United States District Court, D. Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Roger W. Titus United States District Judge
This matter arises out of a firearm and drug possession case, in which Petitioner Ryan Ramey ultimately pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. On February 2, 2011, Ramey moved this Court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 67. This Court denied his petition on August 29, 2012, ECF No 95, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied him a certificate of appealability and dismissed his appeal on May 28, 2013, ECF No. 102. The mandate took effect on August 29, 2013. ECF No. 108. Now pending before the Court is Ramey’s petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate this Court’s August 29, 2012 order denying his § 2255 petition.
On March 30, 2009, a grand jury charged Ramey in a four-count Indictment alleging that Ramey-having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year-knowingly possessed two firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), one firearm with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), and 62 grams cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). ECF No. 9. On November 4, 2009, Ramey pleaded guilty before this Court to two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government. ECF No. 77. On February 2, 2010, this Court sentenced Ramey to 120 months imprisonment as to each count, with each sentence to run concurrently. ECF No. 45. Judgment was entered on February 3, 2010. ECF No. 46. No appeal was filed.
The filing history subsequent to Ramey’s sentencing, which began approximately one year later, is haphazard and disorganized, with certain motions being filed improperly and others prematurely. Ramey’s numerous filings include motions for return of property, for copy work, for a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, for discovery and disclosure of documents, to review of grand jury and sentencing transcripts, for equitable tolling, to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(e), to seal his Rule 59(e) motion, to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to strike the Government’s response in opposition to his § 2255 petition, and for an emergency subpoena. ECF Nos. 55, 60–65, 67–68, 79, 83–84, 90, 92. The Government responded to most of these motions separately, ECF Nos. 72, 81, and the Court entered orders denying all the motions, with the exception of an order directing the Government to return some of Ramey’s property, on July 27 and August 29, 2012, ECF Nos. 78, 85, 95.
Ramey appealed three of this Court’s decisions to the Fourth Circuit. On August 9, 2012, Ramey appealed this Court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion and his motion to strike the Government’s response in opposition to his § 2255 petition to the Fourth Circuit, ECF No. 86, which it dismissed for failure to prosecute on November 19, 2012, ECF No. 96. The mandate took effect that same day. ECF No. 97. On December 28, 2012, Ramey appealed this Court’s denial of his motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to the Fourth Circuit, ECF No. 99, which it dismissed on May 28, 2013, ECF No. 102. The mandate took effect on August 29, 2013. ECF No. 108.
On November 21, 2013, Ramey filed the present motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate this Court’s August 29, 2012 order denying his § 2255 petition. ECF No. 113. The Government filed a response in opposition on April 11, 2014, ECF No. 117, and Ramey replied in support on April 24, 2014, ECF No. 118.
Ramey moves for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate this Court’s August 29, 2012 order denying his § 2255 petition. ECF No. 113, at 8. In the Rule 60(b) Motion, Ramey alleges (1) that he was denied a fair opportunity to research and prepare his § 2255 petition; (2) that he was denied exculpatory evidence during the § 2255 process; and (3) that this Court failed to address certain allegations of ineffective assistance enumerated in his § 2255 petition. ECF No. 113, at 8–9. The Court finds that the self-styled Rule 60(b) Motion fails for its untimeliness and evident lack of merit, and, to the extent it might be considered a second or successive § 2255 petition, is dismissed absent authorization from the Fourth Circuit.
In United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 206–07 (4th Cir. 2003), the Fourth Circuit distinguished between a Rule 60(b) motion and a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. The Fourth Circuit explained that “a motion directly attacking the prisoner's conviction or sentence will usually amount to a successive application, while a motion seeking a remedy for some defect in the collateral review process will generally be deemed a proper motion to reconsider.” Id. at 207. Because Ramey’s motion is focused on alleged defects in the collateral review process, the Court concludes that it is properly considered under Rule 60(b). See Handy v. United States, No. 04-CR-559-AW, 2013 WL 6388602, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 5, 2013).
Relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is a matter committed to the discretion of the district court. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573, 576 (4th Cir. 1973). In order to prevail under Rule 60(b), a petitioner must first meet certain “threshold conditions.” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Gray, 1 F.3d 262, 264–65 (4th Cir. 1993). It must be shown that the motion is timely, there is a meritorious defense, and the opposing party would not suffer unfair prejudice by having the judgment set aside. Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993). If threshold conditions are met, the analysis proceeds to a second stage of inquiry wherein the petitioner must then satisfy one of the six enumerated grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). See Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 1984). Those enumerated grounds are the following:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move ...