United States District Court, D. Maryland
RICHARD D. BENNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court for preliminary screening is Billy Ray
Jackson's ("Jackson") self-represented
Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,
filed on February 8, 2017. ECF No. 1 & 2. Although the
Complaint is difficult to decipher, Jackson appears to invoke
the Court's federal question jurisdiction and cites to
both federal and state criminal statutes. He accuses a state
administrative law judge of placing listening and talking
devices in her court room when hearing Jackson's
disability case. He claims that parties were too intrusive
into his business and his "case has been embezzled [by
the Defendants.]" ECF No. 1, p. 4.
next makes outlandish statements regarding transactions
between the Defendants involving payments and deals resulting
in the theft of his real name and implies that his
"disability" and retroactive pay were taken. He
seemingly claims that several Defendants spied on him and
were able to review paperwork, obtain the key from his mail
box, and "drain" money out of his account. ECF No.
1, pp. 4-5.
further states that the apartment property management company
controls the keys to his mail box and appears to allege that
the management company was complicit in allowing some of the
Defendants to access his mail box, enabling them to apply for
veteran's benefits under his and his father's name.
He contends that he has written the local police department,
but they refuse to help him. Jackson charges the
administrative law judge and police of protecting these
individuals and their criminal acts. ECF No. 1, p. 5.
seeks a federal court order to stop the Defendants alleged
harassment. He claims that Defendants have taken his
father's veteran's benefits and states that he was
informed that the administrative judge applied for them. He
complains that he and his wife are harassed "everywhere
we go church store and around our family with sound came from
the air. Listening and talking device this is a problem,
(sic)" ECF No. 1, p. 6. His cause of action shall
be construed as a civil rights action, filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Jackson's Motion for Leave to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis shall be granted. His Complaint, shall,
however, be summarily dismissed.
Jackson is proceeding as a self-represented litigant, the
Court must liberally construe his Complaint. See e.g.,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This Court,
however, is not required to conjure up questions never
squarely presented to it. See Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, a
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the
Court's jurisdiction depends; a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although self-represented
pleadings must be "held to less stringent standards than
those by lawyers, " Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. at 94, a complaint need not contain detailed
allegations. The facts alleged must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level and require
"more than labels and conclusions, " as
"courts are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation." See
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 1915A permit an indigent litigant
to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the
filing fee. To protect against possible abuses of this
privilege, the statute requires a court to dismiss any case
that "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the United
States Supreme Court held that a district court may dismiss
the complaint of a self-represented litigant under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 when the complaint includes only a "fanciful
factual allegation" and lacks "an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Id. at 325; see
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)
("[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous
only if the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless, ' a
category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful,
' 'fantastic, ' and 'delusional.'
"). As those words suggest, a finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to
the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether
or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to
forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed, however,
simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations
unlikely. Neitzke explained that the statute
"accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a
claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Id. at 327. Indeed, § 1915 was amended after
Neitzke and Denton, s-such that now the
statute mandates that a district court "shall
dismiss" a case upon a finding that the Complaint
"fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (B)(ii); see
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).
when providing a generous review to the self-represented
Complaint, see, e.g., Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at
127, 1 find it proper to dismiss Jackson's Complaint.
See Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (a
complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
if it d-does not allege enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face); Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 325-28. The Court concludes that Jackson has
presented rambling claims that are nonsensical. It is
appropriate to dismiss his action under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) for the failure to state a claim.
to the extent that Jackson wishes to file a civil rights
complaint to file criminal charges against Defendants, this
Court has no authority to initiate criminal charges. The
decision whether or not to prosecute, and for what offense,
rests with the prosecution. See, e.g., Borderkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). The Supreme Court said
in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973): "[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another." See also
Banks v. Buchanan, 336 Fed.Appx. 122, 123 (3d Cir.
2009); Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F.Supp.2d 17, 22
(D. D.C. 2012). If Jackson seeks to pursue criminal charges,
he must bring his allegations to the attention of law
enforcement authorities, not this Court. A separate Order
 The Complaint text indicates that
Jackson intended to name these parties as Defendants. The
Clerk shall amend the ...