United States District Court, D. Maryland
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
pending and ready for resolution in this employment
discrimination action is a motion for leave to amend filed by
Plaintiff Janot Jassie (“Plaintiff”). (ECF No.
30). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules,
no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the
following reasons, the motion for leave to amend will be
motion for leave to amend, Plaintiff recites some allegations
previously set forth in the amended complaint and maintains
claims for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621
et seq., and for denial of employer-provided
benefits. (ECF No. 30, at 1). He asserts that he stopped
working for Genesis Healthcare (“Genesis”), his
former employer, on September 28, 2013. According to
Genesis cancelled my health insurance on [September 29, ]
weeks before [it] terminated [my employment] on [October 17].
During the period after Genesis cancelled my insurance but
while I was still a Genesis employee, I received medical care
on [October 15] at Doctors Community Hospital in Prince
George’s County that would have been covered by my
insurance had Genesis not prematurely cancelled it.
Because Genesis prematurely cancelled my insurance I owe the
(ECF No. 30, at 2). Plaintiff further contends that Genesis
failed to compensate him for the 13 vacation days he used
between September 29 and October 17, or the remaining 47
vacation days he had purportedly accrued during the course of
March 2, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against
Keith Mariner, a regional human resources manager at Genesis.
No. 2). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 8,
asserting claims of age discrimination, wrongful cancellation
of health insurance, and hardship. (ECF No. 7). Mr. Mariner
removed the action to this court (ECF No. 1) and moved to
dismiss the amended complaint or, in the alternative, for a
more definite statement (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff moved to
amend. (ECF No. 20).
court granted Mr. Mariner’s motion to dismiss on all
claims and denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion
to amend. (ECF Nos. 22; 23). The court reasoned that Mr.
Mariner was not the proper defendant for Plaintiff’s
ADEA claim, and Plaintiff failed to include Genesis as a
defendant in either his Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) charge or the amended
complaint. (ECF No. 22, at 7-9). Similarly, the court
determined that Mr. Mariner was not the proper defendant for
Plaintiff’s claim concerning wrongful cancellation of
health insurance. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to state a claim
for wrongful cancellation under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
(Id. at 14 (“[W]hether Plaintiff’s claim
is considered as a statutory [Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)] claim or as a
claim under state law for breach of contract, the factual
allegations in the amended complaint cannot withstand Rule
12(b)(6) scrutiny.”)). Finally, the court interpreted
Plaintiff’s claim for hardship as a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The amended
complaint provided no allegations sufficient to sustain such
a claim against Mr. Mariner. (Id. at
15-17). In light of Plaintiff’s pro
se status, however, the court granted him time to file a
properly supported motion for leave to amend that comports
with Local Rule 103.6 and the federal pleading standards.
court subsequently granted Plaintiff three extensions of time
to file for leave to amend. (ECF Nos. 25; 27; 29). On April
11, 2016, Plaintiff filed the pending motion naming only
Genesis as a defendant. (ECF No. 30). Mr. Mariner responded
in opposition. (ECF No. 31).
Standard of Review
may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21
days after serving it or within 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), whichever is earlier. Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(a)(1). When the right to amend as a matter of course
expires, “a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) provides
that courts should “freely give leave [to amend] when
justice so requires, ” and commits the matter to the
discretion of the district court. See Simmons v. United
Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 769
(4th Cir. 2011). Denial of leave to amend is
appropriate “only when the amendment would be
prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith
on the part of the ...