United States District Court, D. Maryland
YURI J. STOYANOV
RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge
pending and ready for resolution in this employment
discrimination case are: (1) a motion for reconsideration
filed by Plaintiff Yuri J. Stoyanov ("Plaintiff")
(ECF No. 40); (2) a motion for leave to file a motion for
summary judgment on the remaining claims, and a motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendant Ray Mabus
("Defendant") (ECF Nos. 39; 44); and (3) two
"motion[s] for sanctions and for leave to rebut"
Defendant's arguments filed by Plaintiff (ECF Nos. 43;
55). The relevant issues have been briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration and his motions for sanctions will be denied.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
discussion of the procedural and factual background of this
case may be found in a prior memorandum opinion issued on
August 26, 2015. (ECF No. 37, at 1-7). Additional relevant
facts will be discussed in the analysis section. The
complaint, filed by pro se Plaintiff on July 25,
2007, asserted fourteen counts arising out of thirteen
"Incidents." (See ECF No. 1, at 22-24, 29-44).
The August 26 memorandum opinion and accompanying order
granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF
Nos. 37; 38). All of Plaintiff's claims against
defendants other than Defendant Ray Mabus, Secretary of the
Navy, were dismissed. (See ECF No. 38 ¶ 3). The
only claims that remain are certain of Plaintiff's
allegations that the Navy failed to hire or promote him due
to his national origin and age in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the
"ADEA") (Counts I and III), and in retaliation for
his Equal Employment Opportunity complaints in violation of
Title VII (Count II). Specifically, only claims within Counts
I, II, and III regarding Incidents 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13
remain. (See Id. ¶ 5). These remaining claims
assert that Plaintiff was discriminated or retaliated against
when the Navy, Plaintiff's employer at all relevant
times, failed to promote him to five ND-5 Program Manager
positions and instead promoted or assigned work to other
employees who Plaintiff alleges were less qualified.
September 9, 2015, Defendant filed the pending motion for
leave to file a motion for summary judgment on the remaining
claims. (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff filed the pending motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 40), and Defendant responded (ECF
No. 42). Plaintiff filed a "motion for sanctions and for
leave to rebut Defendant's  Response." (ECF No.
43). On October 9, Defendant filed the pending motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 44), which is fully briefed (ECF
Nos. 51; 54). Finally, Plaintiff filed another pending
"motion for sanctions and for leave to rebut"
Defendant's reply. (ECF No. 55).
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
54(b) governs reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
See Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders,
Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1469-70 (4th Cir. 1991).
Rule 54(b) provides that "any order or other decision,
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of
a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties' rights and liabilities." "In the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
precise standard governing a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order is unclear." Innes v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Md., 121 F.Supp.3d 504, 506
(D.Md. 2015) (citing Fayetteville Investors, 936
F.2d at 1472). "While the standards articulated in Rules
59(e) and 60(b) are not binding in an analysis of Rule 54(b)
motions, courts frequently look to these standards for
guidance in considering such motions." Id. at
506-07 (citing Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy
Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir.
2003); Akeva, LLC v. Adidas Am., Inc., 385 F.Supp.2d
559, 565-66 (M.D. N.C. 2005)).
Public policy favors an end to litigation and recognizes that
efficient operation requires the avoidance of re-arguing
questions that have already been decided. Most courts have
adhered to a fairly narrow set of grounds on which to
reconsider their interlocutory orders and opinions. Courts
will reconsider an interlocutory order in the following
situations: (1) there has been an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) there is additional evidence that was
not previously available; or (3) the prior decision was based
on clear error or would work manifest injustice.
Akeva, 385 F.Supp.2d at 565-66 (citations omitted);
see also Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Kraft Foods.,
Inc., No. PJM-08-409, 2010 WL 3059344, at *1-2 (D.Md.
Aug.4, 2010) (applying this three-part test when evaluating a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b)). Importantly, a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) may not be used
merely to reiterate arguments previously rejected by the
court. Beyond Sys., Inc., 2010 WL 3059344, at *2.
argues that reconsideration is appropriate because the August
26 memorandum opinion and order is "unsupported by
evidence, wrong, with misrepresentations and [is] virtually a
copy of [defense counsel's] fraudulent submissions to the
court." (ECF No. 40, at 1). Plaintiff's specific
justifications for reconsideration under the standard set
forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) are not entirely clear. He has
not identified any intervening change in law, newly developed
evidence, clear error of law, or manifest injustice to
warrant an alteration of the prior opinion. The arguments he
appears to assert in support of his motion for
reconsideration are unpersuasive.
overarching argument throughout Plaintiff's motion is
that the court improperly relied on Defendant's alleged
fraudulent representations. Plaintiff's motion rehashes
the same arguments raised earlier in this case and in
numerous prior actions as well. Plaintiff's assertions of
fraud and misconduct appear simply to be disagreements with
Defendant's legal arguments and the court's
conclusions. Once again, "Plaintiff supports this motion
with nothing more than vague, subjective, and unsubstantiated
allegations of misconduct. Absent some specific evidence of
wrongdoing, the extraordinary relief sought is
unwarranted." (ECF No. 37, at 46-47 (citing Stoyanov
v. Mabus, No. DKC-07-1953, 2012 WL 1957841, at *2 (D.Md.
May 30, 2012))).
Plaintiff fails to articulate why reconsideration is
necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice. To justify reconsideration on the basis of clear
error or manifest injustice, the prior decision cannot be
"just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike [the
court] as wrong with the force of a five-week-old,
unrefrigerated dead fish." TFWS, Inc. v.
Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
Plaintiff asserts many of the same substantive arguments as
before. Such a "reiteration of prior arguments reveals a
‘mere disagreement' with the court's decision
and thus is an insufficient basis for such an extraordinary
remedy." Panowicz v. Hancock, No. DKC-11-2417,
2015 WL 5895528, at *3 (D.Md. Oct. 5, 2015) (citing
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082
(4thCir. 1993)). Plaintiff's conclusory and
repetitive legal arguments do not warrant reconsideration and
are, in some instances, irrelevant or incorrect. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration will be denied.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment