United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge
pending and ready for review is a "motion for void
judgment and to set aside order" filed by Plaintiff
Florence Diane Franklin ("Plaintiff"). (ECF No.
20). The court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
background to this case can be found in the memorandum
opinion issued on May 12, 2016, granting the motion to
dismiss filed by Defendant BWW Law Group, LLC
("Defendant"). (ECF Nos. 18; 19). On May 27,
Plaintiff filed the pending motion for void judgment and to
set aside order, which will be construed as a motion for
reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
Standard of Review
motion for reconsideration filed within 28 days of the
underlying order is governed by Rule 59(e). Courts have
recognized three limited grounds for granting a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e): (1) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new
evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct clear
error of law or prevent manifest injustice. See United
States ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4thCir. 2002) (citing
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)).
59(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters,
or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have
been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Pac.
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (quoting 11 Wright, et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1, at 127-28 (2d ed.
1995)); see also Medlock v. Rumsfeld, 336 F.Supp.2d
452, 470 (D.Md. 2002) ("To the extent that Plaintiff is
simply trying to reargue the case, he is not permitted to do
so. Where a motion does not raise new arguments, but merely
urges the court to ‘change its mind, ’ relief is
not authorized." (citation omitted)),
aff’d, 86 F.App’x 665 (4th
Cir. 2004). "In general, ‘reconsideration of a
judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.’" Pac. Ins.
Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (quoting Wright, et al.,
supra, § 2810.1, at 124).
asserts that "no real party in interest has appeared on
the record and the motion to dismiss . . . is only argued by
the opposing attorney, who is not allowed to testify on the
facts of the case." (ECF No. 20, at 3). According to
Plaintiff, "[t]he practice of an attorney filing an
affidavit on behalf of his client asserting the status of
that client is not approved, inasmuch as not only does the
affidavit become hearsay, but it places the attorney in a
position of witness thus compromising his role as
advocate." (Id.). As a result, she contends,
"each of the motion(s) to dismiss was never argued by
the real party in interest." (Id. (emphasis
arguing that "no real party in interest has appeared on
the record" and that Defendant’s attorney is
prohibited from "testify[ing] on the facts of the case,
" Plaintiff misapprehends the motion to dismiss. She
misinterprets it as testimony offered by David Solan,
Defendant’s attorney. Contrary to Plaintiff’s
assertions, the motion to dismiss is not an affidavit filed
by Mr. Solan. Defendant, by and through counsel, properly
advanced legal arguments challenging the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. The court
addressed those legal arguments in the memorandum opinion,
found them persuasive, and granted Defendant’s motion
motion for reconsideration does not satisfy any of the three
grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). A Rule 59(e)
motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, which is
precisely what Plaintiff attempts to do here. The memorandum
opinion explained that the allegations offered by Plaintiff
did not support her claims for relief. (See ECF No.
18, at 12-23). Plaintiff fails to offer new evidence or
identify any intervening change in controlling law. Neither
does she argue that voiding judgment and setting aside the
court’s memorandum opinion are necessary to prevent
manifest injustice. Rather, Plaintiff’s reiteration of
prior arguments reveals a "mere disagreement" with
the court’s decision and thus is an insufficient basis
for such an extraordinary remedy. See Hutchinson v.
Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met the high bar she faces to
succeed on her motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e),
and there is no reason to disturb the memorandum opinion and
foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration will be denied. Thus, it is this
6th day of June, 2016, by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that:
motion for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff Florence Diane
Franklin (ECF No. 20) ...