RANDY T. DAVIS, SR., #366577, Plaintiff,
WAYNE A. WEBB, et al., Defendants.
ROGER W. TITUS, District Judge.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights Complaint was received for filing on November 21, 2012. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff, Randy T. Davis, Sr., then confined at the Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown ("MCIH"), was injured on July 11, 2012, while performing a work assignment due to an unsafe condition "known by department supervisor Hull." ( Id. ). He claims that his job was terminated on July 19, 2012, in violation of a prison directive. ( Id. ). Plaintiff contends that he received inadequate medical treatment because he was never seen by a physician, but was examined by a nurse and given an x-ray and pain medication several weeks after the accident. He claims that the x-ray noted injuries to his back and hip. Plaintiff alleges that despite his attempts to resolve his medical problem, he remains in pain. He seeks lost wages and compensation for pain. ( Id. )
II. PENDING DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
Warden Webb's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment remains pending. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff has filed his Opposition. (ECF No. 14). The case may be determined without oral argument. See Local Rule 105.6. (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Webb's dispositive Motion will be granted.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Motion to Dismiss
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff=s obligation to prove the grounds' of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). "[S]omething beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim' be allowed to take up the time of a number of other people....'" Id. at 1966 (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true, " and "construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). However, "because the court is testing the legal sufficiency of the claims, the court is not bound by plaintiff's legal conclusions." IFAST, Ltd. v. Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, Inc., No. CCB-06-2088, 2007 WL 3224582, at *3 (D. Md. 2007).
2. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(a), which provides, in part:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). In resolving the motion, the Court should "view the evidence in the light most favorable to... the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). However, "[t]he party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings, ' but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Moreover, the Court must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually ...