United States District Court, D. Maryland
RANDY T. DAVIS, SR., #366-577 Petitioner,
RICHARD D. DOVEY and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND Respondents.
W. Grimm, United States District Judge
T. Davis, a self-represented Maryland prisoner, seeks habeas
corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1.
He attacks his convictions from 2010 in the Circuit Court for
Somerset County for robbery, handgun, theft, assault, and
related gun charges. The Warden of the Maryland Correctional
Institution in Hagerstown ("MCI-H") and the Maryland
Attorney General (collectively, "Respondents")
filed a Limited Answer and offered exhibits outlining
proceedings relating to Davis's criminal case. Limited
Ans., ECF No.;; State Ct. Docket, ECF No.7-1; Davis v.
State, No. 2548 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 28, 2022), ECF
No. 7-2; Mandate (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 31, 2015), ECF No.
7-3. Although afforded the opportuntty to do so, ECF No.3,
Davis has not replied. The Court has reviewed the Petition
and Limited Answer. See Rule 8(a), Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). For the
reasons set forth below, the Petition shall be denied and a
certificate of appealability shall not issue.
Factual and Procedural History
was charged in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, tried
by a jury, and convicted of armed robbery, first-degree
assault, second-degree assault, armed robbery, and related
offenses. State Ct. Docket; Davis, slip op. at 1. On
December 8, 2010, Circuit Court Judge Daniel M. Long
sentenced Davis to a 30-year term of incarceration. State Ct.
Docket 15; Davis, slip op. at 1. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment on
September 28, 2012. State Ct. Docket 18; Davis, slip
op. at 1. The mandate was issued on October 31, 2012. State
Ct. Docket 18; Mandate, ECF No. 7-2, at 11. Davis did not
seek further review in the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
State Ct. Docket.
December 19, 2012, Davis filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in the Circuit Court for Somerset County. Id.
at 18. He moved to withdraw the petition, and the court
granted the motion on April 3, 2013. Id. at 19. On
August 13, 2013, Davis filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence, which Judge Long denied on September 11, 2013.
Id. at 20. Davis appealed that ruling on September
26, 2013. Id. On October 9, 2013, Davis filed
another petition for post-conviction relief, which was stayed
pending his appeal of the motion to correct an illegal
sentence. Id. at 20-21. He then asked the court to
dismiss his appeal, which the court did on July 31, 2014,
id. at 21. The appellate court's mandate was
issued on September 10, 2014. Id.
the appeal of the motion to correct was dismissed, the stay
was lifted as to the postconviction proceedings. A hearing
was held on July 28, 2015, and post-conviction relief was
denied on August 11, 2015. Id. at 22-23. Davis filed
an application for leave to appeal, which was dismissed as
untimely by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on
November 25, 205. Id. at 23. Davis then moved for
reconsideraiion on December 11, 2015, and the Court of
Special Appeals denied the motion and issued its mandate on
December 31, 2015. Id.
petition, deemed filed on July 29, 2016, asserts that (1)
officers made several misrepresentations to obtain a search
warrant application; (2) detectives took him from his vehicle
without probable cause and allowed false information to be
utilized in all reports; (3) officers searched his home
without a warrant; (4) officials' reports and an
affidavit were replete with falsehoods; (5) officials used
false information in an affidavit to obtain a search warrant;
(6) the State's Attorney presented false evidence and
information to the court and withheld information; and (7)
the State's Attorney allowed fabricated evidence to be
used in court. Pet. 6-19. In their Limited Answer,
Respondenss assert that this Court cannot reach the merits of
Davis's claims because the Petition is untimely, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 9 2244(d), and Davis has provided no basis for
applying the doctrine of equitable tolling. Limited Ans. 2,
Applicable Statutory Standards
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") was enacted and signed into law on April
24, 1996. Prior to AEDPA, there was no time limitation on
when a prisoner could file an original action for habeas
corpus relief in federal court. AEDPA introduced a one-year
limitations period for state prisoners filing under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The one-year period that
applies to habeas petitions begins to run on "the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review" or, if no appeal is taken, upon "the
expiration of the time for seeking such review."
See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Wall
v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 549 (2011). The one-year period
is tolled while properly filed post-conviction or collateral
review proceedings are pending, and it may otherwise be
equitably tolled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2);
Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir.
the limitations period began to run on November 15, 2012, the
date when Davis's criminal judgment became
fina1. Between November 15, 2012, and July 29,
2016, when Davis filed this federal Petition, more than 365
days (one year) passed during which there were no proceedings
pending in state court that would serve to toll the
limitations period of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). Davis does not
present any grounds to support an argument that the
limitations period should be statutorily tolled in his favor.
entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period,
Davis must establish that either some wrongful conduct by the
State contributed to the delay in filing his federal habeas
corpus petition, or that circumstances beyond his control
caused the delay. See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Rouse v. Lee, 339
F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003). "(A]ny resort to equity
must be reserved for those rare instances where - due to
circumstances external to the party's own conduct - it
would be unconscionabee to enforce the limitation period
against the party and gross injustice would result."
Rouse, 339 F.3d at 246 (quoting Harris, 209
F.3d at 330); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 418 (2005) (recognizing that equitable tolling requires
a showing ...