United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division
STARSHA M. SEWELL, Plaintiff,
DAVID WAGNER, Defendant.
Starsha M. Sewell, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
J. HAZEL, District Judge.
above-captioned matter was filed on June 30, 2016, together
with a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. ECF No. 2.
Because Plaintiff, Starsha M. Sewell, appears to be indigent,
her motion shall be granted, but for the reasons that follow
the Complaint must be dismissed.
self-represented pleading is entitled Notice of
Removal and seeks enforcement of an Order
previously issued by this Court remanding a case that
Plaintiff attempted to remove from the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals. See Sewell v. Howard, No.
JFM-12-2736 (D. Md. 2012) at ECF No. 3. Plaintiff appealed
that decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and it
was affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See Sewell v.
Howard, Slip Op. No. 14-1231 (unpublished) (4th Cir.
2014); see also ECF No. 1-2. The state case
Plaintiff attempted to remove to this Court concerned the
custody of her children and was remanded because this Court
does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
now appears to allege that both this Court's Order and
the Fourth Circuit's decision affirming it required the
Maryland state courts to hear her claims regarding a vast
conspiracy and public corruption she believes exists and
involves the Prince George's County States Attorney, the
Prince George's County Police Department, the judge who
heard the child custody case. Child Protective Services, the
Department of Social Services, and the FBI, among others. The
named Defendant in this action. David Wagner, appears to be
the attorney who represented Plaintiff's ex-spouse in the
child custody proceedings. While there are no allegations
against Wagner in the Complaint, Plaintiff's claim for
relief as to Wagner is for this Court to issue an Order
requiring "the FBI to hold David Wagner accountable for
conspiring with Artemis Moutstatous and [Prince George's
County Department of Social Services] workers against the
rights of my minor African American Christian male sons in
violation of Sarbanes Oxley 18 U.S.C. [§] 1519. [the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO")] Act [18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ],
and 18 U.S.C. [§] 242." ECF No. 1 at 11. Other
relief sought by Plaintiff includes ordering the return of
her children to her custody because the state court judge
violated the remand order; ordering the State of Maryland to
repay child support from funds in the "victim's
crime board"; ordering the Office of Personnel
Management to remove adverse information from Plaintiff's
credit report and employment file: and damages of $100
filed this Complaint in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). which permits an indigent litigant to
commence an action in this Court without prepaying the filing
fee. To guard against possible abuses of this privilege, the
statute requires dismissal of any claim that is frivolous or
malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). This Court is
mindful, however, of its obligation to liberally construe
self-represented pleadings, such as the instant Complaint.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94,
127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007). In evaluating such a Complaint, the
factual allegations are assumed to be true. Id. at
93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). Nonetheless, liberal
construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear
failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a
cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990): see
also Beaudett v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274. 1278
(4th Cir. 1985) (stating that a district court may not
"conjure up questions never squarely presented.").
In making this determination. "[t]he district court need
not look beyond the complaint's allegations.... It must
hold the pro se complaint to less stringent standards than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and must read the complaint
liberally." White v. White, 886 F.2d 721,
722-23 (4th Cir. 1989).
when the instant Complaint is afforded liberal construction,
it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The prior Order issued by this Court remanding a case that
Plaintiff improperly attempted to remove contained no
directive to the state court that instilled any enforceable
right to Plaintiff or her ability to continue litigating her
claims in that forum. This Court has no jurisdiction to issue
a writ of mandamus commanding a state court to entertain a
motion or cause of action. See Gurley v.
Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586. 587
(4th Cir. 1969); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Thus,
the Orders of this Court and the Fourth Circuit cannot be
read to mandate the Maryland courts to hear Plaintiff's
Complaint also contains no factual allegations regarding the
named Defendant, but instead is a recitation of
Plaintiff's now familiar theories of conspiracy and
public corruption which she faults for, in essence, every
adverse decision or action taken against her. To the extent
that the Complaint seeks a mandate requiring law enforcement
agencies to initiate criminal prosecution against this
Defendant. Plaintiff has no enforceable right to insist upon
such action. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146 (1973) (citizens lack
standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority
when he himself is neither prosecuted or threatened with
prosecution): Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224. 227
(4th Cir. 1988) (no right to force state to prosecute others
under equal protection clause).
Complaint also seeks to revisit a matter over which this
Court does not have jurisdiction: the custody of
Plaintiff's children. Domestic relations cases, including
child custody matters, may not be heard in this Court.
See Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 343
(4th Cir. 1985) (explaining the domestic relations exception
to federal courts' jurisdiction based on idea that state
has a stronger, more direct interest); Wasserman v.
Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982) (diversity
jurisdiction does not include power to grant divorces,
determine alimony or support obligations, or decide child
custody rights): Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196. 202
(4th Cir. 2006) (citing Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083,
1087 (4th Cir. 1980)) (noting federal courts "generally
abstain from hearing child custody matters"). It is
clear in reading the self-represented pleading filed in this
case that the matter of the custody of Plaintiff's
children is inextricably intertwined in every aspect of the
because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, it will be dismissed by separate Order
 From the context of the Complaint, there
does not appear to be an underlying open state case that
Plaintiff is attempting to remove to this Court.
 Review of the exhibits submitted by
Plaintiff reveals that her primary grievance regarding the
underlying child custody case is that her report of sexual
abuse of her children to Child Protective Services did not
result in the criminal prosecution ...