from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Joseph A.
BY: Pro Se. FOR APPELLANT
BY: Karen H. Rohrbaugh (Brian B. Frosh, Attorney General on
the brief) all of Baltimore, MD. FOR APPELLEE
BEFORE Kehoe, Leahy, Raker, Irma, S., (Retired, Specially
Md.App. 107] Kehoe, J.
Maryland law authorizes a judgment creditor to attach assets
of the debtor to satisfy the judgment. Our attachment law has
a number of exemptions. In this case, we must decide whether
one such exemption is available in child support enforcement
chain of events giving rise to this appeal began in 2014 when
the Montgomery County Office of Child Support Enforcement
(the " Office" ) sought to collect a judgment of
$9,866.80 against Byron Alexander Kelly for unpaid child [227
Md.App. 108] support. At the request of the Office, the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued a writ of
garnishment against Capital One Bank, N.A. There were two
accounts in Kelly's name at the bank with a combined
balance of $2,705.05. The bank reported this information to
the court and suspended activity in the accounts pending a
then filed a motion to release the two accounts from the
levy. He based his motion on Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article (" CJP" ) §
11-504(b)(5), which permits a judgment debtor under certain
circumstances to elect to exempt up to $6,000 in cash or
other property from a levy to satisfy a money judgment. After
an evidentiary hearing, the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County denied Kelly's motion and separately ordered
Capital One to pay the account proceeds to the Office.
has appealed both orders and presents four questions to us.
We have consolidated and reworded them as follows:
(1) Did the trial court correctly interpret the exemption
contained in CJP § 11-504(b)(5) to be inapplicable in
actions to collect child support arrears?
(2) Were the trial court's findings as to the source of
the funds in the accounts clearly erroneous?
affirm the trial court's judgment.
Were the account proceeds exempt from garnishment?
The Applicable Rules of Statutory Construction
resolving the issues in this appeal, we will pay heed to the
following guidelines of statutory interpretation:
[227 Md.App. 109] (1) Our purpose is to " ascertain and
effectuate the real and actual intent of the
Legislature." Employees' Ret. Sys. of City of
Baltimore v. Dorsey, 430 Md. 100, 112, 59 A.3d 990
(2) In this context, " intent" means " the
legislative purpose, [that is] the ends to be accomplished,
or the evils to be
remedied" by the statute in question, id. ;
(3) We usually identify the legislative purpose by
considering the plain language of the statute " within
the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs,
considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in
enacting the statute." State v. ...