United States District Court, D. Maryland
Sports Productions, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Richard
M. Kind, Law Offices of Kind and Dashoff, Amy Keller, Kind
and Dashoff & Erica Millicent Cook, Kind and Dashoff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.
pending and ready for resolution in this case involving
alleged violations of the Communications Act of 1934 is a
motion for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff J & J Sports
Productions, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or "J &
J"). (ECF No. 12). The court now rules, no hearing being
deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following
reasons, the motion to reconsider will be denied.
complete recitation of the factual background can be found in
the court's prior memorandum opinion on default judgment.
( See ECF No. 10). That opinion and an accompanying
order granted Plaintiff's motion for default judgment and
entered judgment against Defendant Intipuqueno, LLC t/a
Intipuqueno Restaurant ("Defendant"), in the amount
of $4, 200.00. On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider the damages awarded to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 12).
Standard of Review
motion for reconsideration of a final judgment filed within
twenty-eight days of the underlying order is governed by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Courts have recognized three limited
grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration pursuant to
Rule 59(e): (1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice. See United States ex
rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d
284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am.
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998)). A motion for reconsideration is properly denied when
a movant fails to establish one of these three criteria.
See, e.g., Jarvis v. Enter. Fleet Servs. &
Leasing Co., No. DKC-07-3385, 2010 WL 1929845, at *2
(D.Md. May 11, 2010), aff'd, 408 F.Appx. 668
(4th Cir. 2011) (denying motion to reconsider because the
plaintiff failed to identify valid circumstances that would
cause the district court to alter or amend its prior
59(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters,
or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have
been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Pac.
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (quoting 11 Wright, et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1, at 127-28 (2d ed.
1995)); see also Medlock v. Rumsfeld, 336
F.Supp.2d 452, 470 (D.Md. 2002), aff'd, 86
F.Appx. 665 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) ("To the
extent that Plaintiff is simply trying to reargue the case,
he is not permitted to do so. Where a motion does not raise
new arguments, but merely urges the court to change its mind,
' relief is not authorized."). "In general,
reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an
extraordinary remedy which should be used
sparingly.'" Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403
(quoting Wright, et al., supra, § 2810.1, at 124).
seeks the court's reconsideration of Plaintiff's
damages, asking the court to include enhanced damages under
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(c)(ii). Plaintiff's motion,
however, does not satisfy any of the three grounds for
reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff merely repeats
arguments previously considered by this court regarding the
award of enhanced damages. Those arguments are not only
insufficient to prevail on a motion to reconsider under the
stringent standard of Rule 59(e), but they have been rejected
consistently by recent opinions in this district.
argues that the court should increase the damages awarded to
Plaintiff because the current amount of $4, 200.00
"neither adequately compensates Plaintiff nor acts as an
effective deterrent." (ECF No. 12-1, at 2). At base,
Plaintiff's argument fails because it neglects to address
any of the three established grounds on which the court may
grant a motion to reconsider. Plaintiff points to no
intervening case law that would persuade the court to change
its opinion, nor does Plaintiff point to newly discovered
evidence relevant to the court's prior
opinion. The court can only assume then that
Plaintiff attempts to challenge the court's prior opinion
based on clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.
fails to show that an award of enhanced damages, on top of
the award of statutory damages, is necessary to prevent
manifest injustice or correct a clear error of law.
Plaintiff's reiteration of prior arguments reveals a
"mere disagreement" with the court's decision
and thus is an insufficient basis for such an extraordinary
remedy. See Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, Plaintiff's
disagreement with the court's decision is brazen given
the strong, repeated reproach judges in this district have
leveled against the exact argument Plaintiff advances as the
basis for reconsideration in this case. See, e.g., J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. El Rodeo Rest., LLC, No.
PJM-15-172, 2015 WL 3441995, at *4 (D.Md. May 26, 2015)
("Judges in this District recently found that J & J has
been on notice, at least since Quattrocche, that in
a case of non-egregious willfulness, it was not eligible to
recover the maximum damages authorized by statute...");
J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Rumors, Inc., No.
CCB-14-2046, 2014 WL 6675646, at *4 (D.Md. Nov. 21, 2014)
("Undaunted, J & J has repeatedly filed motions seeking
excessive damages in nearly identical cases, and the court
has consistently addressed the limitations on damages for the
same causes of action brought here.'" (citation
omitted)); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Sabor Latino
Rest., Inc., No. PJM-13-3515, 2014 WL 2964477, at *2
(D.Md. June 27, 2014) ("It is troubling that J & J
Sports Productions continues to proceed without regard to the
many opinions written on this issue."); J & J Sports
Prods., Inc. v. Quattrocche, No. WMN-09-3420, 2010 WL
2302353, at *1 (D.Md. June 7, 2010) ("Plaintiff here has
been a Plaintiff in many nearly identical cases and is on
notice as to the kind of evidence to which the courts look in
determining statutory damages. Instead of providing such
evidence, it has chosen to argue that the award should be the
statutory maximum, including enhancement... This amount is
extraordinarily excessive."). Plaintiff's lack of
acknowledgment or recognition of this case law is
has not met the high bar it faces to succeed on its motion
for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff cannot point
to a change in controlling law favorable to its position, nor
has it offered any new evidence. And as discussed, Plaintiff
fails to identify any clear error of law or manifest
injustice to warrant the extreme remedy of ...