United States District Court, D. Maryland
K. BREDAR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
2, 2016, the Court received for filing the above-captioned
44-page Complaint filed by self-represented plaintiff Nicole
Yvette Winston ("Ms. Winston"), a resident of Fort
Washington, Maryland. Ms. Winston sues the Maryland
Department of Human Resources and Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene, raising claims of constitutional rights
violations,  violations of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, violation of Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, intentional misrepresentation,
harassment, battery, conspiracy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, tortious interference with family
relationships, and loss of consortium. ECF No. 1. She invokes
this Court's federal question jurisdiction under §
1331 and seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of the
Ms. Winston is proceeding as a self-represented litigant, the
court must liberally construe her complaint allegations.
See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). This court, however, is not required to conjure up
questions never squarely presented to it. See Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985).
Further, a pleading that sets forth a claim for relief shall
contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which
the court's jurisdiction depends; a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and a demand for judgment for the relief the
pleader seeks. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although
self-represented pleadings must be "liberally
construed" and "held to less stringent standards
than those by lawyers, " Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), a Complaint need not contain detailed
allegations. Nevertheless, the facts alleged must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and
require "more than labels and conclusions, " as
"courts are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation." See
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citing Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint
must allege facts that allow a court "to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must also be mindful, however,
that it should not allow defendants to be subjected to
"paranoid pro se litigation ... alleging ... a
vast, encompassing conspiracy" unless plaintiff meets a
"high standard of plausibility." Cooney v.
Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).
Winston claims that she has received food stamps, medical
care, and monetary assistance through Prince George's
County Social Services since November of 2007. She speculates
that "I have not been able to get off state assistance
partly due to Social Services not providing adequate benefit
information and intentionally allowed [sic] my health to
decline by not providing sufficient or proper medical
care." ECF No. 1, pp. 3-5. She seemingly alleges that
she was not informed of Social Security as an option for
disability benefits and discusses the physical ailments and
conditions she has experienced from 2007 to 2012. She seeks
special damages in the amount of $9, 328.00 for inpatient
bills she incurred while at Southern Maryland Hospital and
Washington Hospital Center ("WHC") and $320, 176.04
for "being kept in the state of unemployment from
January [of] 2008 to December [of] 2015." ECF No. 1, pp. 5,
6, 43, & 44.
Winston additionally provides a running chronology of the
disability assistance she received from 2007 to
and voices her concerns as to whether she has been part of
some biomedical research program. She claims that she has a
number of health related issues and has never consented to
any sort of medical research or programs. Id. at pp.
10-11. She also complains that she has been subject to
harassment and provides a litany of specific incidents of
such since 2007 (interference with family relationships,
initial denial of exemption from jury duty, being given wrong
information, "absurd" Social Service requirements,
assessment of library fines, misconduct by a Praxis test
administrator, and exposure to unspecified materials at the
WHC). Ms. Winston additionally discusses the
"harassment" she experienced at the hands of her
sibling, businesses, Social Services, and a state court.
Id., pp. 12-16. She accuses defendants of battery
and "manipulation of harm, " and discusses her
heart, gynecological, dermatological, "head pressure,
" lip, dental, and overall health conditions, as well as
incidents of hair, drink, food, and facial product tampering
and the questionable dispensing of prescription medication.
Id., pp. 17-30.
Winston accuses defendants of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the tortious interference with family
relationships, and the loss of consortium. She recounts
"recent employment hindrances" she has experienced.
Id., pp. 32-34 & 37-41.
Winston has not paid the filing fee. Instead, she has filed a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2,
which shall be granted. Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and
1915Apermitan indigent litigant to commence an action in
federal court without prepaying the filing fee. To protect
against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute
requires a court to dismiss any case that "fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the United
States Supreme Court held that a district court may dismiss
the complaint of a self-represented litigant under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 when the complaint includes only a "fanciful
factual allegation" and lacks "an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Id. at 325; see
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)
("[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous
only if the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless, ' a
category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful,
' 'fantastic, ' and 'delusional.'
"). As those words suggest, a finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to
the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether
or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to
forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed, however,
simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations
unlikely. Neitzke explained that the statute
"accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a
claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but
also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless."
Id. at 327. Indeed, § 1915 was amended after
Neitzke and Denton, such that now the statute
mandates that a district court "shall
dismiss" a case upon a finding that the Complaint
"fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);see
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).
when providing a generous review to the self-represented
complaint, see, e.g., Erikson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. at 127, the undersigned finds it proper to dismiss
Ms. Winston's Complaint. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (a complaint must be dismissed
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it does not allege
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325-28. Ms. Winston
presents a plethora of claims against two Maryland agencies,
without cogently demonstrating how they are responsible for
her alleged injuries. She seemingly attributes any problem
she has experienced, whether it be related to employment, the
receipt of benefits, the dispensing of medication, food and
beverage, and interaction with family members, to be the
constitutional or tortious error of defendants. Ms.
Winston's allegations are made without any viable factual
supporting allegations and appear to be the product of
paranoid fantasies. Her allegations are wholly implausible.
It is proper to dismiss her action under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). A separate order follows.
 Ms. Winston cites to 42 U.S.C,
§§ 19811983, 1985 and 1986; the Fourteenth, Fourth,
First, Eighth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution; as well as federal criminal and Maryland
statutory code provisions. ECF No. 1, pp. 2, 6-9.
 A federal court does not act as an
advocate for a self-represented claimant. See Brock v.
Carroll,107 F.3d 241, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1996);
Weller v. Department of Social Servs.,901 F.2d 387,
391 (4th Cir. 1990); Gordon v.Leek ...