United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
W. Grimm United States District Judge
Pierre Hicks and Tanya Hicks, who are proceeding pro
se, filed a Complaint on August 12, 2016 alleging that
Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practice
Act (the "FDCPA",, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, through
their attempts to collect a purported debt from Plaintiffs
and their "illegal non-judicial forced sale of the
consumer's consumer goods with false representation of
the character, and legal status of the alleged debt."
Compl. 3, ECF NO.1. On October 3, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an
Emergency Request for Injunctive Relief ("Motion",,
and Mr. Hicks filed a letter seeking further relief.
See Pls.' Mot., ECF No. 10; Mr. Hicks Ltr., ECF
No. 9. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants
"conducted an illegal debt collection action" in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and "were
granted a Judgment of Possession." Pls.' Mot. 1.
They attach the state court judgment, awarding possession of
Plaintiffs' real property at 10406 Damascus Park Lane,
Damascus, Maryland 20872 to U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee. ECF
No. 10-1. Plaintiffs ask "to be protected by an order of
injunction concerning consumer goods that were obtained for
personal, family and household purposes." Id.
In the accompanying letter, Mr. Hicks claims that the
Defendants persist with the collection activity that is the
subject of Plaintiffs' Complaint and "are seeking to
dispossess [Mr. Hicks] and [his] family from [their]
dwelling." Mr. Hicks Ltr. 1. He asks the Court "to
issue an order to the Respondent's to cease all
collection activities until this case is resolved."
Id. I construe both filings together as a motion for
injunctive relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Because
Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed on
the merits and because some of the relief they seek runs
contrary to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2283, I will
deny their request for injunctive relief.
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to "protect the
status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the
pendency of a lawsuit, ultimately to preserve the court's
ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits."
In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2003). A preliminary injunction cannot be
issued without notice to the nonmovan.. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(a)(1.. Here, Plaintiffs provide a Certificate of
Service, stating that Mr. Hicks mailed the Motion to
"Carrie M. Ward, et al." ECF No. 10-1.
prevail on a motion for injunctive relief, a party must
"establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and an injunction is in the public interest."
Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum
Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff
must satisfy each requirement for the Court to grant
injunctive relief. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed.
Election Com'n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009).
Importantly, injunctive relief is "an extraordinary
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter,
555 U.S. at 22.
Motion does not show how they likely would succeed on the
merits because their Motion is "conclusory [and] relies
entirely on the allegations of the complaint." Sail
v. Bounassissi, No. DKC-10-2245, 2010 WL 5139032, at *2
(D. Md. Dec. 1, 2010). Although Plaintiffs' Complaint
only references consumer goods, Mr. Hicks's letter
seeking further relief references their real property.
Compl.; Mr. Hicks Ltr. Consequently, it is unclear whether
Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated the FDCPA in regards to
their personal or real property. Nonetheles,, Plaintiffs'
pleadings include correspondence between the parties,
apparently to show Defendants' alleged FDCPA violations.
See Exs. A-K, ECF Nos. 1-2 - 1-12; Fed.R.Civ.P.
1O(c). Exhibit I is correspondence between Mr. Hicks, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and Defendant BWW Law
Group ("BWW"). See Ex. I, ECF No. 1-10. In
the correspondence, BWW stated that Plaintiffs'
allegations of FDCPA violations were "not true."
Id. BWW asserted that Hicks sent it "a letter
disputing the debt and seeking verification of the debt ...
six years after [BWW's] initial disclosures were made to
him under the FDCPA." Id. Further, BWW
"advertised the sale [of Mr. Hicks's real property]
as required by law and mailed notice of the sale to the
complainan.." Id. Moreover, Hicks
"participated in the pending foreclosure action . . .
[by] fil[ing] a motion to stay the foreclosure sale alleging
that [BWW] had no right to foreclose. That motion was
denied." Id. This suggests that BWW complied
with the FDCPA.
Plaintiffs identify evidence that contradicts BWW's
assertions. Specifically, Mr. Hicks states that BWW's
"initial illegal debt collection case . . . was opened
on 6/8/2010 and dismissed with prejudice on 5/3/2011."
Ex. I. Additionally, Mr. Hicks claims that BWW
"initiated a new illegal debt collection case ... on
11/17/2015" but neglected to provide him with a debt
verification letter. Id. at 3. Given the lack of
clarity as to how Defendants violated the FDCPA, Plaintiffs
did not show that they are "likely" to prevail on
their claim that Defendants violated the FDCPA, only that the
Defendants may have violated the FDCPA. See Winter,
555 U.S. at 21. Consequently, Plaintiffs have not shown
that this Court should exercise this "extraordinary
remedy" and grant injunctive relief. Id. at 22.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the first
requirement for injunctive relief is dispositive because a
plaintiff must meet all four requirement's for a Court to
grant injunctive relief. Real Truth About Obama, 575
F.3d at 347.
insofar as Plaintiffs seek relief with regard to the state
court judgment specifically, this Court cannot issue an
injunction to protect Plaintiffs from a judgment entered by
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The Anti-Injunction
Act states that a federal court cannot grant "an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by an Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. S 2283. This Court
cannot enjoin the Circuit Court for Montgomery County because
the "three specifically defined exceptions" do not
apply to this case. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970); see
Henry v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. TDC-14-1344, 2016
WL 1248672, at *3 (D. Md. March 25, 2016).
motion for injunctive relief SS DENIED.
 Defendants include BWW Law Group LLC,
Carrie M. Ward, Howard N. Bierman, Jacob Geesing, Pratima
Lele, Joshua Coleman, Richard R. Goldsmith, Jr., Ludeen
McCartney-Green, Jason Kutcher, Elizabeth C. Jones, Nicholas
Derdock, John E. Driscoll, David K. McCloud, and Alex Cooper
 Having reviewed Plaintiffs'
filings, I find that neither Defendants' response nor a
hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. ...