusing him from wearing work
boots, which could be confirmed by consulting computer
records. id. Johnson told Plaintiff it was not her
job to go to the medical department to get the paperwork and
that Plaintiff should have been given a copy of it or it
should have been sent over to the work supervisor.
Id. Plaintiff explained that he had no control over
what medical staff had done with the medical order and that
the doctor had told him not to wear the boots because they
"may be making [his] condition worse." Id.
Plaintiff states that the work boots were bruising his feet,
but claims that Johnson stated she did not care. Id.
his conversation with Johnson, White and Troxell began
talking to Plaintiff. White stated that she had not received
anything from medical and Plaintiff stated he would write a
request for the order. Id. Troxell, the only named
Defendant, then asked why Plaintiff wasn't wearing boots.
Id. Plaintiff explained that he could not wear the
boots as they may be worsening his condition. Id.
Plaintiff claims that Troxell became angry and gave him an
ultimatum to go put on his work boots or he would receive an
infraction for refusing to work. Id. After Plaintiff
protested and said he was not refusing to work, rather the
work boots caused him extreme pain, Troxell sent him back to
his housing unit and said they would be waiting for him to
turn in his "kitchen whites." Id.
states that White agreed that he was not refusing to work and
suggested that Johnson go to medical to find out what was
going on. Id. at 5. When Johnson went to medical she
obtained a copy of the medical order that stated Plaintiff
should be excused from wearing work boots. Id.
Regardless, Plaintiff was still required to return to his
housing unit. He claims his dismissal from the job site
constituted discrimination against him based on his
disability.Id. As relief, Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages of $600, 000. Mat 3.
reviewing the complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) the court accepts all
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and
construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived
therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420
(4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra
v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v.
Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26
(4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating
that a complaint need only satisfy the "simplified
pleading standard" of Rule 8(a)).
Supreme Court of the United States explained a
"plaintiffs obligation to provide the
"grounds" of his "entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusion,, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the
complaint does not need "detailed factual
allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 555. Instead, "once a claim has been
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint."
Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, "a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]'
- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief"
Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563
(citing Sanjuan v. Am. Ed. o/Psychiatry and Neurology,
Inc., 40 F.3d, 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994)).
asserts in part that the Complaint fails to state a claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Def.'s
Mem. 9-10, ECF No. 14-1. The ADA was enacted in 1990 "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, " 42 U.S.C. S 12101(b)(1), and "to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, " id. S 12101(b)(2). Title II of
the ADA, which is at issue here, prohibits public entities,
including "any State or local government" and
"any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government, " id. S 12131(1), from
discriminating "by reason of disability against a
"qualified individual with a disability, "
id. S 12132.
purposes of Title II, a "qualified individual with a
disability" is defined as an individual with a
disability "who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal
of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers,
or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. S 12131(2).
State prisoners, such as Plaintiff, may qualify as
"qualified individual] with . . . disabilities],
" Id.., meaning that they are entitled to
protection under Title II of the ADA. In Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213
(1998), a unanimous Supreme Court held that "the plain
text of Title II of the ADA unambiguously extends to state
prison inmates." Although the Fourth Circuit "has
not squarely addressed the issue, " several circuits
"have determined that S l2132ss words 'or be
subjected to discrimination by that entity' are meant to
be a 'catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination
by a public entity, regardless of the context"'-in
other words, that Title II of the ADA applies to
"anything a public entity does." Seremeth v.
Ed. of Cty. Comm'rs of Frederick, 673 F.3d 333, 338
(4th Cir. 2012) (citing cases) (citations omitted); see
also Paulone v. Frederick, 787 F.Supp.2d 360, 380-81 (D.
Md. 2011) (collecting authority).
has not alleged, nor does he offer any evidence to support a
finding that he has a disability. In addition, there is no
allegation that Plaintiff was deprived of a benefit to which
he was otherwise entitled because of a disability. Rather, he
was simply not permitted to work on one ...