United States District Court, D. Maryland
RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.
Pending is self-represented Plaintiff James Calhoun-El's ("Calhoun-El") Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Defendants, Bobby Shearin, David Wade, Keith Arnold, and Joshua Pritts,  by their counsel, have filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) with verified exhibits in reply to which Calhoun-El has filed an opposition with his declaration. (ECF No. 28). No hearing is needed to resolve the issues presented. See Local Rule 106.5 (D. Md. 2011). Defendants' pleading (ECF No. 22) will be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTED for reasons to follow.
A. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
Calhoun-El claims that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he was an inmate at North Branch Correctional Institution ("NBCI"). He alleges that on January 31 and February 3, 2012, Officer Fritts "used the cell door to slam Plaintiff between cell door [sic], causing a gash in Plaintiffs back shoulder area." (Complaint, ECF No. I at 8). He also asserts, apparently as background information, that he was slammed by a cell door by unnamed corrections personnel on or about September 2009. Additionally, Calhoun-El claims his due process rights were violated because Defendants deprived him of the opportunity to "grieve" his conditions of confinement. Id. He is requesting unspecified declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
B. DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS
Defendants' verified exhibits and declarations are undisputed and summarized as follows. On August 9, 2009, Calhoun-El filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure ("ARP") request claiming that, two days prior, he was slammed into a wall by a sliding sally port cell door while leaving the multi-purpose building at NBCI. (Def. Exhibit 1, Decl. of Randy Durst at 7). Calhoun-El alleged the unnamed operator of the door had used it as a weapon. Id. at 8.
Lt. Manuel was assigned to investigate the ARP. Id. at 9. The investigation included interviews with Calhoun-El, correctional officers, and medical staff Id. at pp. 9-10. Calhoun-El, who was interviewed twice, claimed during his first interview that he had placed a sick call request and told the medical providers that the sliding cell door injured his hand. Id. Manuel thereafter spoke with medical staff and reviewed Calhoun-El's medical records. Id. Manuel determined that Calhoun-El had provided false information during their first interview and had not been seen by medical staff for injury from a sliding cell door. Id. Further, the correctional officers that were responsible for the operation of the cell door at issue both. stated that they had no knowledge of Calhoun-El being hit by a cell door. Id. During his second interview, Cahoun-El claimed that he told medical staff that the cell door injured this back, and not his hand. Id.
On October 16, 2009, Manuel recommended dismissal of the ARP because Calhoun-El had provided false information and there was no evidence that he had been hit by a cell door. Id. The Warden accepted the recommendation and dismissed the ARP. Id. at 7.
On October 21, 2009, Calhoun-El filed a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office ("IGO") appealing the dismissal of his August 9, 2609 ARP. Id. at 11. On March 3, 2010, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("All"). Id. 15-19. On April 28, 2010 the ALJ dismissed the grievance because "as a matter of law, [Calhoun-El] has failed to prove that he suffered a compensable injury as a result of [...] negligence or other improper act..." Id. at 18.
On January 31, 2012, Calhoun-El submitted a sick call request form complaining of "neck, shoulder, and back injuries after being slammed between [a] cell door." Id. at 16. He told medical providers on February 3, 2012, that he had "a large scar on [his] back from when [he] got slammed in the cell door." Id. at 17. Examination revealed a "small scratch/abrasion" on Calhoun-El's left shoulder that "appearecl[ed] to be well healing." Id. The abrasion was diagnosed as "superficial" and Calhoun-El was instructed to submit another sick call slip if his condition did not improve. Id. The attending nurse noted on the medical record that the abrasion appeared "self-inflicted." Id. Calhoun was questioned about the incident and "could not remember when [the] alleged injury occurred." Id. The medical chart notes "Inmate was seen on 1/27; twic [sic] pm 1/26/1/20 by RN and 1/20 for chronic care clinic by MD with no mention of alleged incident." Calhoun-El submitted no additional sick calls requests concerning the abrasion. He has not filed any request for administrative review of his claims that Pritts injured him with the cell door on January 31 or February 3, 2013. (Declaration of Jared Zais, Exhibit 3, with attachments, at ¶ 5; see also, Declaration of Scott Oakley, Exhibit 4: ¶ 3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motions and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quotations omitted). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue over a material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge's function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual dispute to warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. See id. at 249.
In undertaking this inquiry, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). This Court also has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.1993). When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the nonmoving party must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment must be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. A "party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of inferences." Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D. Md. 2001) (citations omitted). Mindful that Calhoun-El is proceeding pro se, this Court must ...