United States District Court, D. Maryland
March 31, 2015
TRAVIS MARCINE FULLARD a/k/a James Anthony Jackson a/k/a Saeed Kwanzaa Plaintiff,
STATE OF MARYLAND ANGELA D. ALSOBROOKS ALANA GAYLEE MELANIE SHAW-GETER CLERK #344 BOBBY SHEARIN Defendants.
PAUL W. GRIMM, District Judge.
On October 28, 2014, the court received for filing the above-captioned fee-paid, 64-page civil rights complaint filed by Travis Marcine Fullard, a prisoner housed in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") system at the Mark W. Stiles Unit in Beaumont, Texas. The self-represented claims are filed against the State of Maryland, two state prosecutors, a state circuit court judge, a state court clerk, and a former Maryland state prison warden. The complaint was accompanied by 190 pages of documents comprised of a verified complaint, an index of documents, affidavit and declarations, and an extensive number of exhibits. ECF No. 1. Fullard also filed a motion for official service of process. ECF No. 2.
Fullard claims that he and "James Anthony Jackson" are two separate and distinct persons and that Jackson "is an artificial person" and a registered trade name of plaintiff Fullard that operates as the "conveyance utility" of Fullard in admiralty. Fullard further states that he is a natural person born in the Republic of Florida and is of Moorish-American descent. He objects to the Court's "presumption that he is a U.S. Person, U.S. Resident, State Resident, State Ward, Public Individual, Elective Franchise or any other type of agent or instrumentality of the United States." He seemingly attacks a 1987 charging document issued in Prince George's County, Maryland, raising an elaborate argument that he entered into a "simple contract" in admiralty with the State of Maryland and received a charging document that was defective because it was not based on substance or consideration. Compl. 7-9. Fullard discusses negotiable escrow securities, "exchanges of consideration, " warranties, a void judgment, warehouse receipts, a notice of default, and his unauthorized "naturalization" by a state court judge. He accuses the defendants of a breach of contract and trust and civil rights violations. Id. at 10 & 46-48.
Fullard additionally alleges that in September of 2013, during his confinement in Maryland, his legal property was confiscated and was not returned to him for two days. He claims that in October of 2013, his personal property was confiscated to prevent him from "enforcing his private administrative remedy" in the state courts. Compl. 20-21 & 32-34. Fullard claims that his requests to forward the personal property to the TDCJ have not been responded to by Maryland prison personnel. Id. at 33-35.
Next, Fullard discusses his recent efforts to void the criminal judgment in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, stating that defendants had a duty to respond to his demand of proof of claim. He references an alleged administrative remedy settlement agreement between himself and the State of Maryland involving his "void judgment." Fullard further claims that his transfer to Texas under the Interstate Corrections Compact ("ICC") was a "malicious attempt" to prevent him from litigating his administrative remedy claim against the State of Maryland, in that it prevented him from being released on his void judgment. He complains that the clerk and judge have denied him docket entries in his state court case and a hearing on his "motion to vacate void judgment" in violation of the "Public Vessels Act." He contends that defendants have incurred liability by default and that he has a "commercial claim in admiralty against the defendants." Id. at 14-20, 22-31, & 35-45. Fullard seeks damages and injunctive relief. !d. at 55-56.
On November 24, 2014, Fullard filed a supplemental complaint to include additional "evidentiary file exhibits" to his complaint. ECF NO.3. On December 9, 2014, Fullard filed an amended complaint which seemingly seeks to invoke this Court's 28 U.S.C. S 1332 diversity of citizenship jurisdiction as a means of inculpating the State of Maryland and the state prosecutors in light of the "constructive trust" formed upon the delivery and indorsement of the 1987 charging document and his filing of an "administrative remedy agreement." ECF NO.6. Although he styled the document as an amended complaint, he states that it provides "amendments/supplements to the original pleading." Id. In addition, on February 2, 2015, Fullard filed a motion for injunctive relief, seeking release of his "commercial" property (himself) or a show cause order as to why defendants should be allowed to continue to withhold the "commercial" property. ECF No. 9. Finally, on February 20, 2015, Fullard filed a motion for extension of time to effect service of process on defendants. ECF No. 10.
Although a complaint need not contain detailed allegations, the facts alleged must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and require "more than labels and conclusions, " as "courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 569. Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 547.
The Court has thoroughly examined the complaint and finds it is insufficient and does not comply with federal pleading requirements. Instead of a concise statement of facts as to the underlying cause of action, the complaint is a rambling discourse regarding Fullard's 1988 conviction,  the failure of authorities to forward his personal property with him to Texas,  and the failure of the circuit court to provide him a partial docket sheet in his 1987 criminal case and to afford him a hearing on his "motion to void" his judgment,  with no discernible factual allegations from which a cause of action might be gleaned. The statements made in the complaint are nonsensical, referencing various contracts, negotiable instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). The language used in Fullard's complaint is consistent with the "flesh and blood" defense frequently raised in this court in criminal prosecutions and soundly rejected. jurisdictional claims, whether couched in "flesh and blood" language, admiralty law, and/or the Uniform Commercial Code, do not raise claims involving violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States as required.
Because Fullard is not proceeding in forma pauperis, no statutory screening is authorized under the in forma pauperis statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Nevertheless, a district court has inherent authority to dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (courts have authority to dismiss a frivolous or malicious lawsuit even in absence of a specific statutory provision); Ross v. Baron, 493 F.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (noting that "frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid"); Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that district courts may dismiss frivolous complaints sua sponte, even when plaintiff has paid the filing fee, noting that "district courts are in particular likely to be exposed to frivolous actions, and thus have an even greater need for inherent authority to dismiss such actions quickly in order to preserve scarce judicial resources").
The Court here is faced with Fullard's attack on his 1988 convictions and his allegations against state court personnel and a prison administrator, none of which sets out a colorable claim. The complaint shall be summarily dismissed. Fullard's motion for injunctive relief shall be denied and his motions for official service and extension time shall be dismissed as moot. A separate Order follows reflecting the opinion entered by this Court.