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Piotrowski v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

United States District Court, D. Maryland

July 29, 2015

ROBERT PIOTROWSKI,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DeBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this mortgage loan modification case are: (1) a motion for class certification filed by Plaintiffs (ECF No. 50); and (2) three motions to seal (ECF Nos. 58, 59, 61). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification will be denied. The three motions to seal will be granted.

I. Background

The factual background was explained in the January 22, 2013 memorandum opinion, thus only those facts relevant to the instant dispute will be discussed. ( See ECF No. 20). Robert Piotrowski filed a complaint on December 29, 2011, asserting claims on behalf of a putative class of homeowners who have been damaged by Wells Fargo's alleged failures to comply with applicable federal and state laws in connection with their mortgage loan modification requests. The four-count class action complaint asserted claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) ("ECOA"); the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201 et seq. ("MCDCA"); the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq. ("MCPA"); and the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 7-401 et seq. ("MMFPA").

Mr. Piotrowski and his wife, Iwona Piotrowski, own property located in North Potomac, Maryland ("the Property"). They became concerned about their mortgage in December 2010 and allegedly submitted a completed loan modification application to Wells Fargo, the servicer of their mortgage loan, in January 2011, at a time when they were current on their mortgage loan. In response to certain correspondence from Wells Fargo, the Piotrowskis later submitted two more loan modification requests on April 26, 2011 and May 25, 2011, respectively. As relevant to the ECOA claims, the Piotrowskis asserted that: (1) Wells Fargo failed to provide timely notice of its action in response to each of his three modification requests, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1); and (2) Wells Fargo failed to provide an explanation for declining each of the loan modification requests in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2).

Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint. A memorandum opinion and order were issued on January 22, 2013, granting in part and denying in part the motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 20 & 21). Leave to amend was granted to allow Mr. Piotrowski to join Iwona Piotrowski as an additional plaintiff. The court agreed with the Piotrowskis that Subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) of the ECOA impose separate obligations on creditors. (ECF No. 20, at 17). The January 22 opinion held, in relevant part, that: (1) the complaint failed to state a claim under either Subsection 1691(d)(1) or Subsection 1691(d)(2) as to the first loan modification request ( id. at 18-21); (2) with respect to the second loan modification request, the complaint stated a plausible ECOA claim under Subsection 1691(d)(1) only ( id. at 21-23); and (3) the complaint stated a plausible ECOA claim under both Subsections 1691(d)(1) and 1691(d)(2) with respect to the third loan modification request ( id. at 23-24).

Consistent with the memorandum opinion, an amended complaint was filed on February 12, 2013 to add Iwona Piotrowski as an additional plaintiff, "correct misnomers in the original complaint, and clarify certain factual allegations." (ECF No. 22). A scheduling order was issued and discovery commenced. After several motions to modify the scheduling order were granted, on January 30, 2015 Plaintiffs moved to certify a class only as to the ECOA claims. (ECF Nos. 50 & 51). Defendant opposed the motion (ECF No. 54), and Plaintiffs replied (ECF No. 60). Plaintiffs and Defendant moved to seal in their entirety their respective memoranda and exhibits in connection with the motion for class certification. The court issued a memorandum opinion and order on January 19, 2015 denying both motions to seal without prejudice to the filing of a property supported motion. (ECF No. 57). The parties subsequently filed supplemental motions to seal. ( See ECF Nos. 58, 59, 61).

II. Analysis

A. Rule 23 Certification

A district court has "wide discretion" in deciding whether class certification is appropriate. Ward v. Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 179 (4th Cir. 2010) ( quoting Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 185 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The burden of establishing class status is on Plaintiffs, Bullock v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 210 F.R.D. 556, 558 (D.Md. 2002), and "[t]he court has a duty to undertake a rigorous analysis'" to ensure that the requirements of class certification have been met. Hewlett v. Premier Salons Int'l, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 211, 215 (D.Md. 1997) ( citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted:

If it were appropriate for a court simply to accept the allegations of a complaint at face value in making class action findings, every complaint asserting the requirements of Rule 23(a) or (b) would automatically lead to a certification order, frustrating the district court's responsibilities for taking a "close look" at relevant matters, Amchem [ Prods., Inc. v. Windsor ], 521 U.S. [591, ] 615 [1997], for conducting a "rigorous analysis" of such matters, Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, and for making "findings" that the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied.... " it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the merits, ' limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis. "

Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 2004) ( quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendments) (emphasis in original); see also Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013) (noting that although Rule 23 does not give district courts a "license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage, " a court should consider merits questions to the extent "that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied."). "A party seeking class certification must do more than plead compliance with the [] Rule 23 requirements.... Rather, the party must present evidence that the putative class complies with Rule 23." EQT Production Co., 764 F.3d at 357.

The class must satisfy the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Specifically, Rule 23(a) provides:

(a)Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

If those requirements are met, the class must satisfy at least one of the three sub-parts of Rule 23(b), which will be discussed below.

Moreover, although not specified in Rule 23, the proposed class must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989). The Fourth Circuit recently discussed the ascertainability requirement in EQT Production Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014):

We have repeatedly recognized that Rule 23 contains an implicit threshold requirement that the members of a proposed class be "readily identifiable." Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972); see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 729 (4 th Cir. 1989) ("though not specified in [Rule 23], establishment of a class action implicitly requires... that there be an identifiable class..."), abrogated on other grounds, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1977). Our sister circuits have described this rule as an "ascertainability" requirement. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-94 (3 Cir. 2012); John v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (4th Cir. 2007); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2006).
However phrased, the requirement is the same. A class cannot be certified unless a court can readily identify the class members in reference to objective criteria. See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593; see also Crosby v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 796 F.2d 576, 579-80 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding that a class failed to satisfy Rule 23 requirements because it would be impossible to identify class members without "individualized fact-finding and litigation").
The plaintiffs need not be able to identify every class member at the time of certification. But "[i]f the class members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or mini-trials, ' then a class action is inappropriate." Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593; see also 7A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1760 (3d ed. 2005) ("[T]he requirement that there be a class will not be deemed satisfied unless... it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.").

The Eleventh Circuit recently explained the administrative feasibility requirement in Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 562 F.Appx. 782, 787-88 (11th Cir. 2014):

"An identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria." Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 263 F.R.D. 90, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The analysis of the objective criteria also should be administratively feasible. "Administrative feasibility" means "that identifying class members is a manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual inquiry." Newberg on Class Actions § 3.3 p. 164 (5th ed. 2012). Where a plaintiff satisfies this threshold issue, the district court then "conducts a rigorous analysis of the [R]ule 23 prerequisites." Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

(citing trial court opinion); Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., ___F.App'x___, 2015 WL 3560722 (11th Cir. 2015) (same).

1. Ascertainability

a. Class Definition

Plaintiffs' class definition has evolved over time. In the memorandum accompanying the motion for class certification, Plaintiffs define the class as follows:

All individuals who obtained a loan secured by property located in Maryland whose loans (i) have been serviced by Wells Fargo; (ii) since two years[1] preceding this action; and (iii) have submitted an application to change the terms of their existing mortgage without requesting additional advances or credit; and (iv) were not provided written notice within 30 days of submitting an application regarding the action taken on the application; or (v) were not provided within 60 days of submitting the application with a written statement of reasons (or a disclosure that a borrower can request such a statement) regarding an adverse action taken on the application.

(ECF No. 51, at 2). Based on objections raised by Defendant in its opposition, in the reply memorandum Plaintiffs propose adding the following qualifier to the end of subpart (v):

(v) were not provided with a written statement of reasons (or a disclosure that a borrower can request such a statement) regarding an adverse action taken on the application within 60 days of submitting the application and were not delinquent or in default at the time of the action.

(ECF No. 60, at 27).[2]

Defendant argues that the amended complaint lacks any allegations relating to the notice requirements under the ECOA for incomplete applications, but that based on the arguments in their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs appear to have expanded the class definition beyond what was alleged in the amended complaint. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the amended complaint only alleged violations of Sections 1691(d)(1) and (d)(2) and 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1)(i) pertaining to complete applications, whereas Plaintiffs seek to expand the class to cover purported violations of notice requirements pertaining to incomplete applications.

The fact that Plaintiffs modified the class definition beyond what was included in the amended complaint is not necessarily dispositive. The court possesses the power to modify the class definition. See Jenkins v. Massinga, 592 F.Supp. 480, 487 (D.Md. 1984); Peoples v. Wendover Funding, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 492, 497 (D.Md. 1998); Givens v. Van Devere, Inc., No. 5:11CV666, 2012 WL 4092738, at *15 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 17, 2012) ("Courts have discretion to modify proposed class definitions to make it administratively feasible to determine class membership."). Indeed, in EQT, 764 F.3d at 360, a case cited by Defendant in support of certification denial, the Fourth Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to "determine whether it is possible to adjust the class definitions to avoid or mitigate the administrative challenges we have identified." Judge Bennett explained in In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 F.Supp.2d 840, 860-61 (D.Md. 2013):

Rule 23(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]n order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C). This Court has previously held that a federal district court possesses "broad discretion in determining whether to modify or even decertify a class." Wu v. MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 158, 162 (D.Md. 2008) ( citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) ("Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in light of subsequent developments in the litigation.")). In fact this Court has "an affirmative obligation to ensure that the class membership remains at all times consistent with the underlying facts and procedural posture of the case." Id. at 162-63 ( citing Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5thCir. 1983) ("Under Rule 23... the district judge must define, redefine, subclass, and decertify as appropriate in response to the progression of the case from assertion to facts.")); Chisolm v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 194 F.R.D. 538, 544 (E.D.Va. 2000) (same).

Accordingly, the proper inquiry is whether Plaintiffs' proposed class definition results in an ascertainable and administratively feasible class and meets Rule 23 requirements, not whether it precisely tracks the allegations and class definition in the amended complaint. See also In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Holding plaintiffs to the plain language of the class definition would be overly formalistic.... Second, holding plaintiffs to the plain language of their definition would ignore the ongoing refinement and give-and-take inherent in class action litigation, particularly in the formation of a workable class definition. District courts are permitted to limit or modify class definitions to provide the necessary precision."); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 937 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A court is not bound by the class definition proposed in the complaint and should not dismiss the action simply because the complaint seeks to define the class too broadly."); Harris v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 659 (N.D.Ill. 1989) ("[I]t is certainly within this court's discretion to limit or redefine the scope of the class"). Moreover, as Plaintiffs argue, the amended complaint sought class treatment for the ECOA claims as well as the various Maryland statutory claims and the "amended class definition tailors the criteria to the ECOA claim by shortening the class period, removing mention of foreclosure which does not relate to the Piotrowskis' ECOA claims, and including an additional criterion for those individuals who suffered only a violation of § 1691(d)(2)." (ECF No. 60, at 27).

b. Notice Requirements under the ECOA

Next, Defendant argues that the proposed class definition mischaracterizes the notice requirements under the ECOA:

Plaintiffs continuously mischaracterize ECOA, particularly in the Proposed Expanded Class Definition which includes individuals who "have submitted an application... and were not provided written notice within 30 days of submitting an application regarding the action taken on the application..."... As is evident from the plain language of Section 1691(d) of ECOA and its implementing regulations, however, notice of an incomplete submission can initially be provided orally. See, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.9(a)(1)(ii) and 202.9(c)... Otherwise, written notice is only required within 30 days of an "adverse action" taken on a complete application under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(d)(1) and (d)(2) of ECOA and 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1)(i) of its underlying regulations... and then, only if, a borrower is not then in default.

(ECF No. 55, at 17)(emphasis in original).

Sections 1691(d)(1) and (d)(2) and the implementing regulations impose separate obligations on creditors. Section 1691(d)(1) requires that "[w]ithin thirty days... after receipt of a completed application for credit, a creditor shall notify the applicant of its action taken on the application." (emphasis added). Under Section 1691(d)(1), creditors have an obligation to provide a timely response as to any action taken on an application, whatever that action may be. See, e.g., Offiah v. Bank of Am., N.A., Civ. Action No. DKC 13-2261, 2014 WL 4295020, at *7 (D.Md. Aug. 29, 2014). A creditor also has a duty to notify an applicant if an application is incomplete. See, e.g., Kaswell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. Action No. RDB-13-2315, 2014 WL 3889183, at *3 (D.Md. Aug. 6, 2014) ("Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's Complaint is lacking because it does not allege that Plaintiff submitted a completed application does not relieve Defendant of its duties under § 1691(d)(1)."). 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) provides, in relevant part:

(1) When notification is required. A creditor shall notify an applicant of action taken within:
(i) 30 days after receiving a completed application concerning the creditor's approval of, counteroffer to, or adverse action on the application;
(ii) 30 days after taking adverse action on an incomplete application, unless notice is provided in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

When an application is incomplete, paragraph (c) provides that:

(1) Notice alternatives. Within 30 days after receiving an application that is incomplete regarding matters that an applicant can complete, the creditor shall notify the applicant either:
(i) Of action taken, in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section [regarding notice of adverse action on an incomplete application]; or
(ii) Of the incompleteness, in accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section.

12 C.F.R. § 202.9(c)(1). Paragraph (c)(2) covers notice of incompleteness and provides:

If additional information is needed from an applicant, the creditor shall send a written notice to the applicant specifying the information needed, designating a reasonable period of time for the applicant to provide the information, and informing the applicant that failure to provide the information requested will result in no further consideration being given to the application. The creditor shall have no further obligation under this section if the applicant fails to respond within the designated time period. If the applicant supplies the requested information within the designated time period, the creditor shall take action on the application and notify the applicant in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.

12 C.F.R. § 202.9(c)(2) (emphases added). Although paragraph (c)(2) states that notice of the incompleteness needs to be in writing, Paragraph (c)(3) provides that "[a]t its option, a creditor may inform the applicant orally of the need for additional information. If the application remains incomplete the creditor shall send a notice in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this section." 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(c)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, the creditor has a duty to notify an applicant if the application is incomplete, but it can elect to do so orally and only if the application remains incomplete is the creditor required to send written notice of the incompleteness. To summarize, Regulation 202.9(c) provides that a creditor must do one of two things when confronted with an incomplete application: (1) the creditor can notify the applicant within thirty (30) days of receiving the application of its approval of, counteroffer to, or adverse action on the application in accordance with Section 202.9(a); or (2) the creditor can notify the applicant of the required information within thirty days of receiving the incomplete application in accordance with Section 202.9(c)(2), requiring written notice, or Section 202(c)(3), allowing creditor to inform the applicant orally. See Kirk v. Kelley Buick of Atlanta, Inc., 336 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1332 (N.D.Ga. 2004).

Section 1691(d)(2) of the ECOA, on the other hand, discusses the notification requirements concerning an adverse action taken after a creditor receives a completed application. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2) provides:

(2) Each applicant against whom adverse action is taken shall be entitled to a statement of reasons for such action from the creditor. A creditor satisfies this obligation by -
(A) providing statements of reasons in writing as a matter of course to applicants against whom adverse action is taken; or
(B) giving written notification of adverse action which discloses (i) the applicant's right to a statement of reasons within thirty days after receipt by the creditor of a request made within sixty days after such notification, and (ii) the identity of the person or office from which such statement may be obtained. Such statement may be given orally if the written notification advises the applicant of his right to have the statement of reasons confirmed in writing on written request.

(emphases added).

Subpart (v) of Plaintiffs' proposed class definition covering applicants who "were not provided with a written statement of reasons (or a disclosure that a borrower can request such a statement) regarding an adverse action taken on the application within 60 days of submitting the application" misstates the creditor's obligations pursuant to Section 1691(d)(2). An applicant against whom adverse action is taken is entitled to: (1) be given a statement of reasons in writing; or (2) be given written notification of the adverse action which discloses the applicant's right to a statement of reasons from the creditor within thirty days, provided the applicant requests the statement of reasons from the creditor within sixty days of receiving the written notification of the adverse action. Accordingly, the statement of reasons does not have to be in writing provided the applicant is advised in the written notification of an adverse action of his right to request a statement of reasons.[3] Moreover, Plaintiffs' wording of subpart (v) of their proposed class definition is imprecise and may suggest that it would cover only notification of adverse action taken on incomplete applications, due to the reference to "submission of an application" as opposed to submission of a "complete application."

c. Analysis of Ascertainability and Administrative Feasibility

With these principles in mind, the court turns to the ascertainability requirement. It is not clear at all from the proposed class definition whether Plaintiffs intend the definition to cover those individuals who submitted incomplete applications, but were not provided notice either of an adverse action taken on the incomplete application or regarding the incompleteness pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(c). For instance, Plaintiffs argue in their memorandum in support of class certification that a common question among the class is "[w]hether Wells Fargo violated 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) or (c) of Regulation B by failing to provide written notice to a borrower within 30 days of receiving an incomplete application." (ECF No. 51, at 10) (emphasis added). At least initially, however, creditors may provide notice of incompleteness and request additional information from the applicant orally. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(c)(3). Moreover, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that individuals who were provided notice orally that their application was incomplete could be ascertained. Plaintiffs also have provided no evidence that a class could be ascertained consisting of individuals who were not notified within thirty (30) days of an adverse action taken on an incomplete application or were notified in writing that their application was incomplete.

Subpart (iv) of the proposed class definition - covering individuals who were not provided written notice within 30 days of submitting an application regarding action taken on the application - also is lacking in precision and does not accurately capture the requirements of the ECOA. As set forth above, "Section 1691 provides two rights to applicants. First, it requires a creditor to notify the applicant of its action' on the application within 30 days of receiving a completed application. See 11 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1). Second, where the creditor takes an adverse action' with respect to an application, it is required to provide a statement of reasons for the denial. Id. at § 1691(d)(2)." MacDonald v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Case No. 14-cv-04970-HSG, 2015 WL 1886000, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015) (emphasis added). Receipt of a complete application by the creditor triggers the running of the thirty (30) day time-frame to provide notice of any action on the loan modification application.

Plaintiffs take the position that a class of individuals who were not provided notice of any action taken by the creditor after the applicant submitted a complete application in violation of Section 1691(d)(1) can be ascertained through a code - [REDACTED\] - in the Wells Fargo database. Plaintiffs believe that this code allows Wells Fargo to determine when an application is complete, which triggers the running of the thirty (30) day period for notifying an applicant of any action pursuant to Section 1691(d)(1). Citing to a regulation under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") pertaining to a "complete loss mitigation application, " Defendant erroneously argues that the ECOA does not define the term "completed application." 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f), an implementing regulation of the ECOA, defines a "completed application" as:

an application in connection with which a creditor has received all the information that the creditor regularly obtains and considers in evaluating applications for the amount and type of credit requested (including, but not limited to, credit reports, any additional information requested from the applicant, and any approvals or reports by governmental agencies or other persons that are necessary to guarantee, insure, or provide security for the credit or collateral). The creditor shall exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining such information.

(emphases added).

Kerri Crabtree, a Senior Vice President of Default Decisioning at Wells Fargo, provided the following deposition testimony explaining the process Wells Fargo uses to determine when an application is "complete":

Q: Well, for a loan modification, what you understand a loan modification to be, what triggers the 30 day period running from your understanding of bank policy, Wells Fargo policy?
A:... So the home preservation specialist, HPS collects all the docs. They believe that they have what constitutes a complete package to send on to the underwriter. The underwriter then goes through that package with a fine tooth comb and reviews it.
They at times believe, yes, we have a full package and they make the decision. They at times say no, we don't, and we need to ta[ke] that back to the home preservation specialist to go back to the customer for additional documentation. When that happens and they go back to the customer for additional documentation, that restarts the 30 day clock. It did then and it does now with the AG settlement.[4]
So that application is not deemed complete until the underwriter makes the decision, totally. Now, you can go back now with the AG settlement and say all the docs were in, the underwriter agrees with that. They make the decision and we do have a code now that pertains to we believe we have a complete ap[plication], but that's from the AG Settlement forward, but until that underwriter really reviews the package and deems they have everything that that investor group ...

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