United States District Court, D. Maryland, Northern Division
DAWUD J. BEST, Plaintiff,
SAMUEL I. WHITE, P.C., et al., Defendants.
WILLIAM D. QUARLES, Jr., District Judge.
Dawud J. Best, pro se, sued Samuel I. White, P.C. ("SIWPC") and Capital One, N.A. ("Capital One") (together, the "Defendants"), for violating the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ("MCDCA"). ECF No. 1. Pending is Best's motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 14. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.
On October 31, 2007, Best obtained a mortgage loan from Chevy Chase Bank, FSB ("Chevy Chase") and executed a promissory note (the "Note") for Chevy Chase's benefit. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. Capital One subsequently acquired Chevy Chase. Id. ¶ 7. Beginning in April 2010, Best sent letters to Capital One requesting that it send him a certified copy of the Note and allow him to inspect the original Note. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Best allegedly sought to establish that Capital One was the holder or owner of the Note. Id. ¶ 8. Capital One responded to the letters by sending Best a non-certified copy of the Note; it ignored his request to inspect the original Note. Id. ¶ 10. Best then "ceased sending mortgage payments to Capital One." Id. ¶ 11.
On September 12, 2011, Capital One sent Best a "Notice of Intent to Foreclose" which stated that Best had to "pay $63, 853.93 within 45 days or a foreclosure action may be filed." Id. ¶ 15. On September 24, 2012, Capital One appointed SIWPC attorneys as substitute trustees. Id. ¶ 19. On October 23, 2012, SIWPC "filed a foreclosure Order to Docket in the Prince George's County land records against the property." Id. ¶ 20.
On January 7, 2013, Best again wrote to Capital One requesting a certified copy of the Note and an opportunity to inspect the original. Id. ¶ 21. He also said that he had entered a contract to sell the property and wanted to determine if Capital One was "the proper party to pay and could return the original Note upon satisfaction of the debt." Id. ¶ 21. On January 14, 2013, Capital One sent Best another non-certified copy of the Note and told him that the original Note was in a "secure location and would be mailed to [Best] when the account was paid in full." Id. ¶ 22. On February 3, 2013, Best wrote to Capital One to repeat his earlier requests and to state that Capital One's "possession of the Note pertains to its ability to service the Note." Id. ¶ 23. Capital One did not respond. Id. ¶ 24.
On August 12, 2013, Best filed suit alleging violations of the MCDCA (Count One) and RESPA (Count Two). ECF No. 1. Relevant here, Count Two asserted that Best's letters were "qualified written requests" ("QWRs") under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). Id. ¶ 32. Best contended that the defendants violated § 2605(e) of RESPA because - after receiving the QWRs - they: (1) "fail[ed] to make appropriate corrections" to his account; (2) "fail[ed] to take appropriate action within 30 days;" (3) "fail[ed] to conduct a reasonable investigation;" and (4) "provid[ed] information to" credit reporting agencies "regarding delinquent payments owed by Plaintiff." See id. ¶¶ 33-36.
On June 6, 2014, the Court dismissed Count Two with prejudice. ECF Nos. 12, 13. The Court concluded that Best's RESPA claim failed because his letters were not QWRs. ECF No. 12 at 9. Section 2605(e) of RESPA requires a loan servicer to provide a written response acknowledging receipt within five days if the servicer receives a QWR from the borrower "for information relating to the servicing" of a loan. § 2605 (e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Best had alleged that his letters requested a certified copy of the Note so he could determine whether Capital One "was entitled to collect his payment" and could return the Note at the end of the loan, see ECF Nos. 10 at 3-4; 12 at 8. Because communications that seek to obtain proof of the servicer's authority to service the loan are not QWRs under RESPA, the Court concluded that Best's letters were not valid QWRs. ECF No. 12 at 8-9.
On July 7, 2014, Best moved for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of Count Two. ECF No. 14. On July 23, 2014, the Defendants opposed the motion. ECF No. 15.
A. Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for reconsideration. Auto Services Co. v. KPMG, LLP, 537 F.3d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 2008). A party may move to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), or for relief from a judgment or order under Rule 60. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), 60. A "judgment" is "a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." Auto Servs. Co., 537 F.3d at 856 ( quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A motion to alter or amend filed within 28 days of the judgment is analyzed under Rule 59(e); if the motion is filed later, Rule 60(b) controls. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 280 (4th Cir. 2008); In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 2-3 (4th Cir. 1992). Because this Court's June 6, 2014 Order was a judgment, and Best filed his motion for reconsideration more than 28 days after the Order was issued, Rule 60 governs.
Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief from a final judgment or order by showing "timeliness, a meritorious defense, a lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and exceptional circumstances." Hale v. Belton Associates, Inc., 305 F.Appx. 987, 988 (4th Cir. 2009) ( quoting Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993)). After crossing this "initial threshold, " the movant must also show at least one ground for relief listed in Rule 60(b)'s six subsections: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) a void judgment; (5) satisfaction, release, or discharge; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Dowell, 993 F.2d at 48; Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). However, when a Rule 60(b) "motion does not raise new arguments, but merely urges the ...