United States District Court, D. Maryland
PETER J. MESSITTE, District Judge.
Troy Bullock brought this suit, ostensibly pro se , against Defendants Ocwen Loan Servicing, Homeward Residential, Inc., and Deutsche Bank National Trust Co ("Deutsche Bank"). The Court granted in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18, as to all claims against both defendants, save a single claim under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 et seq. ("TILA") against Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank now moves for summary judgment as to that claim. Since the Court finds that the TILA provision at issue was not yet in effect when Bullock's promissory note was transferred to Deutsche Bank, the Court will GRANT Deutsche Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 40.
According to the Amended Complaint,  Bullock executed a Note and Deed of Trust in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation with respect to residential property located at 13302 Williams Drive in Brandywine, Maryland, Amend. Compl. ¶ 7. According to the Affidavit ("Aff.") of Crystal Kearse of Ocwen Financial Corporation, the terms of the loan were memorialized in the Note, which was identified by a loan number ending in 7991. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, Adjustable Rate Note, ECF No. 40-3; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Kearse Aff. ¶¶ 5, 7, ECF No. 40-2. The principle amount of the Note was $213, 750. Id. The deed of trust, dated March 15, 2006, which was recorded among the Land Records of Prince George's County on October 27, 2006 (the "Deed of Trust"), Kearse Aff. ¶ 6, was also identified by a loan number ending in 7991. Id. ¶ 7. Bullock made payments on the loan from 2006 to 2012. Amend. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 16.
Further, per the Kearse Affidavit, on or about May 12, 2006, Bullock's mortgage loan was securitized in a pool of loans, wherein Deutsche Bank was designated as trustee of a securitized trust denominated "Soundview 2006-OPT2." Kearse Aff. ¶ 8. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the "Pooling and Servicing Agreement") defines the Custodian of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement as Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). Id. ¶ 9. Kearse states that Wells Fargo received the original Note on March 24, 2006. Id. ¶ 10. Pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated May 1, 2006, Bullock's note was included among the pool of loans acquired by Deutsche Bank on or before May 12, 2006. Id. ¶ 11. Wells Fargo's records demonstrate that Bullock's Note was included among the pool of loans acquired by Deutsche Bank on or before May 12, 2006 and that Deutsche Bank has been in possession of the Note since March 24, 2006. Id.
Homeward Residential was the loan servicer for a period beginning at least as early as 2012. See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 9-13, ECF No. 16. On March 1, 2013, Homeward transferred servicing to Ocwen. Id. ¶ 15.
On January 15, 2014, Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation executed an assignment of the Deed of Trust to Deutsche Bank. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, Ex. C, Assignment of Deed of Tr. Md., ECF No. 11-4. The assignment was recorded in the Land Records of Prince George's County, Maryland at Liber 35549, folio 344 et seq. (the "Assignment"). Id.
Ocwen's counsel filed a foreclosure action on the subject property on February 14, 2014 and a foreclosure sale was held on July 1, 2014. Amend. Compl. ¶ 20; Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 3, Report of Sale, ECF No. 17-3. The foreclosure sale was ratified on April 8, 2015. Approximately one month following completion of the foreclosure sale, the trustees of the Deed of Trust conveyed the Property to Deutsche Bank, pursuant to a Trustee's Deed dated April 10, 2015 and recorded among the Land Records of Prince George's County, Maryland on April 27, 2015 at Liber 36917, folio 411 et seq. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 4, ECF No. 40-1.
Prior to that time, on October 20, 2014 Bullock had filed the present suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201 et seq., the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq., the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and common law breach of contract and conversion. Defendants removed the suit to this Court on December 9, 2014 and moved to dismiss Bullock's then operative Amended Complaint. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 20, 2015, the Court dismissed with prejudice all but one of Bullock's claims. ECF Nos. 33, 34. The Court denied Defendants' Motion without prejudice as to a single claim under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 et seq. ("TILA") and gave Deutsche Bank leave to file a further Motion to Dismiss or a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 33, 34. The Court denied Bullock leave to file a Second Amended Complaint without prejudice, stating that he would need to file a new suit to add the proposed claims. Id. Bullock then filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Dismissal of his claims for breach of contract, conversion, and violations of RESPA, which the Court has already denied. ECF No. 38. There is no indication that Bullock even filed a new suit.
In its present Motion for Summary Judgment on the TILA claim, ECF No. 40, Deutsche Bank affirms that the undisputed material facts show that Bullock's loan was among a number of loans securitized and transferred to it pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement that closed on May 12, 2006. Kearse Aff. ¶ 11. Because the applicable TILA section did not come into effect until 2009, over three years later, Deutsche Bank argues that the TILA claim fails as a matter of law.
Bullock has not responded to Deutsche Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court agrees with Deutsche Bank.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). A genuine dispute is one where the evidence is such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Erwin v. United States, 591 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2010) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Dulaney, 673 F.3d at 330. A nonmoving party may not, however, defeat summary judgment by making assertions lacking sufficient factual support or by relying on a mere "scintilla of evidence." Am. Arms Int'l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 2009). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact on each essential element of its case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Celotex Corp. v. ...