WELLS FARGO EQUIPMENT FINANCE, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellee,
NABIL J. ASTERBADI, Defendant-Appellant.
Argued: September 20, 2016
from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge.
B. Lamb, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Neal Leitess, LEITESS FRIEDBERG PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for
A. Donohoe, Potomac, Maryland, for Appellant.
S. Young, Pierce C. Murphy, LEITESS FRIEDBERG PC, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Irene M. KEELEY,
United States District Judge for the Northern District of
West Virginia, sitting by designation.
by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Diaz and Judge Keeley joined.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
appeal, we address the enforceability of a judgment
originally entered in the Eastern District of Virginia but
registered for enforcement in the District of Maryland under
28 U.S.C. § 1963. Particularly, we consider the time
period during which the judgment remains enforceable in
on a financing debt incurred by Dr. Nabil J. Asterbadi,
CIT/Equipment Financing, Inc. ("CIT") obtained a
$2.63 million judgment against Asterbadi in 1993, in the
Eastern District of Virginia. Under Virginia law, that
judgment remained viable for 20 years. Roughly 10 years after
the judgment had been entered, on August 27, 2003, CIT
registered the judgment in the District of Maryland pursuant
to § 1963. Under Maryland law, made relevant by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), judgments expire 12 years
sold the judgment to Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Inc., and
Wells Fargo thereafter, in April 2015, began collection
efforts in Maryland. Asterbadi filed a motion for a
protective order, contending that the judgment was
unenforceable because the efforts began more than 12 years
after the judgment had originally been entered in Virginia.
Wells Fargo responded that the registration of the Virginia
judgment in Maryland before it had expired under Virginia law
became, in effect, a new judgment that was subject to
Maryland law for enforcement. Thus, it argued, Maryland's
12-year limitations period began on the date that the
judgment was registered in Maryland, not on the date that the
original judgment was entered in Virginia, and therefore the
judgment was still enforceable.
district court agreed with Wells Fargo, concluding that the
time limitation for enforcement of the judgment began with
the date of its registration in Maryland, on August 27, 2003,
and that therefore it was still enforceable against
reasons that ...