United States District Court, D. Maryland
ERIC S. TAYLOR, Petitioner,
WARDEN JOHN WOLFE, et al., Respondents.
CATHERINE BLAKE, District Judge.
The above-captioned petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on February 18, 2014. Respondents were directed to file a limited response addressing only the timeliness of the petition and have done so. ECF 4. Petitioner filed a reply addressing respondents' assertion that the petition should be dismissed as time-barred. ECF 7. No hearing is necessary for the disposition of this case. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014); see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a petitioner is not necessarily entitled to a hearing under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2)). For the reasons that follow, the petition will be dismissed and a certificate of appealability shall not issue.
The petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, concerns petitioner's March 6, 1991 conviction for attempted first degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and a related weapons offense following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. ECF 4 at Ex. 1 and 4. On April 17, 1991, petitioner was granted a new trial on the attempted murder charge and, in lieu of re-trying petitioner, the State "nol prossed" the charge. For the remaining attempted armed robbery and weapons offense, petitioner was sentenced to serve 40 years in prison. Id. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal in an opinion dated April 21, 1992, issued by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. ECF 4 at Ex. 2. Petitioner sought no further review of the judgment.
On February 7, 1994, petitioner initiated post-conviction proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. ECF 4 at Ex. 4, p. 2. After a hearing on July 20, 1994, post-conviction relief was denied in a decision dated August 12, 1994. Petitioner's application for leave to appeal the denial of post-conviction relief was denied by the Court of Special Appeals on December 1, 1994. For purposes of federal habeas relief, the one-year statute of limitations expired (unless tolled) on April 24, 1997, one year after the effective date of AEDPA.
On December 7, 2008, petitioner filed a motion to re-open post-conviction proceedings which was denied on February 5, 2009. Id. at Ex. 4. His application for leave to appeal was denied by the Court of Special Appeals on May 4, 2010; the mandate issued on June 3, 2010. Id. at Ex. 5. Petitioner filed three motions to correct illegal sentence in 2009 and 2010. Id. at Ex. 6. The motions were denied and the decision denying the motion filed on September 23, 2010, was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals on May 28, 2013. Id.
In the instant petition, the claims asserted are as follows: (1) petitioner's sentence was enhanced as a mandatory consecutive sentence as a second or subsequent offense when there was no first offense; (2) the State did not comply with Maryland law making the mandatory sentence improper; (3) the State relied on charges at sentencing for which petitioner was never found guilty in order to support imposition of a mandatory sentence; and (4) the sentence imposed was imposed pursuant to a statute under which petitioner was never charged. ECF 1 at p. 6.
Statute of Limitation
As set forth above, the filing deadline for petitioner's federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was April 24, 1997. Specifically under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d):
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through ...