United States District Court, D. Maryland
WILLIAM D. QUARLES, Jr., District Judge.
On February 18, 2014, Lawrence Mosley, a state prisoner confined at North Branch Correctional Institution ("NBCI"), initiated a civil rights action against prison psychology staff, complaining of inadequate mental health treatment and seeking injunctive relief requiring staff to provide him the "right treatment." Mosley indicated he was angry and possibly homicidal, and stated he wanted a transfer to another prison. That action, Mosley v. Psychology Department, Civil Action No. WDQ-14-480 (D. Md.) required response from the Maryland Attorney General. ECF 2 and 4. On April 30, 2014, the undersigned examined records detailing the mental health care Mosley had been provided, denied injunctive relief, and closed the case. Id. ECF 8 and 9.
While Civil Action No. WDQ-14-480 (" Mosley I ") was pending, Mosley filed the instant action, seeking mental health treatment and indicating he is depressed, suffers extreme mood swings, and is "losing control" to "the point of hurting someone." (" Mosley II "). ECF 1. Again, counsel has provided a court-ordered response that has been construed as a dispositive motion. Mosley was permitted an opportunity to respond,  but has failed to do so. No hearing is needed to resolve the issue raised in this case. See Local Rule 105.6. (D. Md. 2014).
The facts at issue here were fully detailed in Mosley I.  On December 17, 2013, Mosley reported that his girlfriend had been killed and requested to speak with psychology staff. ECF 4-1, Declaration of Laura M. Booth, Licensed Professional Clinical Counselor, at ¶ 4; ECF 4-2, Declaration of Randy Durst, Case Management Manager, with attachment, p. 17. His self-referral was forwarded to social work for follow-up according to standard procedure. Id.
On January 8, 2014, Mosley wrote to Amanda L. Tart, LCPC, advising her that he did not want to receive any correspondence from her. ECF 4-1, at ¶ 4; ECF 4-2, p. 16. He further stated, "So Ms. Tart, you can go play kid games with someone else! Thank you for you time and have a nice day." Id. Tart made note in his file that "no further follow-up [be] scheduled at this time." Id.
At the request of the Warden, on February 21, 2014, Mosley was evaluated by Laura M. Booth, a licensed professional clinical counselor. ECF 4-1, at ¶ 6; ECF 4-2, pp. 8-9. During the evaluation, Mosley denied feeling homicidal or suicidal. Id. When Booth confronted him with a letter to the court, dated February 10, 2014, Mosley stated that he did not want to be placed on suicide precautions. Id. In her evaluation note, Booth wrote that Mosley had a bitter attitude towards treatment staff and focused more of his frustration on his housing assignment than the death of his girlfriend, Latavia Womack. Id. at ¶ 6; ECF 4-2, p. 8. She concluded that he had no homicidal or suicidal ideation. Id. At the conclusion of the session, Mosley was informed that: (1) social work would be consulted to provide a call home about the death of his girlfriend if an obituary could be found and (2) his classification would be reviewed for appropriate housing. Id. Upon checking death notices, no obituary for Ms. Womack could be located; therefore, Mosley was not permitted to call home. ECF 4-1, at ¶ 6.
On March 11, 2014, Deirdre Mull, CRNP, saw Mosley for medication management. Id. at ¶ 8; ECF 4-2, pp. 2-7. In the mental status section of the report, she noted that Mosley did not express suicidal or homicidal ideation and was not exhibiting signs, psychosis, or mania. Id. ; ECF 4-2, p. 5. She also reported that Mosley complained that he was feeling very irritable and frustrated, was unhappy because he is innocent and should not be in prison, and was sleeping poorly. Id. Mull's assessment concluded that she "suspected that much of pt's mood' issues may be due to Axis II traits rather than anxiety or depression, however, medication may help with his irritability and behavior. Discussed med options, will begin[sic] lithium 300 mg for irritability/mood lability; r/b/se discussed with pt and he gave informed consent." Id.
Booth avers that a review of his mental health record reflects that mental health providers are regularly monitoring him. ECF 4-1, at ¶ 9. Mosley has not filed any administrative remedy procedure ("ARP") requests concerning his mental health care at NBCI. ECF 4-3, Lawrence Mosley, #307-049, ARP Index.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is plainly entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) the Supreme Court explained that in considering a motion for summary judgment, the "judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. Thus, "the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. No genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her case as to which he or she would have the burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with an affidavit or other similar evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom "in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also E.E.O.C. v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir. 2005). The mere existence of a "scintilla" of evidence in support of the non-moving party's case is not sufficient to preclude an order granting summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
A "party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences." Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D. Md. 2001) (citation omitted). Indeed, the court has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 ...