The opinion of the court was delivered by: George L. Russell, III United States District Judge
Pending are Defendant ConMed's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) and Defendant DeHaven's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17). An Answer was filed on behalf of Defendants Finn, Saikali, and Smith. ECF No. 14. Despite being advised that failure to oppose Defendants' dispositive motions may result in dismissal of the claims raised against them, Plaintiff has failed to oppose either motion. ECF Nos. 16 and 18. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted without a hearing, this Court having determined that a hearing in this matter is unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
Plaintiff John Robert Schultz ("Schultz") alleges when he arrived at the Harford County Detention Center on January 21, 2009, he made correctional and medical staff aware of the fact he has diabetes. ECF No. 1 at p. 3. He claims that despite informing staff about his condition, medical staff never checked his hemoglobin and never raised his Insulin during his 29-month stay at the Detention Center. Id. He claims these steps should have been taken in an effort to control his blood sugar level which was above 200 every day. He states he was kept at 17 units of Lantis during his entire stay. As a result of what Schultz refers to as "long term exposure to uncontrolled diabetes," he developed severe neuropathy in his feet and became incontinent. Id. Schultz seeks monetary damages for injury which he describes as permanent and irreversible. Id.
In reviewing a complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005);Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see alsoSwierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the "simplified pleading standard" of Rule 8(a)).
The Supreme Court of the United States explained a "plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need "detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id.at 563. Thus, a complaint need only state "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 566.
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should "view the evidence in the light most favorable to. . .the non-movant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility." Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court must, however, also abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding ...