United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Charles B. Day United States Magistrate Judge.
this Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of
Order(s) Granting Defendants' Motion to Compel
Post-Judgment Discovery and Supplemental Motion to Compel
Post-Judgment Discovery (“Plaintiff's
Motion”) (ECF No. 243). The Court has also received the
opposition and reply thereto. The Court has reviewed the
parties' submissions and applicable law. No hearing is
deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For
the reasons presented below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
November 18, 2016, the Court denied without prejudice
Defendants' motion to compel post-judgment discovery from
Plaintiff because Defendants failed to satisfy the proof of
service requirement of Local Rule 102.1
(“Defendants' Motion to Compel”) (ECF No. 239
and 240). However, in the same memorandum, the Court
addressed the merits of Defendants' Motion to Compel and
stated that once Defendants satisfied the proof of service
requirement, it would grant Defendants' request.
Defendants filed a supplemental motion satisfying Local Rule
102.1, and the Court granted the supplemental motion in the
November 29, 2016 Memorandum and accompanying Order (ECF No.
242), with reference to the discussion within the November
18, 2016 Memorandum. On December 2, 2016, Plaintiff's
Motion was filed.
asks the Court to reconsider its decision to compel
post-judgment discovery. Defendants identify Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b) as the applicable rule, which allows the Court to
revisit interlocutory orders before the issuance of
a final judgment. As there has already been a final judgment,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) does not specifically govern the instant
case. However, in the absence of a rule on point
on the matter, the Court finds Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) to be an
appropriate guide in reconsidering a motion to compel
courts have adhered to a fairly narrow set of
grounds'” when reconsidering motions under the
authority of Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Warner v. Cellco
P'ship, No. ELH-13-3100, 2016 WL 258342, at *1 (D.
Md. Jan. 20, 2016) (quoting Cezair v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. DKC-13-2928, 2014 WL 4955535, at *1 (D.
Md. Sept. 30, 2014)). Courts “will reconsider”
only where: “(1) there has been an intervening change
in controlling law; (2) there is additional evidence that was
not previously available; or (3) the prior decision was based
on clear error or would work manifest injustice.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
fails to establish any of the three conditions for
reconsideration of an order. His arguments are: (1) Plaintiff
was entitled to file a response to Defendants'
supplemental motion to compel before the Court ruled on the
supplemental motion; and (2) Defendants did not file for
leave to serve additional discovery request to Plaintiff.
the Court's November 18, 2016 Memorandum Opinion (ECF No.
239) resolved the legal issues in Defendants' Motion to
Compel in Defendants' favor. Defendants' Motion to
Compel was filed nearly six months before the Court ruled
upon it. Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Compel was considered and rejected. The subsequent
supplemental motion was filed to address Defendants'
deficiency in satisfying the proof of service requirement of
Local Rule 102.1(c), and no issues or points of dispute
remained. Thus, even if Plaintiff had filed an opposition to
Defendants' supplemental motion, such an opposition would
have been limited to addressing Defendants' compliance
with Local Rule 102.1, which the Court determined was met.
Plaintiff's Motion does not suggest any substantive
deficiencies, but rather argues only that Plaintiff
“should have until December 6, 2016 to respond by
filing his Opposition to the Supplemental Motion” (ECF
No. 243, p. 2). Plaintiff fails to show how he may have been
prejudiced by the Court's decision. As such, the Court
will not grant Plaintiff's Motion in the absence of any
inkling of “additional evidence that was not previously
available” or a showing that “the prior decision
was based on clear error or would work manifest
injustice.” Warner, 2016 WL 258342, at *1.
Defendants were not required to file for leave from the Court
to serve additional discovery requests. By repeatedly
referencing the “closed” discovery deadline,
Plaintiff appears to conflate the requirements for initial
discovery and post-judgment discovery. As the Court explained
in the November 18, 2016 Memorandum (ECF No. 239), Rule 69(b)
permits a judgment creditor to obtain discovery “[i]n
aid of the judgment or execution . . .”. Fed. R. Civ.
69(b). This discovery matter is entirely separate from the
initial discovery that the parties engaged in at the
beginning of the suit, and therefore the discovery schedule
and deadlines issued by the Court at that time are not
relevant in post-judgment discovery. Thus, it was not
necessary for Defendants to file for leave to serve
additional discovery requests upon Plaintiff.
foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.