ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, Jr., District Judge.
Before the Court is Petitioner/Defendant Nathaniel Lee Smith ("Petitioner")'s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will, by separate order, DENY Petitioner's Motion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 17, 2010, Petitioner was arrested in Montgomery County, Maryland for theft, assault, robbery, kidnapping, and burglary. Over time, all charges were dropped except for theft, which resulted in a federal charge of possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. Additionally, on February 26, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced on state drug charges in Prince George's County, Maryland for a term of five years' imprisonment with two years suspended.
After a series of transfers between Prince George's County, Montgomery County, and Maryland state prison, on May 18, 2010, Petitioner was transferred into federal custody. On March 21, 2011, before this Court, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Petitioner was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment for the felony firearm possession to run consecutively with 11 months for violating federal supervised release (AW 04-0388), for a total sentence of 89 months. During sentencing, this Court credited Petitioner time served dating as far back as February 17, 2010. On September 11, 2011, Petitioner was transferred into state custody, where he served the conclusion of his state sentence and, on February 9, 2013, Petitioner returned to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, where he remains. On April 2, 2013, the Court entered an Amended Judgment clarifying the credit Petitioner received for time served since February 17, 2010. Doc. No. 45.
The pending Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was filed on April 4, 2013. Doc. No. 47. Petitioner requests that the Court consider his pro se motion liberally and appoint counsel in its discretion. Id. at 1. Next, Petitioner requests that this Court use the Supreme Court's ruling in Setser v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 1463 (2012), to vacate his conviction and sentence in order to resentence him according to "how the honorable judge intended his sentence to be executed." Doc. No. 47 at 5. Accordingly, Petitioner asks the Court to interpret Setser, which addressed who had the authority to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences prior to anticipated but undecided state sentences, as recognizing a new right that should be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. Petitioner argues that the holding in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which establishes a standard for retroactivity of criminal procedural rules, is inapplicable here because Setser announced new substantive rules, which generally apply retroactively. Doc. No. 47 at 2-3. The Government filed a Response in opposition to Petitioner's Motion on June 17, 2013. Doc. No. 59. Petitioner subsequently requested an extension of time to file a reply brief, and the Court granted Petitioner until August 19, 2013 to file a reply. Doc. No. 62. Despite being granted that extension, Petitioner never filed a reply brief. Accordingly, the petition is ripe for the Court's consideration.
A. Timeliness of Petitioner's Motion
Petitioner contends that his § 2255 petition was timely because he filed within one year from the "date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court's ruling in Setser, which was decided on March 28, 2012, established a new right within the guidelines of § 2255(f)(3). Doc. No. 47 at 2. Although the motion was filed after the one-year period expired on March 28, 2013, Petitioner asserts, and the Government does not contest, that he submitted the motion via his prison's internal mailing system on March 25, 2013. Doc. No. 59 at 2. Therefore, under the "Inmate Filing" procedures stated in Rule 3(d) of the Federal Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 Cases, and per the "prison mailbox rule, " announced in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1998), the motion is timely. Therefore, this Court will look to the merits of his argument.
B. Consideration of Petitioner's Motion and Appointment of Counsel
The Court considers this matter with the liberal construction afforded to pro se petitioners seeking relief since "[d]ocuments filed pro se are... held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Saracay-Orellana v. United States, Crim. No. RDB-10-0590, 2013 WL 2490235, at *3 (D. Md. June 7, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, because the power to appoint counsel is discretionary and this cause of action is neither overly complex nor one where Petitioner cannot adequately represent himself, the Court finds no exceptional circumstances requiring the appointment of counsel. Cf. Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 799, 780 (4th Cir. 1975).
C. Petitioner's claim is dissimilar from the facts and holding of Setser
In Setser, the Supreme Court considered the matter of Monroe Setser, a defendant who pleaded guilty in federal district court and was sentenced prior to an anticipated but undecided state sentence. 132 S.Ct. at 1466. The federal sentence mandated that Setser serve 151 months' imprisonment, to run consecutively to the expected state probation violation sentence and concurrently to the anticipated state methamphetamine possession sentence. However, controversy arose because the state's subsequently imposed sentence, directing both state counts to run concurrently, made the federal sentencing orders impossible to enforce. Consequently, Defendant Setser questioned whether the district judge or Bureau of Prisons should decide if the sentence runs concurrently or consecutively. Choosing the former, the Supreme Court deemed the subsequently applied state sentences irrelevant and looked only at the federal sentence imposed. The Court explained that "the reasonableness standard we apply in reviewing federal sentences asks whether the district court abused its discretion." Setser, 132 S.Ct. at 1472 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)). The Court found that the sentence imposed was reasonable and the district court was correctly within its discretion to impose a sentence to run both concurrently and consecutively with the anticipated state sentences. Id. at 1472-73.
Here, Petitioner's motion is without merit because the facts leading to the controversy in Setser are inconsistent with Petitioner's stated account of events in the present case. Notably, this Court sentenced Petitioner after the state court imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment with two years suspended. See Doc. No. 41. Therefore, the confusion in Setser about the implementation of the federal sentence as a result of the subsequently applied state sentence is absent here. The sentence imposed by this Court was appropriate in light of the federal sentencing guidelines, consistent with the presentence report ...